scholarly journals On James Sterba’s Refutation of Theistic Arguments to Justify Suffering

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Bruce R. Reichenbach
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Divine Intervention ◽  
Horrendous Evils ◽  
Consistent Application ◽  
Moral Requirements

In his recent book Is a Good God Logically Possible? and article by the same name, James Sterba argued that the existence of significant and horrendous evils, both moral and natural, is incompatible with the existence of God. He advances the discussion by invoking three moral requirements and by creating an analogy with how the just state would address such evils, while protecting significant freedoms and rights to which all are entitled. I respond that his argument has important ambiguities and that consistent application of his moral principles will require that God remove all moral and natural evils. This would deleteriously restrict not only human moral decision making, but also the knowledge necessary to make moral judgments. He replies to this critique by appealing to the possibility of limited divine intervention, to which I rejoin with reasons why his middle ground is not viable.

Framing Morality: How Antecedent-Focused Strategies Can Shape Moral Judgments

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kappes ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Emotional Reactions ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Process Dissociation ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
First Response ◽  
High Conflict

From moral philosophy to programming driverless cars, scholars have long been interested in how to shape moral decision-making. We examine how framing can impact moral judgments either by shaping which emotional reactions are evoked in a situation (antecedent-focused) or by changing how people respond to their emotional reactions (response-focused). In three experiments, we manipulated the framing of a moral decision-making task before participants judged a series of moral dilemmas. Participants encouraged to go “with their first” response beforehand favored emotion-driven judgments on high-conflict moral dilemmas. In contrast, participants who were instructed to give a “thoughtful” response beforehand or who did not receive instructions on how to approach the dilemmas favored reason-driven judgments. There was no difference in response-focused control during moral judgements. Process-dissociation confirmed that people instructed to go with their first response had stronger emotion-driven intuitions than other conditions. Our results suggest that task framing can alter moral intuitions.

Normative Principles are Synthetic A Priori

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-383
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Open Question

AbstractI argue for the claim that there are instances of a priori justified belief – in particular, justified belief in moral principles – that are not analytic, i.e., that cannot be explained solely by the understanding we have of their propositions. §1–2 provides the background necessary for understanding this claim: in particular, it distinguishes between two ways a proposition can be analytic, Basis and Constitutive, and provides the general form of a moral principle. §§3–5 consider whether Hume's Law, properly interpreted, can be established by Moore's Open Question Argument, and concludes that it cannot: while Moore's argument – appropriately modified – is effective against the idea that moral judgments are either (i) reductively analyzable or (ii) Constitutive-analytic, a different argument is needed to show that they are not (iii) Basis-analytic. Such an argument is supplied in §6. §§7–8 conclude by considering how these considerations bear on recent discussions of “alternative normative concepts”, on the epistemology of intuitions, and on the differences between disagreement in moral domains and in other a priori domains such as logic and mathematics.

Folklorisation and the Emergent Moral Degeneration: A Functionalist Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Siziwe Mandubu
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
South African ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Behavioral Norms ◽  
South African Society ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Societal Norms ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
The Social ◽  
Functionalist Approach

Living in an egalitarian society has resulted in the corrosion of the moral base among certain sectors in the community. Some people misconstrue egalitarianism as an authorisation to act as they see fit. Young people, in particular, are gradually losing touch with reality in relation to acceptable behavioral norms in the South African society. Based on the functionalist theory of balancing the social equilibrium among people, the article delineates moral standards as the most fundamental and general principles of behaviour and reflects on how the society expects one to act in certain situations. The article, therefore, explores the primary concepts within functionalism and attempts to outline that the society is a system of interconnected parts that work together in harmony to maintain a state of stability and social cohesion. The article will use the folktale “uDyakalashe noMvolofu” (“The Jackal and the Wolf”) to reflect on the expected societal norms. It demonstrates that folktales, which used to transfer values, morals and shape the conduct of people in the olden days are still appropriate in reshaping the outlook and perceptions of today’s generation. As such, the shrewd nature of folklore in the moral regeneration of the current generation of young people is exposed. While there are many folktales in this category, “uDyakalashe noMvolofu” (“The Jackal and the Wolf”) provides the theme relevant for the analysis of the topic to highlight that moral standards generate moral principles and moral judgments.

scholarly journals Famine, Affluence, and Amorality

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sackris
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
First Person ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Distinct Kind ◽  
Ordinary Case ◽  
Made In ◽  
The Way

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot.

Oppenheim's Defense of Noncognitivism

1971 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 1105-1114
Author(s):  
Donald VanDeVeer
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Logical Status ◽  
Attractive Candidate ◽  
History Of ◽  
Positive Support

In his recent book, Moral Principles in Political Philosophy, Felix Oppenheim provides a useful examination of the assumptions of well known figures in the history of political philosophy concerning the logical status of moral principles. Classifying them as cognitivists (if they view fundamental moral principles as either true or false) or noncognitivists (if they view moral principles as neither true nor false), Oppenheim attempts to exhibit the inadequacy of the cognitivist point of view and, importantly, the adequacy of the noncognitivist position. My critique aims at demonstrating the inconclusiveness of Oppenheim’s arguments against cognitivism. Oppenheim presupposes the availability of a plausible and workable criterion for determining when a sentence counts as a statement (statements are for Oppenheim entities which are true or false and, thus, “cognitively meaningful”), but he fails to provide any attractive candidate for that position. Further critical discussion revolves around the following related questions: Is there adequate positive support for the noncognitivist view? Does it allow for the rationality of fundamental moral commitments? And can Oppenheim really justify his case that, far from being irrational or pernicious, noncognitivism is naturally associated with certain humanistic ideals, such as toleration of those of differing moral and political viewpoint?

Reasons Consequentialism

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 671-682 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Sachs
Keyword(s):  
Recent Book ◽  
Moral Requirements

Douglas Portmore’s recent book, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Rationality Meets Morality, is an ambitious, painstaking effort to render the moral requirements of consequentialism consistent both with our intuitions and with the requirements of rationality. Portmore argues for a version of consequentialism that requires one to act in accordance with one’s reasons for preference or reasons for desire. I raise doubts here as to whether such reasons can explain moral requirements and whether, if they do, it would be of any practical use to know that they do.

An Evolutionary Science Perspective on Intuition, Rationality, Conflict, and Moral Judgments

2021 ◽  
pp. 49-61
Author(s):  
James M. Honeycutt ◽  
Ryan D. Rasner
Keyword(s):  
Ground State ◽  
Parasympathetic Nervous System ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Road Rage ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
State Laws ◽  
Cognitive Reasoning ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Evolutionary Science ◽  
Survival Mechanisms

Moral judgments can be the result of cognitive deliberations, which develop with age and socialization. Rationality began in humans with the development of the cerebral cortex. Alternatively, they can be the based-on survival mechanisms emanating in the sympathetic nervous based on innate, survival mechanisms (fight, flight, freeze) and the amygdala. Common examples are road rage (e.g., I was right while the other driver was wrong, cut me off, and could have killed me) and hold-your-ground state laws for self-defense (the victim was justified in killing the intruder, even though the intruder had no weapon when reaching into their coat pocket). Moral decision making can be based on an innate survival mechanism. Those who did this did not survive and were not our ancestors. This chapter reviews the research on signal detection theory, how aggression is favored over conciliation, as cognitive reasoning breaks down. Physiological studies involving the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system are reviewed in terms of the amygdala and emotional intelligence.

scholarly journals Morals from rationality alone? Some doubts

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 248-273
Author(s):  
JP Messina ◽  
David Wiens
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Valid Argument ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Standard Conception ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Theoretic Argument ◽  
Game Theoretic

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. It is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler’s recent book, Minimal Morality, seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel ‘two-level’ social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant’s categorical imperative is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler’s informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler’s conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler’s contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conception of rationality. We thus extend our understanding of familiar contractarian difficulties by showing how they arise even if we restrict the scope of contractarian morality to a domain where its application seems both promising and necessary.

scholarly journals Virtue ethics: an approach to moral dilemmas in nursing

Curationis ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
E Arries
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Whistle Blowing ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The One

Nurses are increasingly confronted with situations of moral difficulty, such as not to feed terminally ill patients, whistle blowing, or participation in termination of pregnancy. Most of these moral dilemmas are often analyzed using the principle-based approach which applies the four moral principles of justice, autonomy, beneficence, and nonmalificence. In some instances, consequentialism is considered, but these frameworks have their limitations. Their limitations has to do with a consideration for the interpersonal nature of clinical nursing practice on the one hand, and is not always clear on how to judge which consequences are best on the other hand. When principles are in conflict it is not always easy to decide which principle should dominate. Furthermore, these frameworks do not take into account the importance of the interpersonal and emotional element of human experience. On the contrary, decision making about moral issues in healthcare demands that nurses exercise rational control over emotions. This clearly focuses the attention on the nurse as moral agent and in particular their character. In this article I argue that virtue ethics as an approach, which focus of the character of a person, might provide a more holistic analysis of moral dilemmas in nursing and might facilitate more flexible and creative solutions when combined with other theories of moral decision-making. Advancing this argument, firstly, I provide the central features of virtue ethics. Secondly I describe a story in which a moral dilemma is evident. Lastly I apply virtue ethics as an approach to this moral dilemma and in particular focusing on the virtues inherent in the nurse as moral agent in the story.

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