Quantum Interference

Moving to more subtle experiments, we consider how the standard formulation of quantum mechanics predicts and explains interference phenomena. Tracking the conditions under which one observes interference phenomena leads to the notion of quantum decoherence. We see why one must sharply distinguish between collapse phenomena and decoherence phenomena on the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. While collapses explain determinate measurement records, environmental decoherence just produces more complex, entangled states where the physical systems involved lack ordinary physical properties. We characterize the quantum-mechanical wave function as both an element of a Hilbert space and a complex-valued function over a configuration space. We also discuss how the wave function is interpreted in the standard theory.

The Standard Formulation of Quantum Mechanics

The standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics is presented as a set of five basic rules. We discuss each rule is discussed in turn paying particular attention to the conceptual history of the theory. Of central importance is the standard interpretation of states (the eigenvalue-eigenstate link) and the dynamical laws of the theory (the random collapse dynamics and the deterministic linear dynamics) and how the interpretation and dynamics work together to predict and explain the results of basic quantum experiments. While the focus is on the behavior of electrons, we also briefly consider how the theory uses the same mathematical formalism to treat other phenomena like the behavior of neutral K mesons and qbits in a quantum computer.

Empirical Ontology and Explanation

Each formulation of quantum mechanics we consider in the book seeks to explain why we have determinate measurement records distributed according to the standard quantum statistics. The explanation we get relies on the metaphysical assumptions that underlie the particular theory. Metaphysics here does real explanatory work in accounting for our experience. While it is not at all clear what specific metaphysical commitments best explain our experience, one can distinguish between different types and degrees of empirical adequacy each formulation provides. Stronger notions of empirical adequacy might be characterized in terms of such things as the plausibility that one’s experience in fact supervenes on the sort of records a particular theory provides and the richness of the account of experience provided by the theory.

Pure Wave Mechanics

Everett thought of the quantum measurement problem as one of providing a consistent description of nested measurement. He proposed solving the measurement problem by simply supposing that all physical systems whatsoever always obey the linear dynamics and hence never collapse. Dropping the collapse dynamics immediately solves the measurement problem, but it introduces two new problems: explaining determinate measurement records and explaining quantum probabilities. In addition to these, we also consider the problem of empirical coherence in the context of pure wave mechanics. We then discuss how Everett himself understood determinate records and probabilities in his relative-state formulation of pure wave mechanics. What he ultimately provided was an argument that his formulation of quantum mechanics was consistent and empirically faithful. We will see why this is a relative weak standard by which to judge the empirical adequacy of a physical theory.

The Collapse of the Quantum State

We consider Wigner’s proposal for solving the quantum measurement problem. His solution involves a strong mind-body dualism, but it is also possible to provide a purely physical collapse solution to the quantum measurement problem. To this end, we consider the GRW formulation of quantum mechanics and three ways one might interpret it: GRWr, GRWm, and GRWf. These ways of interpreting the theory differ in the metaphysical commitments one makes and, hence, in how one explains one’s measurement records and hence one’s experience. This provides an introduction to the notions of an empirical ontology and a primitive ontology. We consider some of the comparative virtues and vices of the GRW formulation of quantum mechanics.

Classical Mechanics

While quantum mechanics is one of the most successful physical theories we have ever had, it is deeply counterintuitive. It must be given the empirical evidence it explains. We consider some of the historical evidence for the theory and the conceptual arguments that led from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics. These considerations illustrate some of the ways in which our commonsense and philosophical intuitions are simply incompatible with the physical world.

Many Worlds and Such

We consider a number of radically different ways that Everett’s pure wave mechanics has been understood. Each of these reconstructions aims to provide a stronger variety of empirical adequacy than Everett’s own formulation of the theory. Among the alternative formulations of quantum mechanics we consider are splitting worlds, decohering worlds, many minds, many threads, and many maps. Each of these differs in its metaphysical commitments and, hence, in how it explains determinate measurement records and probabilities. We focus, in particular, on the problem of accounting for the standard quantum probabilities. To this end, we consider the relationship between typicality and probability and contrast synchronic and forward-looking probabilities. We conclude with a brief discussion of epistemological, pragmatic, and information-theoretic formulations of quantum mechanics. A recurring issue in this chapter concerns what it should mean for a physical theory to be empirically adequate.

Real and/or Local

Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) argued that quantum mechanics was incomplete. We consider their argument and the physical and philosophical intuitions that motivated it. Among their intuitions was a commitment to real physical properties and to local properties and interactions. For his part, Einstein’s commitment to locality was closely related to how he understood special relativity. We show why the standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics is flatly incompatible with special relativity. Following Bell, we then see why no physical theory that satisfies EPR’s commonsense and philosophical intuitions can be empirically adequate over quantum phenomena.

The Mathematics of Quantum Mechanics

Quantum mechanics is written in the language of linear algebra. On the Schrodinger picture the theory represents quantum-mechanical states using the elements of a Hilbert space and represents observable physical properties and the standard dynamics using the linear operators on the state space. We consider the mathematical notions for understanding and working with the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. Each mathematical notion is characterized geometrically, algebraically, and physically. The mathematical representation of quantum-mechanical superpositions is discussed.

Quantum Phenomena

The behavior of electrons provides several concrete examples of quantum phenomena. We consider electron spin properties, how electrons move, quantum randomness and the relationships between observables, quantum limits on empirical prediction, superpositions, interference effects, nonlocality, and the role of observation in generating quantum phenomena. Each illustrates the counterintuitive nature of quantum phenomena and provides a sense of the sort of phenomena that any satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics must predict and explain.