Explaining the Long Peace

Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare

This chapter addresses the charge made by some behavioral economists (and many strategic analysts) that game theory is of limited utility for understanding interstate conflict behavior. Using one of perfect deterrence theory’s constituent models, a logically consistent game-theoretic explanation for the absence of a superpower conflict during the Cold War era is provided. As well, the chapter discusses a prescription based on an incorrect prediction attributed to John von Neumann, one of the cofounders of game theory. It also examines a logically inconsistent explanation of the long peace offered by Thomas Schelling, the game theorist many consider the most important strategic thinker in the field of security studies. The argument is made that a predictively inaccurate or logically inconsistent game model in no way undermines the utility of game theory as a potentially powerful methodological tool.


2019 ◽  
pp. 199-230
Author(s):  
Alan Bollard

In Japan conventional bombing had not proved sufficient: it was the atom bomb that ultimately brought surrender. The brilliant Hungarian mathematician John von Neumann had worked on the Manhattan Project and identified Hiroshima as a bombing target. He went on to design computers that helped build bigger bombs. In addition he developed an original mathematical approach to modelling a dynamic economy that helped economists advance their modelling. With the Cold War looming, he and colleague Oskar Morgenstern pioneered the new subject of game theory which the big powers used to model their post-war defence tactics, and led to the classic 1950s strategy of ‘mutually-assured destruction’.



Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare

The main purpose of this book is to demonstrate, by way of example, the several advantages of using a formal game-theoretic framework to explain complex events, diplomatic history, and contentious interstate relationships, via causal mechanisms and rationality. Chapter 1 lays out the broad parameters and major concepts of the mathematical theory of games and its applications in the security studies literature. Chapter 2 explores a number of issues connected with the use of game-theoretic models to organize analytic narratives, both generally and specifically. Chapter 3 interprets the Moroccan crisis of 1905–6 in the context of an incomplete information game model. Chapter 4 surveys and evaluates several prominent attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Chapter 5 offers a general explanation that answers all of the foundational questions associated with the Cuban crisis within the confines of a single, integrated, game-theoretic model with incomplete information. Chapter 6 uses the same game form to develop a logically consistent and empirically plausible explanation of the outbreak of war in Europe in early August 1914. Chapter 7 introduces perfect deterrence theory and contrasts it with the prevailing realist theory of interstate war prevention, and classical deterrence theory. Chapter 8 addresses the charge made by some behavioral economists (and many strategic analysts) that game theory is of limited utility for understanding interstate conflict behavior.



2015 ◽  
pp. 1849-1872
Author(s):  
Ben Tran

In 1954, the British philosopher Richard Braithwaite gave his inaugural lecture, Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Braithwaite predicted game theory would fundamentally change moral philosophy. However, in hindsight, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour was the moment modern game theory entered the discipline of ethics. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between game theory and business ethics. In other words, this chapter explains how game theory plays a role in business ethics and affects business ethics for emerging economies and covers in detail: 1) the history of game theory; 2) types of/definition(s) of games; 3) business ethics; 4) business; and 5) ethics. The chapter concludes with the role that game theory and business ethics play in emerging economies.





2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Giocoli

The year 2003 marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of John von Neumann (1903–1957), one of greatest geniuses of the last century. Beyond contributing to fields as diverse as set theory, quantum mechanics, atomic energy, and automatic computing, von Neumann has also had a decisive influence upon modern economics. From the invention of game theory to the axiomatization of expected utility, from the introduction of convex analysis and fixed-point techniques to the development of the balanced growth model, the von Neumann heritage can be clearly traced in several areas of our discipline. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the two concepts of rationality he devised in his classic 1944 book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, written with the collaboration of the Austrian economist Oskar Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953).



2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 138
Author(s):  
W. A. V. Souza ◽  
M. C. Malavazi

Game Theory is a mathematical approach to the study of decision making between individuals when each outcome depends on the decisions of others, ie, one should not make an arbitrary decision, but decide based on what they think the decision of their "opponent" will be, knowing that they think the same. Developed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 in the book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, it had been very contested since its launch, but the works of a genius named John Nash, winner of the Nobel Prize in economics in 1994, ended these contestations. This work shows that the Game Theory was not limited to the field of economics, but expanded to other areas, such as biology, explaining strategies used by species to survive. As results are presented more than ten models based on the principles of Game Theory, among them the Prisoner's Dilemma, Ice Cream Vendors Game, Clean City Law and Warning Song between Bird.



Author(s):  
Stephen K. Reed

The power of abstract thinking is captured by the brilliance of John von Neumann who made many contributions to mathematics, computer science, and game theory. One definition of abstraction is that an instance exists only in the mind (the word truth) rather than in the environment (the word car). An advantage of the latter, concrete examples is they support the formation of visual images to aid recall. A second definition of abstraction is a focus on the most important attributes of an instance. These attributes include those that differentiate one object from another or one category from another. A third definition of abstraction is that an abstract idea applies to many particular instances of a category. Prototypes, rules, and schema are examples.



Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare

This chapter surveys and evaluates previous attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, including, but not limited to, explanations developed in the style of Thomas Schelling, Nigel Howard, and Steven Brams. All of these explanations are judged to be either incomplete or deficient in some way. Schelling’s explanation is both empirically and theoretically inconsistent with the consensus interpretation of the crisis; Howard’s metagame theory is at odds with the contemporary understanding of rational strategic behavior; and Brams’s theory of moves explanation is inconsistent with the full sweep of the events that define the crisis. As game theory has evolved, so have the explanations fashioned by its practitioners. An additional purpose of this chapter is to trace these explanatory refinements, using the Cuban crisis as a mooring.



Author(s):  
Anthony Chaney

This chapter explores double-bind theory and the concept of power, including the sexist tendency among proponents to blame the mother. Similarly, radicals, liberals, and secular existentialists challenged the “tragic turn” as bourgeois accommodation to status quo power relations. The holism of systemic approaches foregrounded the old problem of whether nature supplies an ethic. Bateson and the double-bind research team struggled to account for power in the schizophrenic family in a way that blamed neither victim nor victimizer. Bateson's recognition of progressive stalemate in the schizophrenic family drew on the systems theory concept of runaway. Runaway in arms race policies, in turn, reflected political and theoretical conflicts between Norbert Weiner and John von Neumann, the leading mathematicians of the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics. In two essays, Bateson critiques the centrality of power in von Neumann's game theory. Meanwhile, Bateson's conflicts with the more pragmatic research team members, such as Jay Haley, lead him to cast about for a new direction. His eulogy for Frieda Fromm-Reichmann echoed a similar debate over political quietism between Reinhold Niebuhr and Richard Niebuhr.



1993 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ann E. Cudd

Although it may seem from its formalism that game theory must have sprung from the mind of John von Neumann as a corollary of his work on computers or theoretical physics, it should come as no real surprise to philosophers that game theory is the articulation of a historically developing philosophical conception of rationality in thought and action. The history of ideas about rationality is deeply contradictory at many turns. While there are theories of rationality that claim it is fundamentally social and aims at understanding and molding all facets of human psychological life, game theory takes rationality to be essentially located in individuals and to concern only the means to achieve predetermined ends. Thus, there are some thinkers who have made important contributions to this history who do not appear in the story of game theory at all, among them, Plato, Kant, and Hegel. There is, however, a clear trail to follow linking theories of instrumental rationality from Aristotle to the nineteenth-century marginalist economists and ultimately to von Neumann and Morgenstern and contemporary game theorists, that historically grounds game theory as a model of rational interaction.



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