Jus post vim Revisited

2021 ◽  
pp. 235-254
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Brunstetter
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Just War ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Ethical Consideration ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Ideal Form ◽  
Grey Area ◽  
Risk Principle ◽  
Just War Tradition ◽  
Enforcement Mechanisms

This chapter revisits the theme of jus post vim in the non-ideal form. It begins by looking at the grey area between vim success and failure, characterized by shaky containment (the lingering doubt that the enemy is really contained) or by persistent contested order that threatens the ability of law enforcement mechanisms to uphold a minimalist view of order in certain states. Among the vim failures are the unjust escalation to war, the unfazed enemy outcome, the recurring last straw scenario, and the intractable contested and fragmented sovereignty dilemma. The chapter continues by exploring jus ex vi, or the ethical consideration of terminating the use of limited force, further to tease out what success and failure might look like. The key to defining success and knowing when to end vim operations depends on the just management of military risk principle. The chapter concludes by exploring moral options in cases of failure. Building on the observation that framing the use of force as punishment can be more restrictive than open-ended justifications based in self-defense constructed as prevention or protection against future acts of aggression, the chapter concludes by arguing states might have recourse to the punishment principles. Drawn from an interpretation of the just war tradition privileging a presumption against war as being at the heart of just war thinking, the escalation management and demonstrable retribution criteria depict the narrow moral logic where the legitimate goal of limited force is something other than the moral truncated victory of jus post vim.

Blurring the Lines

2021 ◽  
pp. 29-54
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Brunstetter
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Just War ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The State ◽  
Special Forces ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
The Government ◽  
Peace And War ◽  
Clear Line ◽  
Western Democracies

Law enforcement is often seen as the de facto, and relatively pure, alternative to contemporary just war. If we are not at war, then the more restrictive law enforcement is the viable paradigm. This chapter interrogates two assumptions underlying this view. It begins by demystifying the unwritten assumption that the liberal law enforcement paradigm associated with Western democracies is the idealized foil to just war. Using France, whose postcolonial legacy complicates the turn to the Western liberal paradigm as an illuminating case, the chapter explores how domestic warlike violence creates a state of fractured order—the violence and potential for abuses of power that permeate society as the government seeks to balance security and individual rights. The chapter then turns to the transnational context to challenge the view that there exists a clear line between the state of war and the state of peace. Mali serves as a paradigmatic case to illustrate how the effectiveness of law enforcement is curtailed in spaces of contested order where heavily armed terrorist groups challenge the authority of the state, thus prompting a turn to Special Forces and drones to restore order. In both contexts, the chapter identifies a shift away from the restrained norms that typically govern the use of force in law enforcement to more warlike uses of force that blur the lines between peace and war. The chapter concludes with a reflection on how this shift might inform the ethics of limited force, which lies between law enforcement and just war.

Force and the international community: Blair’s Chicago speech and the criteria for intervention

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Freedman
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
International Community ◽  
Five Factors ◽  
Just War Tradition ◽  
Kosovo War ◽  
Invasion Of Iraq

Tony Blair’s April 1999 Chicago speech is widely seen as foreshadowing his later decision to support the invasion of Iraq. Two sets of context for the speech are described: other criteria for the use of force, going back to the Just War tradition and more recent contributions from Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell, and the December 1998 strikes against Iraq and the Kosovo War, which began in March 1999. The origins of the five factors mentioned when considering force are explored and their implications assessed.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando R. Tesón ◽  
Bas van der Vossen
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Just War ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Collective Self

We introduce general concepts of just war theory and describe different kinds of war: national self-defense, collective self-defense, and humanitarian intervention. After laying down the conditions for the justification of humanitarian intervention, we highlight some of our differences. We conclude with an outline of the international law of use of force and some jurisprudential themes that bear on the current humanitarian intervention debate.

International Law and Armed Conflict

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ward Thomas
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Just War ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The Other ◽  
World War ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Raison D’État ◽  
The One

International law and armed conflict have a rather contentious history together. One the one hand, armed conflict implies and absence of law, and yet, on the other, international law plays an important role in codifying the use of force. The UN Charter’s restrictions on the use of force, drafted in the waning days of a second cataclysmic world war, were intended to radically transform the centuries-old ideology of raison d’état, which viewed war as a sovereign prerogative. More precisely, Article 2(4) of the Charter forbids not just war but force of any kind, or even the threat of it. On its face, the Charter system is a model of simplicity, consisting of a clear prohibition and two exceptions to that prohibition. The apparent simplicity is misleading, however. Article 2(4) is violated so often that experts disagree about whether it should even be considered good law. The Chapter VII enforcement exception is rarely used, and the meaning of self-defense under Article 51 is the subject of contentious disagreement. Moreover, even some UN bodies have supported creating another exception (humanitarian intervention) that coexists uneasily with the organization’s foundational principles. In addition, there is yet another exception (the use of force by national liberation movements) that may be as significant as the others, yet is little discussed by contemporary commentators.

Fratelli tutti and the Responsibility to Protect

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Drew Christiansen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Just War ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The State ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Pope Francis ◽  
Just War Tradition ◽  
The Military

Fratelli tutti expresses skepticism about the ability of the just-war tradition to provide guidance on the state use of force. It is dismissive of a whole range of rationales for going to war. In rejecting humanitarian “excuses,” Pope Francis puts to question the Church’s support even for armed enforcement of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In place of abstract moral reasoning, Francis invites contemplation of the suffering of the victims of war. He expands the horizon of analysis from particular acts to consideration of the cascading consequences of war. He invites the military to color their warrior ethic with the kindness of Christ. In practice, his teaching implies increased attention to the ius postbellum and “the responsibility to rebuild” after armed conflict.

The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts Conduct of Hostilities, Law Enforcement, and Self-Defense

2018 ◽  
pp. 61-108
Author(s):  
Gloria Gaggioli
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Law Enforcement Officials ◽  
Modern Warfare

In modern warfare, military forces are expected to use lethal or potentially lethal force in a variety of contexts ranging from combat operations against the adversary to maintaining law and order or responding to imminent threats to life or limb. In practice, it may not be easy to distinguish between these various situations, which may overlap, as for instance when fighters hide among rioting civilians or demonstrators. Situations of violence may also be volatile and quickly evolve from mere civilian unrest to armed clashes. This factual or operational complexity is accompanied by a legal complexity. Different legal regimes and “paradigms” govern the use of force. From an international law perspective, the use of force by armed forces and law enforcement officials is governed by two different paradigms: the conduct of hostilities paradigm, derived from international humanitarian law (IHL), and the law enforcement paradigm, mainly derived from international human rights law (IHRL). Additionally, armed forces frequently refer to the concept of self-defense at various levels (State, unit, personal) as encompassed in numerous rules of engagement. The legal sources of these concepts and interplay with IHL and HRL remain often unsettled and deserve being clarified. This chapter aims at addressing the legal complexities in identifying governing use of force rules through the analysis of various situations/scenarios that are typical of contemporary military operations.

International Justice as Equal Regard and the Use of Force

2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Bethke Elshtain
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
International System ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
International Justice ◽  
Present Moment ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Comparative Justice ◽  
Just War Tradition

Elshtain presents a case for the primacy of politics if one would argue persuasively about international justice. Without political stability, all attempts to assist developing states, or to sustain persons caught in the chaos of “failed states,” must fail. A concept of justice lies at the heart of this discussion and revolves around the fundamental questions of to whom justice is owed and in what justice consists.Have we any obligations beyond our own borders? If so, what form do these take? These questions are addressed by developing a concept of comparative justice indebted to the just war tradition and tying it to the equal moral regard of persons. This leads, in turn, to two further difficulties. First, what does it mean to make a claim under the equal regard norm? Just war criteria posit certain universal claims in a political universe in which particular bodies politic either respond, or do not, to such claims in light of their own principles and interests. The article develops a citizenship model for cases of humanitarian intervention, rejecting any and all approaches that involve an asymmetrical valuing of human life.Second, who can be called upon to use coercive force in behalf of justice? Elshtain argues that all states have a stake in creating and sustaining an international system of equal regard. But, at present, there is no universal body that can be turned to with any confidence in situations of catastrophic violence, like ethnic cleansing. UN Peacekeepers are effective only after a measure of order is restored. As a result the state, or states, with the greatest capability to project power bears the lion's sharer of responsibility for enforcing an equal regard norm. Elshtain acknowledges the difficulties of articulating a strong universal justice claim while assigning a particular state, or states, and their people a disproportionate enforcement burden. But that best describes the present moment and it is better by far that those with power deploy that power within a framework of principles and constraints rather than solely along the lines of classic realpolitik.

I. The Nonviolence–Just War Nexus

Horizons ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-114
Author(s):  
Drew Christiansen
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Catholic Social Teaching ◽  
Social Teaching ◽  
Second Vatican Council ◽  
Pastoral Letter ◽  
Vatican Council ◽  
The Us ◽  
Just War Tradition ◽  
Peace And War

Gerald Schlabach wrote that a key test of progress for Catholicism in its dialogue with the historic peace churches on nonviolence and the use of force would be that the church's teaching on nonviolence would become “church wide and parish deep.” While modern Catholic social teaching has recognized nonviolence since the time of the Second Vatican Council, and Pope Saint John Paul II gave nonviolence strong, formal endorsement in his 1991 encyclical Centesimus Annus, the church's teaching on nonviolence is hardly known in the pews. If they are familiar at all with Catholic teaching on peace and war, most Catholics would know the just-war tradition, especially through the US bishops’ 1983 pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace. But the newer and still relatively slight teaching on nonviolence is hardly known at all. Only by rare exception do Catholic preachers address issues of peace and war.

Sovereignty, Pluralism, and Regular War: Wolff and Vattel’s Enlightenment Critique of Just War

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 218-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Kalmanovitz
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Just War ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Christian Wolff ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Just War Tradition ◽  
War Discourse

Since its early origins, just war discourse has had two contrasting functions: it has sought to speak law and morals to power, and thus to restrain the use of force, but it has also served to authorize and legitimize the use of force. Critical voices have recently alerted to the increasing use of authorization and legitimization in a broader context of hegemonic and unilateral appropriations of just war discourse. In this article, I show that such critiques of just war have a long history, and reconstruct the powerful challenge that two of the foremost international jurists of the Enlightenment—Christian Wolff and Emer de Vattel—mounted against early modern accounts of just war. Their neglected theory of “regular war” helps us to recover a sense of what a truly pluralist and anti-hegemonic doctrine of ius ad bellum may look like, and reveals a deep tension in the just war tradition between the criteria of political authority and just cause.

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