scholarly journals A Game-Theoretic History of the Cuban Missile Crisis

2019 ◽  
pp. 61-82
Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Cuban Missile Crisis ◽  
History Of ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Thomas Schelling

This chapter surveys and evaluates previous attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, including, but not limited to, explanations developed in the style of Thomas Schelling, Nigel Howard, and Steven Brams. All of these explanations are judged to be either incomplete or deficient in some way. Schelling’s explanation is both empirically and theoretically inconsistent with the consensus interpretation of the crisis; Howard’s metagame theory is at odds with the contemporary understanding of rational strategic behavior; and Brams’s theory of moves explanation is inconsistent with the full sweep of the events that define the crisis. As game theory has evolved, so have the explanations fashioned by its practitioners. An additional purpose of this chapter is to trace these explanatory refinements, using the Cuban crisis as a mooring.

Game Models in Various Applications

2014 ◽  
pp. 44-128 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Original Game ◽  
Technical Problems ◽  
Research Areas ◽  
History Of ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Recently, game-theoretic models have become famous in many academic research areas. Therefore, many applications and extensions of the original game theoretic approach appear in many of the major science fields. Despite all the technical problems, the history of game theory suggests that it would be premature to abandon the tool, especially in the absence of a viable alternative. If anything, the development of game theory has been driven precisely by the realization of its limitations and attempts to overcome them. This chapter explores these ideas.

Explaining the Long Peace

2019 ◽  
pp. 145-160
Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Security Studies ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
John Von Neumann ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
Incorrect Prediction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Thomas Schelling

This chapter addresses the charge made by some behavioral economists (and many strategic analysts) that game theory is of limited utility for understanding interstate conflict behavior. Using one of perfect deterrence theory’s constituent models, a logically consistent game-theoretic explanation for the absence of a superpower conflict during the Cold War era is provided. As well, the chapter discusses a prescription based on an incorrect prediction attributed to John von Neumann, one of the cofounders of game theory. It also examines a logically inconsistent explanation of the long peace offered by Thomas Schelling, the game theorist many consider the most important strategic thinker in the field of security studies. The argument is made that a predictively inaccurate or logically inconsistent game model in no way undermines the utility of game theory as a potentially powerful methodological tool.

scholarly journals New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior: Game-Theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent P. Crawford
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Economic Problem ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
Future Developments ◽  
New Directions ◽  
Game Theoretic

In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory's principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking” and “learning” rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments

Game Models in Various Applications

Game Theory ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 244-336
Author(s):  
Sungwook Kim
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Original Game ◽  
Technical Problems ◽  
Research Areas ◽  
History Of ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Recently, game-theoretic models have become famous in many academic research areas. Therefore, many applications and extensions of the original game theoretic approach appear in many of the major science fields. Despite all the technical problems, the history of game theory suggests that it would be premature to abandon the tool, especially in the absence of a viable alternative. If anything, the development of game theory has been driven precisely by the realization of its limitations and attempts to overcome them. This chapter explores these ideas.

Institutional economics of Russia (On the book by R. M. Nureev and Yu. V. Latov “Economic history of Russia: An essay in institutional analysis”)

2017 ◽  
pp. 136-147
Author(s):  
A. Zaostrovtsev
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Predictive Power ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
History Of ◽  
Game Theoretic

Game theory has been a huge success in economics. Many important questions have been answered, and game theoretic methods are now central to much economic investigation. We suggest areas where further advances are important, and argue that models of learning are a promising route for improving and widening game theory’s predictive power while preserving the successes of game theory where it already works well. We emphasize in particular the need for better understanding of the speed with which learning takes place.

The Heuristic Use of Game Theory: Insights for Conflict Resolution

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben D. Mor
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Protracted Conflict ◽  
History Of ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Three Stages ◽  
Theoretic Solution

This article illustrates the heuristic use of game theory by applying it to the analysis of conflict resolution. To this end, we will proceed in three stages. First, we will define a generic bargaining game, which confronts two states that share a history of protracted conflict. Second, we will then introduce a gradual and controlled change in the preferences of the two states for the outcomes that are generated by the bargaining game. Third, for the game series that will be produced, we will apply alternative game-theoretic solution concepts and examine the expected implications of different information conditions. That is, we will establish by means of the theory what the states are expected to do in response to the induced change in their own preferences, in those of the opponent—and in their perception of each other. By modifying these parameters, we will be able to analyze the obstacles that are expected to arise in the peacemaking process and the conditions that are required to attain and stabilize a negotiated settlement.

Book Reviews

2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 653-658
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Scientific Approach ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Experimental Game Theory

Sanjit Dhami of Department of Economics, Accounting, and Finance, University of Leicester reviews “Handbook of Experimental Game Theory” edited by C. M. Capra, Rachel T. A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon, and Tanya S. Rosenblat. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Sixteen papers explore the study of game-theoretic propositions from a scientific approach, covering methodological innovations in the measurement of strategic behavior and static and dynamic games of both complete and incomplete information.”

Reputation and Gossip in Game Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-229
Author(s):  
Charles Roddie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Behavior ◽  
Future Behavior ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Shed Light

When interacting with others, it is often important for you to know what they have done in similar situations in the past: to know their reputation. One reason is that their past behavior may be a guide to their future behavior. A second reason is that their past behavior may have qualified them for reward and cooperation, or for punishment and revenge. The fact that you respond positively or negatively to the reputation of others then generates incentives for them to maintain good reputations. This article surveys the game theory literature which analyses the mechanisms and incentives involved in reputation. It also discusses how experiments have shed light on strategic behavior involved in maintaining reputations, and the adequacy of unreliable and third party information (gossip) for maintaining incentives for cooperation.

Development of Game Theoretic Protocols for Multilevel Design

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayan Sinha ◽  
Farrokh Mistree ◽  
Janet K. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Geometric Modeling ◽  
Underwater Vehicle ◽  
Design Problems ◽  
Single Level ◽  
Engineering Teams ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Multiple Levels ◽  
The Relationship

The effectiveness of the use of game theory in addressing multi-objective design problems has been illustrated. For the most part, researchers have focused on design problems at single level. In this paper, we illustrate the efficacy of using game theoretic protocols to model the relationship between multidisciplinary engineering teams and facilitate decision making at multiple levels. We will illustrate the protocols in the context of an underwater vehicle with three levels that span material and geometric modeling associated with microstructure mediated design of the material and vehicle.

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