Why Nations Rise . . . or Remain Reticent

What is known of rising powers is both sparse and contentious. This chapter discusses the assumptions of rising powers and puts forward an alternate way of understanding them. It shows that all rising powers are not the same, even if their military and economic power is increasing relative to the status quo, and argues that narratives about becoming a great power are an additional element that needs to be considered. It also discusses what great power meant in the late 19th century, during the Cold War, and in post–Cold War eras, and lays out the map of the book. Topics covered in this chapter include the power transition and rising power literature, the role of ideas in foreign policy, and an overview of the perceptions of great power.

The Reticence of India

Like China, the world began to see India as a rising power in the post–Cold War world. While today many would argue China has pulled away from India, in the 1990s, the two countries were comparable in terms of their economic and military development. In the post-Cold War world, thanks to domestic reforms, India’s economic growth took off at unprecedented rates. It continued to invest in its military, and also became a nuclear weapons state. But, as this chapter shows through two of its relationships, with the United States and with ASEAN, India remained peculiarly reticent on the world stage. And the narratives that accompanied its material growth remained entrenched in older ideas and inward facing ideas about nation-building.

The Reticence of the Netherlands

In the late 19th century the Dutch entered a second Golden Age. This chapter details how the Dutch were considered the second greatest colonial power after the United Kingdom, became one of the richest countries in Europe at the time, and began military reforms. But they were extremely reticent in their foreign policy behavior, giving up colonies and engaging in passive diplomacy. Despite its colonies and wealth, the narratives within the Netherlands denied that the Dutch were imperialist, and showed little appetite for active behavior on the world stage. The behavior of the Dutch was surprising not simply when compared to the world powers of the time—these great powers were, after all, arguably in a stronger strategic position than the Netherlands. Rather the Dutch were reticent even when compared to the smaller European powers of the day who jockeyed for influence, particularly with respect to colonies.

The Active Rise of China

China transformed economically and militarily in the 1990s, and was recognized by the world as a rising power. This chapter examines the process of its rise and finds that in addition to increasing its military and economic power, China also engaged in accommodational behavior. In a switch from its past foreign policy behavior, it now conformed to the existing international order by accepting its norms. It integrated into many international institutions and regimes in the world, and began to also assume leadership roles in various international issues. Simultaneously, it had narratives on how to become a great power through institutional leadership, multilateralism, and acceptance of international responsibility.

Thoughts on Power Transitions, Past and Future

This chapter reviews the patterns found in the book and draws conclusions about the rise of China and India today. It argues that economic power, military power, and narratives about becoming a great power are all essential elements that rising powers which became great powers possessed, and in order to actively rise, these countries recognized the current norms of great power and initially played by the rules of the international order. Those that did not possess all those elements stayed reticent. Particularly, the absence of narratives about how to become a great power stymied these countries from active behavior on the world stage even when they possessed important elements of material power. This difference between active and reticent powers helps us understand why some nations rise to become great powers, as well as the differences between China and India today.

Meiji Japan and Cold War Japan

Japan was considered a rising power in the late 19th century and again during the Cold War. But it rose to become a great power in only the former period. This chapter examines the rise of Meiji Japan and Cold War Japan to show how, despite growing military and economic power in both eras, Japan’s behavior was different—Meiji Japan was active and Cold War Japan was reticent. Examining the narratives in both periods, it finds that in the former it had narratives about how to become a colonial great power, and in the latter it lacked narratives of great power.

The Active Rise of the United States

By the early 20th century the United States was recognized as a great power. This chapter details the rise of the United States to great power status by engaging in behavior that was both active and accommodational of great power norms in Venezuela, Hawaii, and the Philippines. It shows that the United States, in addition to acquiring economic and military power, also had vibrant and contesting narratives about becoming a colonial great power. These narratives, rooted in older ideas about the role and identity of the United States, spoke to the international norm that a great power by definition would assert imperial authority.