Municipal reaction to functional rescaling in Italy

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the municipal reaction to a recent rescaling policy in Italy that, since 2010, require to small municipalities to jointly manage their basic tasks (compulsory joint management – CJM) through intermunicipal forms of cooperation. The paper will investigate: how many small municipalities did effectively join their basic tasks; which forms of cooperation did they choose to perform these tasks; and which kind of reaction municipalities enacted toward the national provision.Design/methodology/approachQuantitative data rely on an original database collecting information on all Italian municipalities up to 2015. A qualitative research has also been conducted by submitting a semi-structured questionnaire and interviews to the civil servants in charge of the CJM in each of the 20 Italian regions and to other privileged interlocutors.FindingsItalian municipalities poorly complied with the CJM norm and when they did, they choose the easiest way to do it (using the simplest available intermunicipal cooperation form). Among the explanations for this reaction: the lack of consistency and clear political will of the national policy maker in respect to this norm and the lack of a mind set at the local level oriented to cooperation and networking.Originality/valueThis paper highlights the main patterns of conflict in functional rescaling of small-sized municipalities in Italy, thus providing both fresh new data on this phenomena and useful elements for shaping future policy making on this topic.

Pursuing defragmentation at the municipal level: signs of a changing pattern?

Municipal fragmentation is a real historical issue in Italy but its relevance has been differently perceived over time. With a focus on the municipal unions and amalgamations as the main tools for defragmentation, we will present an overview of the last quarter century (1990–2017) of territorial policy at the local level. The reforms introduced since 2010 marked a step change in this area: in fact, empirical evidence shows that the most recent defragmentation attempts have had a certain success. This article, by maintaining a descriptive approach, will try to answer why the most recent defragmentation policy achieved some results, in contrast to those of the past. Some explanatory factors will be presented by reviewing the stances of the main actors in this policy field and their interaction with national policy-maker goals and approaches as well as with normative elements and external conditions.

THE TIMING OF ASSET TRADE AND OPTIMAL POLICY IN DYNAMIC OPEN ECONOMIES

Using a standard open economy DSGE model, it is shown that the timing of asset trade relative to policy decisions has a potentially important impact on the welfare evaluation of monetary policy at the individual-country level. If asset trade in the initial period takes place before the announcement of policy, a national policy maker can choose a policy rule that reduces the work effort of households in the policy maker's country, in the knowledge that consumption is fully insured by optimally chosen international portfolio positions. But if asset trade takes place after the policy announcement, this insurance is absent and households in the policy maker's country bear the full consumption consequences of the chosen policy rule. The welfare incentives faced by national policy makers are very different between the two cases. Numerical examples confirm that asset-market timing has a significant impact on the optimal policy rule.