Conceptual analysis

Author(s):  
Robert Hanna

A distinction must be made between the philosophical theory of conceptual analysis and the historical philosophical movement of Conceptual Analysis. The theory of conceptual analysis holds that concepts – general meanings of linguistic predicates – are the fundamental objects of philosophical inquiry, and that insights into conceptual contents are expressed in necessary ’conceptual truths’ (analytic propositions). There are two methods for obtaining these truths: - direct a priori definition of concepts; - indirect ’transcendental’ argumentation. The movement of Conceptual Analysis arose at Cambridge during the first half of the twentieth century, and flourished at Oxford and many American departments of philosophy in the 1950s and early 1960s. In the USA its doctrines came under heavy criticism, and its proponents were not able to respond effectively; by the end of the 1970s the movement was widely regarded as defunct. This reversal of fortunes can be traced primarily to the conjunction of several powerful objections: the attack on intensions and on the analytic/synthetic distinction; the paradox of analysis; the ‘scientific essentialist’ theory of propositions; and the critique of transcendental arguments. Nevertheless a closer examination indicates that each of these objections presupposes a covert appeal to concepts and conceptual truths. In the light of this dissonance between the conventional wisdom of the critics on the one hand, and the implicit commitments of their arguments on the other, there is a manifest need for a careful re-examination of conceptual analysis.

2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-263
Author(s):  
Milijana Djeric

The aim of this work is twofold. On the one hand, the intention is to provide analysis of the issue of euthanasia. On the other hand, this approach necessarily leads to a discussion toward the provision of an adequate definition of euthanasia. Therefore the article, first of all, refers to the multi?layered aspect of the term euthanasia. To avoid ambiguity and other uncer?tainties while providing the definition of euthanasia, the authors carefully perform a conceptual analysis. This leads to the establishment of a clear distinction between actions which, due to their motives or their method of execution, cast a shadow on the meaning of this medical procedure.


The article deals with the study of the problem of “The Other” in the context of its influence on the formation and formation of “The I”. The methodological basis of the study is existentialism and psychoanalysis. The paper outlines the transition from the traditional understanding of the relationship “The I” - “The Other” to non-classical - “The Other” - “The I”. The paper considers the conditions for constructing the theory of the existence of “The Other” by J.-P. Sartre, as well as the symbolic theory of “The Other” by J. Lacan. The conclusions about the essence of the phenomena of “The I” and “The Other” are drawn based on the conceptual analysis. “The I” is defined as a field of absence, deprivation in an individual. “The Other” is defined as the Symbolic and the ontological facet of the social. The ambivalent process of interaction between “The Other” and “The I” is also presented. “The I” does not exist initially and a priori but it is formed in the process of filling the lack and void with the symbols of “The Other”. The means is the desire which, by splitting an individual, allows him to perceive and realize his being as self. The article shows that this splitting is dual: on the one hand, the I denies the existence of the Other within myself (sadistic component), and on the other, the I entirely denies its Self (masochistic component). The impossibility of being completely satisfied and identifying self with the objects of the Other allows the I not to become like the Other and perceive self as a self-independent and independent being.


Author(s):  
V. V. Olyanich ◽  
◽  
L. V. Olyanich ◽  

The article investigates the economic efficiency of farms in the USSR in the 20's of the twentieth century. Much attention is paid to the study of socio-economic indicators, identifying opportunities to meet production farms and their welfare needs. The author argues that the farms in the USSR in the 20's of the twentieth century were characterized by rather sad indicators of economic efficiency, since a large number of households do not even have available land, livestock, tools and more. On the one hand this is due to the crisis of the early 20's. Caused by the devastating effects of war, revolution, social and economic experiments - nationalization and socialization of land, disruption of grain farming, a situation complicated famine and drought in the south of Ukraine, reducing livestock. On the other hand the socio-economic characteristics and the ability to establish a consumer economy to achieve functional norms to ensure its industrial and social needs in the Marxist paradigm of public relations coverage served only to establish the class structure and definition of objects of taxation, but not for the formation of economically developed farms.


Author(s):  
Roberts Ivor

This chapter discusses terrorism in the context of diplomacy. As far as diplomacy is concerned, attacks on diplomatic and consular missions and on diplomats are attacks on institutions which on the one hand enjoy inviolability under international law but on the other offer attractive targets simply because of their representative character. There can be no a priori definition of procedure to be applied if such attacks take place, although experience shows that capitulation leads only to an escalation in terrorist demands. The only way to work out any guidance on best practice is by taking examples and deducing from them such general advice as one can. Hence the chapter provides some case examples of destructive attacks on missions, the challenges on diplomacy with regards to terrorism, the suppression of terrorism, negotiations, and others.


1941 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-53
Author(s):  
Francis D. Wormuth

Law, we are accustomed to say, comprises two elements. It is a body of obligatory rules of conduct, but it differs from other obligatory rules, such as moral precepts or the rules of a game, in that it is enforced by the state. On the one hand, law exists as a conceptual system of normative rules; on the other, it dwelis as well in the realm of brute fact, where it is something that is “done” or enforced by the state. But here surely is a snake swallowing its own tail, for the state which concretises law on the level of actuality is itself a creature of the realm of ideality: the state is meaningless except as a legal concept.What is needed is a treatment of law which will equate the actual practice of government with the conceptual system of rules that are obligatory, not merely upon citizens, but upon government as well. There seem to be good a priori reasons for believing that this cannot be done, and for believing, furthermore, that no definition of law in terms of either of the elements alone will be satisfactory.The American writers loosely grouped as “realistic” have made a thoroughgoing effort to solve the problem by omitting the normative element. With individual variations, these authors have argued that law is simply the behavior of the judge. Since the judge is a man, the law which he makes is a by-product of his personal existence, secreted, perhaps, as a result of a bad breakfast, as a pearl is secreted by an oyster. It is meaningless to talk of law as obligatory, or law as rule. Law is occurrence, on the simple level of fact, and it is not to be discussed in terms of obligation or validity, ideas which are the product of folklore or father-fixation.


APRIA Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-16
Author(s):  
José Teunissen

In the last few years, it has often been said that the current fashion system is outdated, still operating by a twentieth-century model that celebrates the individualism of the 'star designer'. In I- D, Sarah Mower recently stated that for the last twenty years, fashion has been at a cocktail party and has completely lost any connection with the public and daily life. On the one hand, designers and big brands experience the enormous pressure to produce new collections at an ever higher pace, leaving less room for reflection, contemplation, and innovation. On the other hand, there is the continuous race to produce at even lower costs and implement more rapid life cycles, resulting in disastrous consequences for society and the environment.


Author(s):  
Marlou Schrover

This chapter discusses social exclusion in European migration from a gendered and historical perspective. It discusses how from this perspective the idea of a crisis in migration was repeatedly constructed. Gender is used in this chapter in a dual way: attention is paid to differences between men and women in (refugee) migration, and to differences between men and women as advocates and claim makers for migrant rights. There is a dilemma—recognized mostly for recent decades—that on the one hand refugee women can be used to generate empathy, and thus support. On the other hand, emphasis on women as victims forces them into a victimhood role and leaves them without agency. This dilemma played itself out throughout the twentieth century. It led to saving the victims, but not to solving the problem. It fortified rather than weakened the idea of a crisis.


2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-202
Author(s):  
Brian Z. Tamanaha

A century ago the pragmatists called for reconstruction in philosophy. Philosophy at the time was occupied with conceptual analysis, abstractions, a priori analysis, and the pursuit of necessary, universal truths. Pragmatists argued that philosophy instead should center on the pressing problems of the day, which requires theorists to pay attention to social complexity, variation, change, power, consequences, and other concrete aspects of social life. The parallels between philosophy then and jurisprudence today are striking, as I show, calling for a pragmatism-informed theory of law within contemporary jurisprudence. In the wake of H.L.A. Hart’s mid-century turn to conceptual analysis, “during the course of the twentieth century, the boundaries of jurisprudential inquiry were progressively narrowed.”1 Jurisprudence today is dominated by legal philosophers engaged in conceptual analysis built on intuitions, seeking to identify essential features and timeless truths about law. In the pursuit of these objectives, they detach law from its social and historical moorings, they ignore variation and change, they drastically reduce law to a singular phenomenon—like a coercive planning system for difficult moral problems2—and they deny that coercive force is a universal feature of law, among other ways in which they depart from the reality of law; a few prominent jurisprudents even proffer arguments that invoke aliens or societies of angels.


1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 427-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Prewitt ◽  
Heinz Eulau

Scholars interested in theorizing about political representation in terms relevant to democratic governance in mid-twentieth century America find themselves in a quandary. We are surrounded by functioning representative institutions, or at least by institutions formally described as representative. Individuals who presumably “represent” other citizens govern some 90 thousand different political units—they sit on school and special district boards, on township and city councils, on county directorates, on state and national assemblies, and so forth. But the flourishing activity of representation has not yet been matched by a sustained effort to explain what makes the representational process tick.Despite the proliferation of representative governments over the past century,theoryabout representation has not moved much beyond the eighteenth-century formulation of Edmund Burke. Certainly most empirical research has been cast in the Burkean vocabulary. But in order to think in novel ways about representative government in the twentieth-century, we may have to admit that present conceptions guiding empirical research are obsolete. This in turn means that the spell of Burke's vocabulary over scientific work on representation must be broken.To look afresh at representation, it is necessary to be sensitive to the unresolved tension between the two main currents of contemporary thinking about representational relationships. On the one hand, representation is treated as a relationship between any one individual, the represented, and another individual, the representative—aninter-individualrelationship. On the other hand, representatives are treated as a group, brought together in the assembly, to represent the interest of the community as a whole—aninter-grouprelationship. Most theoretical formulations since Burke are cast in one or the other of these terms.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-37
Author(s):  
MANISHA SETHI

Abstract A bitter debate broke out in the Digambar Jain community in the middle of the twentieth century following the passage of the Bombay Harijan Temple Entry Act in 1947, which continued until well after the promulgation of the Untouchability (Offences) Act 1955. These laws included Jains in the definition of ‘Hindu’, and thus threw open the doors of Jain temples to formerly Untouchable castes. In the eyes of its Jain opponents, this was a frontal and terrible assault on the integrity and sanctity of the Jain dharma. Those who called themselves reformists, on the other hand, insisted on the closeness between Jainism and Hinduism. Temple entry laws and the public debates over caste became occasions for the Jains not only to examine their distance—or closeness—to Hinduism, but also the relationship between their community and the state, which came to be imagined as predominantly Hindu. This article, by focusing on the Jains and this forgotten episode, hopes to illuminate the civilizational categories underlying state practices and the fraught relationship between nationalism and minorities.


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