Conceptual analysis

A distinction must be made between the philosophical theory of conceptual analysis and the historical philosophical movement of Conceptual Analysis. The theory of conceptual analysis holds that concepts – general meanings of linguistic predicates – are the fundamental objects of philosophical inquiry, and that insights into conceptual contents are expressed in necessary ’conceptual truths’ (analytic propositions). There are two methods for obtaining these truths: - direct a priori definition of concepts; - indirect ’transcendental’ argumentation. The movement of Conceptual Analysis arose at Cambridge during the first half of the twentieth century, and flourished at Oxford and many American departments of philosophy in the 1950s and early 1960s. In the USA its doctrines came under heavy criticism, and its proponents were not able to respond effectively; by the end of the 1970s the movement was widely regarded as defunct. This reversal of fortunes can be traced primarily to the conjunction of several powerful objections: the attack on intensions and on the analytic/synthetic distinction; the paradox of analysis; the ‘scientific essentialist’ theory of propositions; and the critique of transcendental arguments. Nevertheless a closer examination indicates that each of these objections presupposes a covert appeal to concepts and conceptual truths. In the light of this dissonance between the conventional wisdom of the critics on the one hand, and the implicit commitments of their arguments on the other, there is a manifest need for a careful re-examination of conceptual analysis.

3. Do you know what I mean?

From the very origins of philosophy, philosophers have been especially conscious of the inadequacies and limitations of language. But they have disagreed on whether this reflects a corresponding deficiency in thought, on what its explanation and implications are, and on how we should respond—in short, on what this itself means. ‘Do you know what I mean?’ explains that in actual cases of analysis, three different dimensions—interpretive, decompositional, and regressive—are typically involved. It also introduces G. E. Moore (1873–1958) who, alongside Russell, inaugurated analytic philosophy in Britain. Moore’s main interests lay with epistemology (the theory of knowledge) and ethics. The paradox of analysis is also discussed.

Philosophical and Conceptual Analysis

This article examines the main lines of contemporary thinking about analysis in philosophy. It first considers G. E. Moore’s statement of the paradox of analysis. It then reviews a number of accounts of analysis that address the paradox of analysis, including the account offered by Ernest Sosa 1983 and others by Felicia Ackerman (1981, 1986, 1991); the latter gives an account of analysis on which properties are the objects of analysis. It also discusses Jeffrey C. King’s (1998, 2007) accounts of philosophical analysis, before turning to views of analysis that are not aimed at addressing the paradox of analysis, including those associated with David Lewis, Frank Jackson, and David Chalmers. In particular, it comments on Lewis’s argument that conceptual analysis is simply a means for picking out the physical state that occupies a certain role, where formulating what that role is constitutes a conceptual analysis of the relevant notion.

Fregean solution of the paradox of analysis and the criterion of difference of thoughts

At the beginning of this essay a formulation of the paradox of analysis is presented. Standard Fregean solution of this paradox is then displayed, as well as the problems that this solution faces. After words, another solution of the paradox of analysis is shown, which can be found in Frege's late writings. It will be demonstrated that this solution, at least at first sight, is incompatible with the criterion of difference of thoughts that is standardly attributed to Frege. In the end, a possible solution to this incompatibility is suggested.