Strategic Patient Discharge: The Case of Long-Term Care Hospitals
2018 ◽
Vol 108
(11)
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pp. 3232-3265
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Keyword(s):
Lump Sum
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Medicare’s prospective payment system for long-term acute-care hospitals (LTCHs) provides modest reimbursements at the beginning of a patient’s stay before jumping discontinuously to a large lump-sum payment after a prespecified number of days. We show that LTCHs respond to the financial incentives of this system by disproportionately discharging patients after they cross the large-payment threshold. We find this occurs more often at for-profit facilities, facilities acquired by leading LTCH chains, and facilities colocated with other hospitals. Using a dynamic structural model, we evaluate counterfactual payment policies that would provide substantial savings for Medicare. (JEL H51, I11, I13, I18)
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2003 ◽
Vol 37
(5)
◽
pp. 483-497
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2015 ◽
Vol 16
(10)
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pp. 874-883
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Keyword(s):
2012 ◽
Vol 34
(2)
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pp. 258-274
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2002 ◽
Vol 16
(2)
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pp. 67-76
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Keyword(s):