The Role of Feedback in Dynamic Crowdsourcing Contests: A Structural Empirical Analysis

In this paper, we empirically examine the impact of performance feedback on the outcome of crowdsourcing contests. We develop a dynamic structural model to capture the economic processes that drive contest participants’ behavior and estimate the model using a detailed data set about real online logo design contests. Our rich model captures key features of the crowdsourcing context, including a large participant pool; entries by new participants throughout the contest; exploitation (revision of previous submissions) and exploration (radically novel submissions) behaviors by contest incumbents; and the participants’ strategic choice among these entry, exploration, and exploitation decisions in a dynamic game. Using counterfactual simulations, we compare the outcome of crowdsourcing contests under alternative feedback disclosure policies and award levels. Our simulation results suggest that, despite its prevalence on many platforms, the full feedback policy (providing feedback throughout the contest) may not be optimal. The late feedback policy (providing feedback only in the second half of the contest) leads to a better overall contest outcome. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics department.

An Empirical Dynamic Model of Trade with Consumer Accumulation

This paper develops a dynamic structural model of trade in which firms slowly accumulate consumers in foreign markets. Estimating the model using export data from individual firms and a particle Markov chain Monte Carlo estimator, the model predicts lower survival rates for new exporters and estimates low entry costs of exporting—less than half of those estimated in the absence of consumer accumulation. Using simulations and out-of-sample predictions, I show that the introduction of such frictions and the reduction in estimated entry costs allow the model to match important facts regarding the aggregate response of international trade to shocks. (JEL D22, F12, F14, L66)

Strategic Patient Discharge: The Case of Long-Term Care Hospitals

Medicare’s prospective payment system for long-term acute-care hospitals (LTCHs) provides modest reimbursements at the beginning of a patient’s stay before jumping discontinuously to a large lump-sum payment after a prespecified number of days. We show that LTCHs respond to the financial incentives of this system by disproportionately discharging patients after they cross the large-payment threshold. We find this occurs more often at for-profit facilities, facilities acquired by leading LTCH chains, and facilities colocated with other hospitals. Using a dynamic structural model, we evaluate counterfactual payment policies that would provide substantial savings for Medicare. (JEL H51, I11, I13, I18)

Approximating the Cost-of-Living Index for a Storable Good

This paper estimates a cost-of-living index using a dynamic structural model for two storable product categories. In each category, regime shifts to higher or lower retail prices are observed. Fixed-base indexes do a poor job of capturing changes in welfare after a regime shift, and deviate from the dynamic index by as much as 300 percent. I evaluate the extent to which two recently proposed indexes can approximate the model-derived index. These indexes improve welfare measurement and are straightforward to compute. The category’s competitive structure and features of the regime shift determine which of the two provides a better approximation. (JEL C43, C51, E31, L11)