Explaining the Long Peace

This chapter addresses the charge made by some behavioral economists (and many strategic analysts) that game theory is of limited utility for understanding interstate conflict behavior. Using one of perfect deterrence theory’s constituent models, a logically consistent game-theoretic explanation for the absence of a superpower conflict during the Cold War era is provided. As well, the chapter discusses a prescription based on an incorrect prediction attributed to John von Neumann, one of the cofounders of game theory. It also examines a logically inconsistent explanation of the long peace offered by Thomas Schelling, the game theorist many consider the most important strategic thinker in the field of security studies. The argument is made that a predictively inaccurate or logically inconsistent game model in no way undermines the utility of game theory as a potentially powerful methodological tool.

Game Theory and Security Studies

This chapter describes the basic assumptions of game theory and illustrates its major concepts, using examples drawn from the security studies literature. An arms race game is used as an example of a strategic form game, illustrating the meaning of an equilibrium outcome and the definition of a dominant strategy. Backward induction and the definition of subgame perfection are explained in the context of an extensive form game that features threats. Nash equilibrium and the Bayesian equilibrium are discussed, and a short review of the many applications of game theory in international politics is provided. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the usefulness of game theory in generating insights about deterrence.

Explaining the 1914 War in Europe

This chapter focuses on the outbreak of World War I, which remains one of the most perplexing events of international history. It should be no surprise that rationalist interpretations of the July Crisis are a diverse lot, ranging from the sinister to the benign. This chapter constructs a theoretically rigorous rationalist explanation of World War I, the 1914 European war that involved Austria–Hungary, Germany, Russia, and France. On the one hand, this chapter confirms the view that one does not have to take a particularly dark view of German intentions to explain the onset of war in 1914; on the other hand, it also calls into question the “accidental war” thesis. A number of related questions about the Great War are addressed in the context of a generic game-theoretic escalation model with incomplete information.

The Moroccan Crisis of 1905–6

This chapter focuses on the Moroccan crisis of 1905–6, which was the first in a series of early twentieth-century confrontations that are generally considered to have led to World War I. The chapter interprets this crisis in the context of an incomplete information game model, the Tripartite Crisis Game, and one of its proper subgames, the Defender–Protégé subgame. British support of France during the 1906 Algeciras Conference, which ended the crisis, the firm stand that France took at the conference, and the German decision to press for a conference, are explained in terms of the model’s principal variables. In addition, the chapter discusses the Entente Cordiale and the “deterrence vs. restraint dilemma” associated with it, and similar strategic relationships. While the analysis is not necessarily at odds with the conclusions of some historians, it is more powerful because it is explicit about the causal mechanisms at work.

A Game-Theoretic History of the Cuban Missile Crisis

This chapter surveys and evaluates previous attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, including, but not limited to, explanations developed in the style of Thomas Schelling, Nigel Howard, and Steven Brams. All of these explanations are judged to be either incomplete or deficient in some way. Schelling’s explanation is both empirically and theoretically inconsistent with the consensus interpretation of the crisis; Howard’s metagame theory is at odds with the contemporary understanding of rational strategic behavior; and Brams’s theory of moves explanation is inconsistent with the full sweep of the events that define the crisis. As game theory has evolved, so have the explanations fashioned by its practitioners. An additional purpose of this chapter is to trace these explanatory refinements, using the Cuban crisis as a mooring.

Postscript

In this chapter, developments in game theory over time are summarized, and the utility of game theory for analyzing conflictual interstate relationships is evaluated. The most important point to be taken from the collection of analytic narratives in this book is game theory’s ability to deliver an explicit causal mechanism upon which explanations can be constructed, and to do this in a transparent and logically consistent way. Game models, by their very nature, facilitate the assessment of logical consistency, minimize the probability of its absence, and encourage counterfactual or “off-the-equilibrium-path” reasoning, allowing for contingent theorizing inter alia. Causal mechanisms are especially valuable because they provide the element of necessity absent in standard (historical) narratives. Nonetheless, game-theoretic knowledge, like all knowledge, is always provisional, so an attitude of intellectual modesty, not arrogance, is the proper one.

Perfect Deterrence Theory

This chapter introduces perfect deterrence theory and contrasts it with classical deterrence theory, which is the prevailing realist theory of interstate war prevention. How and under what conditions war might be prevented is the principal question addressed by both theories. The assumptions, empirical implications, and policy prescriptions of the two approaches to deterrence are discussed. Classical deterrence theory is shown to have both logical and empirical problems. Perfect deterrence theory, which is composed of a number of interrelated game models that are analyzed under a common set of preference assumptions, is not only logically consistent but empirically robust as well.

A General Explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis

This chapter develops a new explanation of the Cuban missile crisis, from a general escalation model of interstate conflict. Specifically, the equilibrium structure of the Asymmetric Escalation Game with incomplete information is used to explain the initiation, development, and resolution of the crisis. This model brings with it a clear set of theoretical expectations about the conditions under which a limited conflict can occur. It also explains why intense interstate disputes occur and, if and when they do, they are successfully resolved (or not). Answers to all three of the foundational questions traditionally associated with the crisis are derived from an examination of the model’s strategic dynamic. The model’s applicability to the strategic relationship of the United States and North Korea is also discussed.

Introduction

History, it is oftentimes said, is just one damned thing after another. Generally speaking, highly skilled diplomatic historians and security studies specialists have performed the task of describing each of these “things” with great acumen. Trachtenberg (1990/1991: 136), for example, convincingly and insightfully shows that the sudden change in German foreign policy on the eve of World War I was precipitated by Russia’s partial mobilization and not, as is oftentimes argued, by a warning in Berlin by the German ambassador in London that Great Britain was unlikely to stand aside in any war that involved France....

Game Theory and Diplomatic History

This chapter explores a number of issues connected with the use of game-theoretic models to organize analytic narratives. First, a causal explanation of the 1936 Rhineland crisis is developed within the confines of a game-theoretic model of asymmetric or unilateral deterrence with incomplete information. In this context, the chapter then introduces the concept of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Then, some methodological obstacles that may arise in a more complex case, such as the 1879 Austro-German alliance, are discussed, and suggestions for overcoming them are offered. Finally, the advantages of using game models to more fully understand real world events are highlighted.