scholarly journals Suomi Moskovasta nähtynä: Suurvaltapolitiikan, sisällissodan ja vallankumouksen leikkauspisteessä 1920–1930

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aappo Kähönen
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Baltic Sea Region ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
The Baltic ◽  
The Right ◽  
Political Decision Making

The focus of this research is on Finland’s role in Soviet Union’s calculation of its foreign policy between 1920 and 1930. This was the first decade of both Finnish independence and of Soviet power in Russia. This book answers questions about the objectives of Soviet foreign policy in Finland, on the contacts used by the Soviet legation to obtain information, and on how well the Soviets understood Finland’s objectives. People interested in Finland and in Russian perspectives with regards to foreign policy and neighbouring countries will find much new in this book because it relies on formerly unpublished Russian archival material to form the basis for charting Soviet objectives in Finland. The book shows that the Soviets primarily observed Finland in a larger regional context along with other states on its borders in the Baltic Sea region. The global objectives of the revolution and the Soviet Union, but also the domestic political situation in both countries, are reflected on this framework. The period was characterized by forced collectivization in the Soviet Union and, in Finland, by the rise of the right-wing Lapua Movement that emerged at the onset of the Great Depression, laying the foundations for the most severe crisis in the relations during 1929–1930 when the issues surrounding these events destabilized simultaneously the society and political decision-making in both countries.

Soviet Foreign Policy Factionalism Under Stalin?: A Case Study of the Inevitability of War Controversy

1976 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-107
Author(s):  
Paul Marantz
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Harsh Discipline ◽  
Capitalist System ◽  
Strict Adherence ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Important Evidence

AbstractThere has been a great deal of controversy among Western scholars concerning the direction of Soviet foreign policy in the final years and months of Stalin's rule.1 One of the crucial questions at issue is whether or not there were significant divisions of opinion within the Politburo over foreign policy matters. This article attempts to explore this particular question through an examination of a doctrinal controversy that surfaced during Stalin's last years. In one of his most famous works, Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism, Lenin argued that war was an inevitable concomitant of the capitalist system. He contended that the unending struggle for markets meant that periodic wars among the capitalist powers were unavoidable and inevitable.2 Stalin adhered to this view throughout his long reign, and it was not until three years after Stalin's death, in Khruschchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, that it was finally revised. Yet despite Stalin's strict adherence to the Leninist analysis of imperialism, and despite the harsh discipline that characterized his rule, there is evidence that the official interpretation was being publicly questioned even while Stalin was still alive. Given the nature of esoteric communication in the Soviet Union,and the close connection between doctrinal and policy debates, an examination of the controversy concerning the inevitability of war can provide important evidence having a direct bearing upon our understanding of this period.3

The Sino-Soviet Split and Problems for the United States in Asia, Europe, and the Americas, 1956–64

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
China’S Foreign Policy

This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
pp. 197-218
Author(s):  
Kyle Burke
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Right ◽  
At Home

The Iran-Contra scandal halted much of these paramilitary campaigns in the late 1980s. That was because it required many of the most important actors, John Singlaub among them, to spend much of their time testifying in Congress and preparing legal defenses, rather than working overseas. Within a few years, the collapse of the Soviet Union made the anticommunist international obsolete. Still, the ideas and impulses that had animated it lived on. Those legacies were most evident in the rise of the private military firms abroad and the radicalization of the right-wing paramilitaries at home.

Leaving

Jimmy Reid ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 159-192
Author(s):  
W.W.J. Knox ◽  
A. McKinlay
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
The Political ◽  
Full Time ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
The Road ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Power Base ◽  
Revolutionary Party ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Right

The chapter explores his vain attempts to be elected as a full-time national official of the AEU defeated by the right-wing of the union’s leadership. It also exposes the organisational deficiencies of Reid; a man capable of motivating and inspiring workers but unable to build a mass power base within the political or industrial arenas. It also discusses critically Reid’s narrative concerning the road to leaving the CPGB as well as the reception to his decision both within the media and among the party membership. We contend that international events such as the Prague invasion were secondary influences, rather we argue it was events nearer to home that were more influential. Thus, we discuss how the rejection of the concept of the revolutionary party by the CPGB in favour of broad-based parliamentary alliances narrowed the ideological chasm between communists and the Labour left. Indeed, the only issue dividing them was the continued support by the former for the Soviet Union; something that Reid had begun to reject. The other factor was his dissatisfaction with party democracy. Reid left in 1976 and joined the Labour Party two years later. Fast tracked by the left he stood as Labour candidate in 1979 in Dundee where he suffered the same fate as in 1974.

The “Lessons” of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy

1981 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Zimmerman ◽  
Robert Axelrod
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Policy Dialogue ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Soviet Policy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Third World ◽  
Individual Choices

This study systematically identifies the Soviet lessons of Vietnam as presented in eleven Soviet newspapers (specialized and regional as well as the central papers) and eight journals. Altogether, 1,585 citations were coded, representing more than 70 different lessons. A predominant finding is that the most common lessons the Soviet Union learned from Vietnam differed from their American counterparts: the Soviet lessons would not have warned the leadership about the dangers of military intervention in Afghanistan. A left/right scale was constructed, based on such issue clusters as why the communists won in Vietnam, the nature of imperialism, and the implications of Soviet policy in the Third World. Substantial variation was found among the media examined, many of which are linked to specific Soviet institutions. The implication is that Soviet foreign policy is contingent upon individual choices, institutional interplay, and changing contexts. This, in turn, suggests that Western policy makers should not lose sight of their capacity to influence the Soviet policy dialogue, and hence Soviet policy choices.

The Soviet Union and the Renner Government of Austria, April–November 1945

1987 ◽  
Vol 20 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 246-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Piotrowski
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Joseph Stalin ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Ideology ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Red Army

When the Red Army moved through Eastern Europe in 1945, it faced the problem of creating what the men in the Kremlin called “friendly” governments. In several countries, Joseph Stalin in short order resolved the dilemma by putting into power Communists who had arrived in the van of his army. In the Western mind, Stalin represented a force inexorably driven by a logic inherent in all totalitarian systems. Stalin became the reincarnation of Hitler, a dictator who sought to impose his system on all territories under his sway—and whose appetite could not be sated. Such a view left little ambiguity in interpreting Stalin's foreign policy. It offered no room for an assessment that Soviet foreign policy was driven by a mix of motives, not only by aggression steeped in Communist ideology, but also by considerations of national security, opportunism, and compromise.

Russia and the Use of Trade Policy: Concentration with Soviet Successor States

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 20170068 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Lutz ◽  
James Lutz
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Former Soviet Union ◽  
Policy Position ◽  
Trade Patterns ◽  
Baltic Countries ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
The Baltic

Economic policy has often been an integral part of foreign policy usage by governments. Many states will use trade, aid, and investment as instruments to attain other objectives deemed to be in the national interest. Albert Hirschman in an early and classic study suggested that governments in the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany consciously attempted to dominate the trade of weaker states in Europe as a means of enhancing the German foreign policy position. Russian trade policy since the breakup of the Soviet Union has followed a similar policy, especially in regard to the other successor states of the former Soviet Union. Patterns were different for the Baltic countries, other European successor states, the Transcaucasian states, and Central Asian countries. Notwithstanding differences that were present, there was evidence in the trade patterns to indicate that Moscow was using trade policy to gain influence in the successor states.

scholarly journals Stalin, the Politburo, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1946

1988 ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Albert Resis
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
New Wave ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Ideology ◽  
Great Patriotic War ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Cold War

The precise function that Marxist-Leninist ideology serves in the formation and conduct of Soviet foreign policy remains a highly contentious question among Western scholars. In the first postwar year, however, few senior officials or Soviet specialists in the West doubted that Communist ideology served as the constitutive element of Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, the militant revival of Marxism-Leninism after the Kremlin had downplayed it during 'The Great Patriotic War" proved to be an important factor in the complex of causes that led to the breakup of the Grand Alliance. Moscow's revival of that ideology in 1945 prompted numerous top-level Western leaders and observers to regard it as heralding a new wave of Soviet world-revolutionary messianism and expansionism. Many American and British officials were even alarmed by the claim, renewed, for example, in Moscow's official History of Diplomacy, that Soviet diplomacy possessed a "scientific theory," a "weapon" possessed by none of its rivals or opponents. This "weapon," Marxism-Leninism, Moscow ominously boasted, enabled Soviet leaders to comprehend, foresee, and master the course of international affairs, smoothing the way for Soviet diplomacy to make exceptional gains since 1917. Now, in the postwar period, Stalinist diplomacy opened before the Soviet Union "boundlesshorizons and the most majestic prospects."

The Present Tragedy of America

Worldview ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 14-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Morgenthau
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Second World War ◽  
Hungarian Revolution ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Moral Crisis ◽  
Second World

It is, of course, trivial to say that the foreign policy of the United States is not only in a political and military crisis — and financial crisis you might add — but also in a moral crisis. This moral crisis has particular significance for the United States. Take, by way of contrast, the moral crises through which Soviet foreign policy has passed since the end of the second world war. Take, for instance, the moral crisis which it faced in consequence of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and the moral crisis it is still facing by virtue of its invasion of Czechoslovakia last year. Obviously those crises considerably decreased the prestige and influence of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has emerged from tbose crises as something different from what it was before. For the Soviet Union today can no longer claim to be the fatherland of socialism, the disinterested vanguard of the international proletariat.

Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: The Role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee

Slavic Review ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 614-630
Author(s):  
Jan S. Adams
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Control Unit ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy

Historically, leaders of the Soviet Union have shown extraordinary faith in the power of bureaucratic reorganization to solve political problems. The 1985-1987 restaffing and restructuring of the foreign policy establishment indicate that Mikhail Gorbachev shares this faith. In the first sixteen months of his leadership, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replaced its minister, two first deputy ministers, seven deputy ministers, a third of all Soviet ambassadors, and created four new departments. In addition, important changes were made in the central party apparat, affecting three of the CPSU Central Committee departments: The International Information Department was abolished. The Propaganda Department gained added prominence in international affairs with the appointment of a new chief, Aleksandr Iakovlev, who began playing a conspicuous role as Gorbachev's advisor at international conferences even before his elevation to the Politburo in January 1987. Of great significance for the Soviet foreign policy establishment as a whole, the International Department (ID) was given new leadership, a new arms control unit, and expanded missions.

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