Party Organizational Linkage

The literature argues that vertically integrated parties are important for generating or encouraging stability in multi-level systems. This chapter differentiates between party organizational linkages at the level of resources and services, cooperation, and attitudinal dimensions. Drawing on data from a survey of over 250 subnational party organizations in seven multi-level systems, this chapter shows that the institutional design of a federation does not necessarily predict the way in which parties share resources and services through vertical linkages, but it does help us predict other important aspects of multi-level organization. This includes the degree of shared values and the ideological distance between subnational and federal parties.

Shaping Multi-Level Democracy

Why, in some multi-level systems, does political competition preserve highly independent spheres of political life across the units and levels of a federation, while in other multi-level systems, political competition results in the emergence of a shared political space? This chapter argues that these patterns of independent or integrated politics in multi-level systems are shaped in important ways by the federal institutional structure, which shapes the incentives that parties and voters alike face. Surveying the literature that identifies how institutions impact party organization, party systems, and electoral behaviour, this chapter sets out a two-stage causal process whereby institutions shape aspects of integrated politics and aspects of integrated politics reinforce each other.

Institutional Configurations and Linkage Formation

This chapter examines how the party, party system, and voter behaviour components of party competition combine with each other and with the federal institutional structure to lead to integrated or independent politics. It uses configurational analysis using fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) methods to identify various pathways to linkage. It then draws on case studies of Spain, Canada, and Germany in order to probe the causal mechanisms and relationships between elements of linkage. Germany and Canada represent cases that institutionally are most likely and least likely to support the development of integrated politics, while Spain offers an asymmetric multi-level system.

Federal Institutional Design

Two aspects of federal institutional design can have a powerful impact on parties and party competition, and especially on the emergence of independent or integrated arenas of competition. The first is the way in which federal institutions allocate resources to the subnational and federal levels. The second is the extent to which the constitutional allocation of policy responsibility creates legislative or administrative interdependence or autonomy. This chapter discusses how these two institutional dimensions shape the incentives that parties and voters face, and presents an operationalization of several indicators for measuring these aspects of institutional design in seven multi-level systems.

Voter Behaviour

How do party organizational and party system linkages help us understand how voters treat multi-level contexts? It is commonly argued that federal contexts disrupt the accountability mechanism. Do certain institutional designs of federalism affect this? Institutional designs that maximize the autonomy of each level of government should preserve the clarity of responsibility more than institutional designs that create a high degree of interdependence between levels of government. The existence of other forms of political linkage, at the party organizational and party system level, should also affect the emergence of linked political behaviour. This chapter tests whether this prediction holds using aggregate-level electoral data to identify barometer voting and subnational economic voting effects across seven multi-level systems. It then uses individual-level data to more closely examine how and when partisanship serves as a linkage mechanism in the case of Canada.

Party System Linkage

This chapter examines two forms of integrated politics at the party system level, party system congruence and party system nationalization. Drawing on data from over 2,220 subnational elections in seven multi-level systems, it assesses three forms of party system congruence across the units of a multi-level system: similarity of the number of parties, electoral support, and similarity of the magnitude and direction of the electoral swing. Using the index of cumulative regional inequality (CRI), it measures the territorial concentration of party systems. The analysis shows that fiscal centralization and administrative interdependence predict integrated politics in the form of more congruent patterns of electoral support. There are limits to the institutional explanation. The electoral system and social cleavage structure are important explanations of variation in party system structures and territorial concentration.

Integrated and Independent Politics

Political life in a multi-level system can be integrated or independent at the level of party organizations, party systems, and voter behaviour, either creating a shared space of political competition or separate political worlds. This chapter elaborates the concepts of integrated and independent politics in multi-level systems and discusses their possible normative consequences for the performance of federalism. The chapter presents an operationalization of the core concepts of integrated and independent politics and discusses how aspects of multi-level competition, at the level of party, party system, and voter behaviour, either generate integrative forces or preserve separate arenas of competition.

Towards a Theory of Political Development in Multi-Level Systems

Integrated and independent politics are useful concepts for understanding the forms of competitive linkages among subnational jurisdictions and between the subnational and federal levels. The forms of linkage that generate integrated politics are varied, with some forms of linkage rooted in the structures of party systems or the organizational structures of parties. Other forms are more fluid, and reflected in attitudes and behaviours of parties and voters or shifts in electoral support. The stronger role for federal institutional influences in these more fluid linkage outcomes helps us to develop a more nuanced theory that can refine the impact of federal institutions. While social cleavages and the electoral system are strong drivers of party system structures and nationalization, federal institutions shape the more fluid aspects of integration. Fiscal centralization, while important, is not a necessary condition of integrated politics. Administrative interdependence can generate integrated politics even alongside decentralization.