On Plato’s Conception of Change

In this paper I argue that in several passages Plato sympathizes with the following view: sensible particulars undergo continuous, pervasive physical change; as a consequence, where there seems to be one and the same object which is identical through time, there is in fact a succession of impermanent objects numerically distinct from each other but similar to each other. I illustrate the difference between this view—which invites interesting comparisons with modern and contemporary theories—and other, superficially similar views which Plato criticizes. I also suggest that this view might contribute to explaining Plato’s contention that sensible particulars lack being and are confined to coming to be. Finally, I show that my interpretation was well attested in antiquity; and I put forward the hypothesis that part of the aim of certain Aristotelian claims about substance might be to correct Plato in this respect.

J. L. Austin’s Lecture Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics : Making Sense of Aristotle on Akrasia

This piece selects from J. L. Austin's unpublished (and only recently retrieved) lecture notes on the Nicomachean Ethics pages relevant to the interpretation of book 7, chapter 3, which is central to his account of akrasia. It takes over many of the details of Austin’s treatment, and carries his thoughts further in two directions: (i) he suggests a tight relation between evaluation and desire that can be developed into one between prohairesis and action; (ii) he sees each lower stratum of Aristotle’s soul as relating to a higher as potentiality to actuality, with the danger of a relapse from higher to lower.

Leaving Nothing to Chance: An Argument for Principle Monism in Plotinus

Plotinus maintains that there is a single first principle, the One (or the Good), from which all other things derive. He is usually thought to hold this view on the grounds that any other thing’s existence depends on its participation in a paradigm of unity. This paper argues that Plotinus has a further, independent argument for adopting a single first principle, according to which principle pluralism is committed (unacceptably) to attributing good cosmic states of affairs to chance. This argument exhibits similarities to ancient design arguments, but is used to draw the more radical conclusion that there is only one non-derivative existent.

Two Classic Problems in the Stoic Theory of Time

In this paper I deal with two philosophical problems in the Stoic theory of time that have been extensively discussed by the Stoics and in modern Stoic scholarship. My overall aim is to prove that, contrary to appearances, the Stoic theory of time is fully internally consistent. To do so, I explore fundamental issues in ontology and causal theory: the connection between the four ontological ‘categories’ and events construed as property exemplifications, the role of procatarctic and synectic causes in the unity of events, the role of events in the individuation of times, and the importance of the distinction between event types and event tokens for assessing the doctrine of everlasting recurrence. Thus, I intend to shed new light on Stoic metaphysics and cosmology.

How Preplatonic Worlds Became Ensouled

This article shows how two basic meanings of psuchē—namely, ‘breath’ and ‘life’—may have helped Platonizing, or for that matter Stoicizing, doxographers in endowing various Preplatonic philosophers with the view that the world is ‘ensouled'. Although I do not attempt a systematic reconstruction of how these cosmo-philosophers conceived the relationship between the world and what was to become ‘the soul’, I suggest that framing the problem in terms of ‘breath’ and ‘life’ helps us to arrive at a more adequate understanding both of the authentic evidence and of the history of its reception. Indeed, to the extent that it is possible I try to reconstruct the interpretative steps that led, with various degrees of legitimacy, from the original wording to its Platonizing or Stoicizing deformations, which remain all too often the framework of analysis in modern interpretations. Five case studies are considered: Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, some Pythagoreans, and Alcmaeon.

The Basic Logic of Plotinus’ System

This article is a discussion of E. K. Emilsson, Plotinus (London and New York, 2017). Three themes are selected: causation; the holistic account of intelligible being; the status of matter and body. The discussion ends with some remarks about Emilsson’s approach to Plotinus’ philosophy. Emilsson’s account of Plotinus’ causation is based on the transmission model, what Emilsson calls ‘the principle of prior possession’. Here it is argued that the transmission model requires qualifications in order to be applied to Plotinus’ account of causation. The section on Plotinus’ holism focuses on two analogies: that of science and its theorems and that of craftsmanship. The section on matter and body addresses the issue of Plotinus’ dualism as different from Cartesian dualism. The final remarks assess Emilsson’s philosophical approach to Plotinus, his use of contemporary philosophical notions, and the problem of Plotinus’ philosophical mysticism.