Counter-Terrorism and Its Ethical Hazards

Chapter 7 discusses ethical problems faced by contemporary counter-terrorism measures. The discussion is primarily focused on reactions of states to sub-state terrorism broadly understood. There is an initial discussion of whether, and in what circumstances, terrorists should be treated as combatants or criminals and the bearing of this upon military and non-military forms of counter-terrorism. Problems with military responses connected with the inflammatory slogan “the war on terror,” including “targeted killing,” are also discussed. Thereafter, the chapter deals mostly with non-military responses and their moral and political hazards. These are examined under the three categories of: (1) legal and regulatory measures; (2) diplomatic measures; and (3) measures to remove the grievance. Under (1), difficulties connected with legal definitions of terrorism, and their tendency to promote abuses of civil rights, are explored; under (2) and (3) the path of political diplomacy is supported, but obstacles to its success in practice are discussed.

Shaping a Concept of Terrorist Acts

Chapter 1 is concerned with bringing some clarity to the widespread conceptual confusion around what terms like “terrorist,” “terrorist act,” and “terrorism” mean. Without being too rigid about definition, it is important to operate with some agreed definitional clarity in the area. The chapter defends the value of such a definitional enterprise and then provides what it calls a tactical definition of a terrorist act that aims to capture a central core involved in talk about terrorism, and opens discussion of terrorist acts to cogent moral assessment. The author’s definition of a terrorist act is: “A political act, ordinarily committed or inspired by an organized group, in which violence is intentionally directed at non-combatants (or ‘innocents’ in a suitable sense) or their significant property, in order to cause them serious harm.” The rest of the chapter discusses advantages of the definition and criticizes a number of objections to it.

Terrorism and Its Claims to “Distinctive Significance”

Chapter 3 addresses four philosophical attempts to show that terrorist attacks, definitional issues aside, have a special moral significance. In their very different ways, these philosophers articulate a concern about terrorism also widely held amongst non-specialists. The philosophers addressing the idea of special significance most directly are Samuel Scheffler, Jeremy Waldron, and Lionel McPherson. Waldron does not use the phrase “special moral significance,” but the idea is at work in his discussion. The fourth is Karen Jones, who doesn’t use “special significance” but her discussion of terrorist disruption of “basal security” seems to mark some distinctive moral feature of terrorism in addition to its being a tactic committed to attacking non-combatants. That makes her claim relevant here. The chapter argues that these various attempts fail to make the strong case they promise, and that the failure is instructive for our understanding of terrorism and for policies to deal with it.

Justifying Terrorism: Four Attempts

Chapter 5 examines four categories of attempted philosophical justification for terrorist acts in certain circumstances. Each one, in different ways, reflects less formal and less carefully articulated views that are proclaimed not only by those who resort to terrorist acts but also by many members of the general public throughout the world, especially when the acts purporting to be justified are committed by their own people or others with whose cause they sympathize. The justifications considered are: utilitarian/consequentialist arguments that may reject the principle of discrimination outright; the argument from self-defense; the tit-for-tat argument; and the argument from the need for a fighting chance. These four attempted justifications raise a more general and very challenging issue about the difficulties of moral philosophizing in the face of absolute moral prohibitions.

Introduction

This Introduction sets the background and scenario for the chapters that follow. It begins by sketching the public impact that terrorist acts have had in the past few decades and how that impact has been affected by the terrible coronavirus of 2020 with its staggering worldwide death toll. It then charts the development of philosophical responses to the dangers of terrorism that begin surprisingly slowly in the 1970s, increase in volume in the 1980s and 1990s, and accelerate dramatically in the wake of the September 11, 2001 hijacked plane attacks on New York and Washington. It also gives an indication of the broader sense of “meaning” in the book’s title that underpins much of the discussion in the later chapters that relies upon but goes beyond the very necessary conceptual clarifications developed in the early chapters. Finally, there are summaries of the themes and arguments in the book’s eight chapters, concluding with a note on the doctrine of double effect and the role of intention in the moral discussion of terrorist acts.

Religion, War, and Terrorism

Chapter 8 is concerned with common views affirming strong links between religion and terrorist acts. One such view is that religion has an inherent, distinctive tendency to promote war and terrorist acts; another is that many past and present wars and terrorist acts were in fact wholly or primarily caused by religious commitments; another is that religion is unusual in inevitably promoting particularly bad features of war and terrorism, such as their ferocity and duration. The chapter argues that these common views oversimplify and often exaggerate the importance of religious elements in violent conflicts. Not only are positive aspects of religious traditions condemning wrongful resort to violence neglected, but political and non-religious ideologies that can drive war and terrorism also tend to be ignored. The chapter examines arguments by a range of theorists, both those in favor of the strong links between religion and violence and those against.

Further Objections

Chapter 2 discusses objections to the definition of terrorism from Chapter 1 that criticize it for being either too narrow or too broad. The narrowness criticisms object that (a) there are terrorist acts that target combatants, (b) there are terrorist acts that do not involve a political motive, such as certain criminal or religious acts, and (c) some non-intentional violence afflicting non-combatants should be encompassed by the definition. The “too broad” category of objections argues that (a) the tactical definition should include an ingredient of intentionally provoking fear, (b) the definition’s encompassing terrorist acts by states is mistaken, (c) including non-combatant property in the definition is mistaken, and (d) this approach simply defines terrorist acts as murder and loses what is distinctive of such acts. These objections are criticized and rejected for the most part, though some elicit concessional comments about their possible ancillary benefits in relation to the preferred tactical definition.

Justifying Terrorism: Three More Attempts

In Chapter 6, three more categories are scrutinized, each of which again reflects a less sophisticated but appealing form of argument that is often enough deployed in the public sphere to justify terrorist acts either by terrorists themselves or by those who identify with the proclaimed justice of cause for which the terrorist acts are committed. The arguments considered in this chapter are: the argument from collective responsibility; the argument from redistributive justice; and the argument from supreme emergency. As with the attempted justifications in Chapter 5, all three of these attempted justifications raise a more general and very challenging issue about the difficulties of moral philosophizing in the face of absolute moral prohibitions.

Combatants, Non-Combatants, and the Question of Innocence

Chapter 4 tackles issues surrounding the concept of combatant/non-combatant and the related notions of guilt/innocence, and the connection of these to the soldier/civilian distinction. The investigation is partly conceptual, but it also inevitably raises moral questions and their significance, since the tactical definition’s reliance upon such concepts relates immediately to the moral assessments enshrined in the just war principle of discrimination, which prohibits the direction of lethal violence at non-combatants and reflects a wider moral principle that prohibits violence against the innocent. Whether one or both of these principles should be rejected, modified, or allow of exceptions are further questions addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. The present chapter requires extended discussion of contemporary debates within the complex just war tradition, particularly between those loosely styled “traditionalist” and “revisionist.” It offers a judgment on the debate and discusses its relation to the author’s account of the nature of terrorist acts.