Is the Copenhagen Interpretation Compatible with Philosophical Realism?

How are quantum mechanics and realism related? This paper will discuss whether or not the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics and the doctrine of philosophical realism are compatible. To answer this question, this paper will first introduce quantum mechanics and the Copenhagen Interpretation in terms of the particle in the box experiment. Then, philosophical realism will be introduced and defined. Finally, the relationship between the Copenhagen Interpretation and philosophical realism will be evaluated. Several points of the Copenhagen Interpretation appear to contradict philosophical realism; thus, it can be concluded that the Copenhagen Interpretation is not compatible with philosophical realism.

On the meaning of EPR’s Reality Criterion

This essay has two main claims about EPR’s Reality Criterion. First, we claim that the application of the Reality Criterion makes an essential difference between the EPR argument and Einstein’s later arguments against quantum mechanics. We show that while the EPR argument, making use of the Reality Criterion, does derive that certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are incomplete, Einstein’s later arguments, making no use of the Reality Criterion, do not prove incompleteness, but rather point to the inadequacy of the Copenhagen interpretation. We take this fact as an indication that the Reality Criterion is a crucial, indispensable component of the incompleteness argument(s). The second claim is more substantive. We argue that the Reality Criterion is a special case of the Common Cause Principle. Finally, we relate this proposal to Tim Maudlin’s recent assertion that the Reality Criterion is an analytic truth.

Hoe zeker is Heisenbergs onzekerheidsprincipe?

How certain is Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle?Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is at the heart of the orthodox or Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. We first sketch the history that led up to the formulation of the principle. Then we recall that there are in fact two uncertainty principles, both dating from 1927, one by Werner Heisenberg and one by Earle Kennard. Finally, we explain that recent work in physics gives reason to believe that the principle of Heisenberg is invalid, while that of Kennard still stands.

A Phenomenological Reading of the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

The articles provides a phenomenological reading of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics and its answer to the measurement problem, or the question of “why only one of a wave function’s probable values is observed when the system is measured.” Transcendental-phenomenological and hermeneutic-phenomenological approaches are employed. The project comprises four parts. Parts one and two review MWI and the standard (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics. Part three reviews the phenomenologies. Part four deconstructs the hermeneutics of MWI. It agrees with the confidence the theory derives from its (1) unforgiving appropriation of the Schrödinger equation and (2) association of branching universes with the evolution of the wave function insofar as that understanding comes from the formalism itself. Part four also reveals the hermeneutical shortcomings of the standard interpretation.

Is the Copenhagen Interpretation Inapplicable to Quantum Cosmology?

It is generally accepted that the Copenhagen interpretation is inapplicable to quantum cosmology, by contrast with the many worlds interpretation. I shall demonstrate that the two basic principles of the Copenhagen interpretation, the principle of wholeness and the principle of complementarity, do make sense in quantum gravity, since we can judge about quantum gravitational processes in the very early Universe by their vestiges in our macroscopic Universe. I shall present the extended phase space approach to quantum gravity and show that it can be interpreted in the spirit of the Everett’s “relative states” formulation, while there is no contradiction between the “relative states” formulation and the mentioned basic principles of the Copenhagen interpretation.

In Everything Is Everything

Anaxagoras proposed “in everything there is a portion of everything,” a notion as bizarre as the most popular interpretation of quantum theory, the Copenhagen. A piece of gold, say, contains gold as well as everything else—copper, wheat—but appears as a distinct golden object because its gold portion is the greatest. But no part of the object is pure. Every part of the golden object is also simultaneously watery, milky (and all other materials), and black and white (and all opposite qualities). In the Copenhagen interpretation, before an observation, something (an electron, Schrödinger’s cat) is all opposite qualities simultaneously, too, with each quality described by a unique probability (“portion”) to actually occur. The cat is both dead and alive; the electron spins simultaneously both clockwise and counterclockwise. Only after the observation, the cat is found either dead or alive, and the object, as Anaxagoras would say, definitely golden, yellow, and dry.