The Propaganda Battle

2021 ◽  
pp. 139-146
Author(s):  
Michael Llewellyn-Smith

This chapter continues with an account of the diplomatic and propaganda battle fought from Therisso, with Venizelos as leader, chief planner, speaker and writer. Through Klearchos Markantonakis he contacted the Greek prime minister Deliyiannis, trying without success to persuade the Greek government to view the insurgency more sympathetically. He wrote letters to supporters in Crete conveying a 'line to take'. The insurgency was boosted when the veteran Sfakianakis declared his support. Inconclusive talks near Therisso with the French Colonel Lubanski amounted to a form of diplomatic recognition. The prince's efforts to nip the insurgency in the bud, e.g. by arresting the leaders, failed. Gradually the powers, led by the British consul general Howard, moved towards negotiation, blocking the prince's efforts to persuade them to suppress the insurgency by force. Howard's efforts to find a way to restore normality were helped by information brought from the rebel camp by Times correspondent James Bourchier. Meanwhile visits by sympathetic Athens journalists helped to spread Venizelos's message to Greeks on the mainland.

Author(s):  
Neofytos Aspriadis

During the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak all countries around the world used several kinds of response strategies to protect public health and control the outbreak. The main aim was to stop the disease from spreading into the community and put a pressure on the health system of the countries. However, severe measures like lockdown of cities and countries brought side-crises like economic pressure on the individuals, corporations and even the state itself. Although the Greek Government was considered to have managed the first phase of the crisis in March effectively, during the aftermath of the first phase, the complete opening of the economy and tourism, the lowering of measures leaded to the increase of new cases. The increased number of cases together with the late imposition of a new lockdown, leaded to the perception of a governmental failure. This perception mobilized direct or indirect image restoration strategies by officials of the Greek Government to maintain the positive image of their handling despite the general perceptions. This paper explores the image restoration strategies used by the prime minister of Greece for the handlings of the second phase of the pandemic in Greece. The methodology used is discourse analysis with the tools of Image Restoration Strategies by Benoit (1995) from October till December 2020.


2021 ◽  
pp. 361-368
Author(s):  
Michael Llewellyn-Smith

King George, who had stayed in Salonika as a symbol of Greek sovereignty, was assassinated there in early March 1913. He deserved the eloquent tribute Venizelos gave him in parliament. His son Constantine, who became king, was a more difficult customer. The main persisting difficulty facing the Greek government and military authorities was over Bulgaria, where Venizelos's policy was regarded by colleagues (Streit and Skouloudis) as too conciliatory. However, on the question of sovereignty Venizelos was firm, while continuing to persuade the new Bulgarian prime minister Danev to his point of view, which was that if no agreement was possible there should be recourse to arbitration or mediation by friendly countries. Meanwhile a blockage of the London negotiations was resolved by Grey, ambassador Elliot and Venizelos, and the London treaty was signed in May. The Bulgarian issue threatened war in early summer, prompting Greece to conclude a defensive treaty with Serbia in May/June, following a dispute between Venizelos and the King as to the extent of Greece's commitments under it (specifically, whether in the event of war between Austria and Serbia Greece would be obliged to help the latter). This issue was to return during the Great War.


Author(s):  
Nitzan Shoshan

IN RECENT YEARS, as tensions between Athens and Berlin over the former’s debt crisis have deepened, Germany’s past was staged not only on the streets of Greece, where portraits of Chancellor Merkel and Finance Minister Schäuble, rendered as Nazis, decorated demonstration posters. Under the shadow of sour negotiations, the Greek government announced it would seek 162 billion euros in damages from Germany over unpaid WWII reparations and a forced war-time loan. Later, citing a figure of 341 billion euros, Justice Minister Paraskevopoulos raised the possibility of property seizures should Germany fail to respect its alleged obligations. Prime Minister Tsipras and other prominent politicians spoke of “an open wound” and a “moral issue.” For the most part, Berlin and German media hit back with anger and denial, some complaining about “moral blackmail.” Germany’s debts and reparations have been legally, politically, and definitively resolved during its reunification, Merkel insisted; 1989, we see once more, continued to re-sequence history and signal a new “Stunde Null” and a new national project....


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-169
Author(s):  
Ronen Yitzhak

This article deals with Lord Moyne's policy towards the Zionists. It refutes the claim that Lord Moyne was anti-Zionist in his political orientation and in his activities and shows that his positions did not differ from those of other British senior officials at the time. His attitude toward Jewish immigration to Palestine and toward the establishment of a Jewish Brigade during the Second World War was indeed negative. This was not due to anti-Zionist policy, however, but to British strategy that supported the White Paper of 1939 and moved closer to the Arabs during the War. While serving in the British Cabinet, Lord Moyne displayed apolitically pragmatic approach and remained loyal to Prime Minister Churchill. He therefore supported the establishment of a Jewish Brigade and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine in the secret committee that Churchill set up in 1944. Unaware of his new positions, the Zionists assassinated him in November 1944. The murder of Lord Moyne affected Churchill, leading him to reject the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-121
Author(s):  
Owen Dudley Edwards
Keyword(s):  

This essay dissects the early premiership of Mr Boris Johnson with particular focus on his impact upon the Scottish Conservatives, and upon his biography of a previous Conservative Prime Minister: The Churchill Factor – How One Man Made History.


Asian Survey ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 477-497
Author(s):  
Nathaniel B. Thayer

2004 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-165

By late August, the crisis that had been brewing between the prime minister and president came to a head; Abbas's government, though backed by the United States, had been undermined during its four months in office by deterioration on the ground and continuing tensions with Arafat, which centered in particular on control of the Palestinian security forces. Abbas's letter of resignation, published in al-Hayat on 9 September, was translated in Mideast Mirror the same day.


2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-151

The quadrilateral meeting at Aqaba, intended to ““kick off implementation”” of the road map, was attended by King Abdallah, Prime Minister Abbas, Prime Minister Sharon, and President Bush. All four leaders made statements at the end of the meeting, but only those by Abbas and Sharon are reproduced below. President Bush's statement was noteworthy for its mention of Israel as a ““vibrant Jewish state”” (““America is strongly committed and I am strongly committed to Israel's security as a vibrant Jewish state””) and of Palestinian ““hopes”” for a ““viable”” state, and for reiterating that the Arab states ““have promised to cut off assistance and the flow of money and weapons to terrorists groups and to help Prime Minister Abbas rid Palestinian areas of terrorism.”” The statements by Abbas and Sharon were drafted with U.S. officials prior to the meeting. Though Abbas did not comply with the Israeli demand of Palestinian acknowledgment of Israel as a ““Jewish state,”” his speech provoked indignation in the occupied territories for its reference to ““the suffering of the Jews”” without mention of Palestinian suffering, its reiterated call for ending the ““armed intifada,”” and its ““renunciation”” of terrorism. Sharon resisted U.S. suggestions to refer to ““settlements,”” but did mention ““unauthorized outposts.”” In reference to Sharon's mention of ““territorial contiguity”” for a ““viable”” Palestinian state, a spokesman indicated that the contiguity would be ensured by ““bridges and tunnels.”” The text of the statements, transcribed by eMediaMill- Works and carried by the Associated Press, was posted on the Washington Post's Website.


2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26

This section comprises international, Arab, Israeli, and U.S. documents and source materials, as well as an annotated list of recommended reports. Significant developments this quarter: In the international diplomatic arena, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 2334, reaffirming the illegality of Israeli settlements and calling for a return to peace negotiations. Additionally, former U.S. secretary of state John Kerry delivered a final address on the Israel-Palestine conflict, outlining a groundwork for negotiations. Two weeks later, international diplomats met in Paris to establish incentives for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas to return to the negotiating table. Despite international discussions of peace talks and the impediment settlements pose to a two-state solution, the Israeli Knesset passed the controversial Regulation Law, enabling the government to retroactively legalize settlements and confiscate Palestinian land throughout the West Bank. Meanwhile, U.S. president Donald Trump took office on 20 January 2017, and he wasted no time before inviting Netanyahu to the White House for their first meeting, in February.


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