The Proprium of Property Law

Classical property law is not only losing economic relevance with the progressing dephysicalization of economic processes but is also increasingly perceived as a static field of private law, pursued by specialized lawyers working with rather inaccessible national concepts and dogmas that seem to have no significant relevance for the development of a digital economy. The mostly codification-driven comparative research on property law continues in the tradition of national property law codifications primarily addressing tangible objects. The research on property law should not restrict itself to this rather pragmatic approach, because in the end this arbitrarily delimits the concept of property law and reinforces the impression of classical property law only dealing with tangibles. Comparative property law should look beyond issues of codification and address the question of what is the essence of property law. Property law deals with the erga omnes effects of rights. It therefore not only addresses full-fledged property rights over movables or immovables but also covers partially absolute rights over these assets on the threshold to contract law. Property law also addresses absolute rights with regard to intangibles. This awareness should on one hand demand from any discussion on creating new (partially) absolute property rights to take notice of the state of the art of current (comparative) property law. It should on the other hand incite classical property lawyers to take part in these debates and to question the traditional concepts and principles in light of the new developments. Classical institutions of property law should be reconsidered from this point of view.

Non-fungible tokens (NFT) and intellectual property: The triumph of the proprietary approach?

Technical methods of intellectual property protection are reviewed and combined in the essay in the discourse of historical development — from man-made signatures of Renaissance artists to non-fungible tokens (NFT). The proliferation of NFTs is analyzed from the point of view of the commercial law: NFTs are discussed as objects that simultaneously have the characteristics of independence and a derivative nature in relation to intellectual property being the underlying digital asset. The self-sufficiency of NFTs as legal objects is provided by their commodity properties, which arise not only from the value of the underlying asset, but from the phenomenon of crystallization of the unique fixed version of the asset in a non-interchangeable and irreproducible token. The derivative nature of NFTs, figuratively correlated with the derivative contracts in financial markets, is manifested in the symbolization of intellectual property as an underlying asset and the loss (in full or in part) of its usual significance for a potential acquirer when placed in an NFT-image. Despite the variety and a specific evolution of legal approaches to the understanding of intellectual property, we can state a long-standing conceptual rejection by legal scholars from the simplest proprietary theories of transferring real rights constructions to intellectual property. However, some absolute property features of the NFTs, ensuring both internal and external legal aspects of the property, raise the question of a new legal life of “proprietarism” in the conditions of digitalization and information capitalism.

Аgroecological aspects of institutional support for land reform in Ukraine at the present stage

All natural objects (resources), which are declared as the absolute property of the Ukrainian people (all citizens) is established to be the main national wealth and the main unborrowed capital of the nation, including soils and other life-giving natural resources of Ukraine, which need rational use, require professional description, characteristics and classification (national accounting) in the process of institutional support for land reform in Ukraine. Emphasis is placed on the central character in ensuring the rational use of nature as an indispensable part of the constitutionally motivated requirements from the standpoint of national interests and each citizen in particular, which is recognized as «citizen-owner». It is proved that due to the unjustified absence for a quarter of a century of the constitutionally declared special Law of Ukraine «On the right to use natural objects of property of the Ukrainian people», which unpunished use of the nation’s capital. As a result, the rights, obligations and responsibilities of users of natural objects, as well as full-fledged requirements for their rational use and protection are not regulated on a paid basis according to the established regulations. This is especially true of fertile soils and other natural resources of the agrosphere. It is established that accomplished fact is cognitive land science and practice formulated by us in specific conditions of Ukrainian reality, which is the basis of our scientific and practical substantiation of institutional support for land reform in Ukraine as a new paradigm through «cognitive land economy» in terms of agri-environmental aspects.

The Blue and the Gray and the Red

This chapter analyzes how the Socialist Party of America invoked the “Second American Revolution” to advocate left nationalism, incremental reform, and Christian socialism, or to validate calls for revolution or international industrial emancipation. Pairing the class struggle with abolitionism tied socialism to domestic tradition and rendered the Civil War part of a revolutionary struggle. The Industrial Workers of the World, meanwhile, claimed one of the most contentious legacies of the abolitionists: the defiance of absolute property rights. However, the Red Scare helped undermine the socialist narrative of the war for the Union as a working-class war. Political repression reinforced the decline of revolutionary Civil War memories, which in turn yielded before rising strains of conservative industrial patriotism.

LIBERTARIAN PHILOSOPHY VERSUS PROPERTARIAN DOGMA: A FURTHER REPLY TO BLOCK

This replies to Block 2019 (B19), which responds to Lester 2014 (L14). The main issues in the, varyingly sized, sections are as follows. 1 Further explanations of critical rationalism, the theory of liberty, and problems with the non-aggression principle. 2.1 The relationships among law, morality, and libertarianism. 2.2 The objective invasiveness of low-level radiation and that it is, therefore, a proactive imposition (albeit trivial) if someone inflicts it on non-consenting people. 2.3 The objective and subjective aspects of proactive impositions; and how clashes can be resolved. 2.4 How liberty relates to risk and self-ownership. 2.5 Libertarian initial acquisition versus absolute property rights by labour-mixing. 2.6 Organisational note. 2.7 Libertarianism and mens rea. 2.8 Libertarian rectification versus lex-talionis doubling. 2.9 Indirectly clashing rights, self-preservation, trespasser-hiker, flagpole-grasper, and landmine-layer. 2.10 A logical point is not a moral point. 2.11 Pacifism and libertarianism. 3.1 A weak criticism of utilitarianism. 3.2 Hedonometers; approximate interpersonal comparisons of utility imply libertarianism; what a libertarian is; libertarian rankings. 4. Libertarian philosophy versus propertarian dogma. Coda: the need to take seriously the philosophical problems with propertarian-justificationist libertarianism. Readers that might be interested include those engaging in libertarian philosophy and those using the Rothbardian/Blockian theoretical approach to libertarianism.

Adjudicating sartorial elegance from the court – the sumptuary impulse in the law of modern sports sponsorship against ambush marketing

Ambush marketing, sometimes also known as guerrilla marketing, comprises attempts to create an unauthorized association with mega-sporting events (such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup) without obtaining official sponsorship agreements. This article contends that the contemporary law of sports sponsorships against ambush marketing harbours a palpable but much-neglected sumptuary impulse, which has never before been adequately scrutinized. It shows that pre-modern sumptuary law strangely resonates with modern anti-ambush law's sumptuary obsession with the visual order of symbols and images as prestige signifiers. It also reveals an ongoing ‘intellectual property’ turn in the recent development of sumptuary anti-ambush law-making, whose ambition is to reify sports-derived sumptuary distinction into a thing-in-itself for nearly absolute ‘property’ protection. My argument is illustrated by a carefully selected number of ambush disputes including Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) v Telstra, which represents the latest development in this field of law.

Educating the Approaches to Intellectual Property as the Trends of Application of Subjective Good Faith in Russian Law

In Russian law, the term "good faith" ("good conscience") refers to different concepts: "honest practice" and "ignorance of the fact when such ignorance generates legal consequences." The article investigate the educational aspects of distinguishing objective and subjective good faith. The questions of application of the rules on subjective good faith to the relations arising in connection with the establishment, circulation and protection of civil rights are considered. The analysis of the content of the legal regime of objects of absolute property rights (things, property security, share in the right of common property, corporate rights) allowed us to conclude that the consideration of the rules on subjective good faith is a natural, necessary element of the legal regime of any object of civil turnover, and the real question is only the recognition of such an element of the legal regime by the rule of law and the definition of the features of its application.

Czy prawo własności nieruchomości w Polsce jest nadal prawem własności?

Is legal estate in land still legal according to Polish law?The aim of the article is to investigate the possibility of implementing Murray Rothbard’s concept of absolute property right in Polish civil procedure. The historical background of this reflection is the time of dispossessions and the policies undertaken by the Polish communist government toward rightful owners of immovable property living in post-war Warsaw. The process of dispossessions was based on the edict imposed by the president of Poland at that time, Bolesław Bierut. Therefore, another aim of the study is to examine the results of Bierut’s edict, including its substantive and procedural legal effects. Furthermore, the article has shown the advantages of primal ownership rule as a fundamental and arbitrary title to being an owner of real estate as the non-aggression principle would be restored. By taking these assumptions under consideration, the author wants to highlight that the undertaken dispossessions were lawless in the normative as well as ethical view. The logical consequence of the abovementioned philosophy is the thesis that the attitude toward this issue of recent Polish governments, which have not done anything to enable legal owners to get their ownerships back from the state, could not be tolerated as it was also unlawful. Moreover, if the Polish government had acted according to the law, the rightful owners of dispossessed legal estate would have received a convenient way to regain their property as well an opportunity to demand payment and compensation.By referring to the concept of absolute property right, the author wishes to indicate that each act of dispossession undertaken by using governmental force was unlawful as it could not be justified by ethical rules of natural law. It has also been concluded that it would be worth deliberating the implementation into Polish civil procedure of an institution which would allow owners who had lost their ownership to regain their right to property. Such proceedings would remain valid not just inter partes between the parties but also erga omnes toward all.The article is also supplemented with a reflection of the economic effects of Bierut’s edict while taking into consideration the policy’s influence upon the possibility of conducting a rational economic calculation.

Boundedness and absoluteness of some dynamical invariants in model theory

Let [Formula: see text] be a monster model of an arbitrary theory [Formula: see text], let [Formula: see text] be any (possibly infinite) tuple of bounded length of elements of [Formula: see text], and let [Formula: see text] be an enumeration of all elements of [Formula: see text] (so a tuple of unbounded length). By [Formula: see text] we denote the compact space of all complete types over [Formula: see text] extending [Formula: see text], and [Formula: see text] is defined analogously. Then [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are naturally [Formula: see text]-flows (even [Formula: see text]-ambits). We show that the Ellis groups of both these flows are of bounded size (i.e. smaller than the degree of saturation of [Formula: see text]), providing an explicit bound on this size. Next, we prove that these Ellis groups do not depend (as groups equipped with the so-called [Formula: see text]-topology) on the choice of the monster model [Formula: see text]; thus, we say that these Ellis groups are absolute. We also study minimal left ideals (equivalently subflows) of the Ellis semigroups of the flows [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. We give an example of a NIP theory in which the minimal left ideals are of unbounded size. Then we show that in each of these two cases, boundedness of a minimal left ideal (equivalently, of all the minimal left ideals) is an absolute property (i.e. it does not depend on the choice of [Formula: see text]) and that whenever such an ideal is bounded, then in some sense its isomorphism type is also absolute. Under the assumption that [Formula: see text] has NIP, we give characterizations (in various terms) of when a minimal left ideal of the Ellis semigroup of [Formula: see text] is bounded. Then we adapt the proof of Theorem 5.7 in Definably amenable NIP groups, J. Amer. Math. Soc. 31 (2018) 609–641 to show that whenever such an ideal is bounded, a certain natural epimorphism (described in [K. Krupiński, A. Pillay and T. Rzepecki, Topological dynamics and the complexity of strong types, Israel J. Math. 228 (2018) 863–932]) from the Ellis group of the flow [Formula: see text] to the Kim–Pillay Galois group [Formula: see text] is an isomorphism (in particular, [Formula: see text] is G-compact). We also obtain some variants of these results, formulate some questions, and explain differences (providing a few counterexamples) which occur when the flow [Formula: see text] is replaced by [Formula: see text].