Rest of Day, July 20

As Hardee's Corps and Stewart's Army of Mississippi assailed Thomas's Army of the Cumberland north of Atlanta, the rest of Sherman's army group continued to inch forward to the east and northeast of Atlanta. Schofield's Army of the Ohio and two divisions of Oliver O. Howard's Fourth Corps worked through tangled vegetation in their effort to link Thomas with McPherson's Army of the Tennessee. They made limited progress, essentially coming up to the developing Confederate position known as the Peach Tree Creek Line (which faced north) and the Confederate Outer Line (which faced east). Elements of Howard's and Schofield's commands skirmished with troops from Benjamin F. Cheatham's Corps (formerly commanded by Hood), which was responsible for holing the far right of the Peach Tree Creek Line and all of the Outer Line. But a gap continued to exist between Howard and John Newton's division. Fortunately for the Federals, the Confederates never became aware of this potentially dangerous hole in Sherman's formation. McPherson continued to move along the Georgia Railroad toward Atlanta, allowing a small force of Confederate cavalry under Joseph Wheeler to slow his pace. By July 20, he came within striking distance of the Outer Line.

Featherston versus Ward

Winfield Scott Featherston's Brigade of William W. Loring's Division, in Alexander p. Stewart's Army of Mississippi, attacked to the left of Hardee. Opposing Featherston was William T. Ward's division of the Twentieth Corps. Because of Hooker's lackadaisical attitude, Ward was not yet in position on the high ground south of Peach Tree Creek. Taken by surprise, Ward's brigade commanders reacted quickly and led their men in a desperate counter charge up the steep bluffs bordering the south side of the creek, met Featherston's men part way up, and pushed them all the way up the slope. The result was an impressive victory for the men of Ward's division. They established and fortified their line on top of the bluff in line with Newton's division to the left and Geary's division to the right. It is true that Ward's three brigades heavily outnumbered Featherston's lone brigade. Moreover, about one-third (820 out of 1,230) of Featherston's men merely stopped on top of the bluff and failed to move down the slope to engage the 4,000 Federals in Ward's three brigades which were led by John Coburn, Benjamin Harrison (a future president of the United States), and James Wood, Jr.

Across the Chattahoochee, July 17–18

On July 17, Sherman moved all of his troops to the south side of the Chattahoochee River and marched on Atlanta, with James B. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee moving the longest distance to reach Decatur east of Atlanta and tear up the Georgia Railroad as it advanced toward the city. This cut one of the three railroads Johnston relied on to feed his army in Atlanta. George H. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland had the shortest route to march, crossing the Chattahoochee near its junction with Peach Tree Creek, moving to Buck Head, and then marching south toward Atlanta. John M. Schofield's Army of the Ohio tried to fill in the distance between those two forces. As the Federals advanced with minor skirmishing against a screen of Confederate cavalry, Davis decided to relieve Johnston of command and elevate John Bell Hood to replace him. Hood, taken by surprise, tried to convince Davis to change his mind or at least postpone the change in commanders but the Confederate president refused to do so. Hood finally assumed his new command on July 18 and tried to prepare the Army of Tennessee to meet Sherman's advance.

To the Chattahoochee

William T. Sherman's conduct of the Atlanta campaign from the first week of May until he reached the Chattahoochee River by mid-July 1864 was highly successful. Relying on his railroad link with Louisville, Kentucky, Sherman refused to risk his men in repeated or heavy frontal attacks against the well-fortified positions Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston established at Dalton, Resaca, New Hope, Pickett's Mill, and Kennesaw Mountain. Although Sherman experimented with a few attacks along the way, most notably at Resaca and Kennesaw Mountain, his failure did not result in crippling losses like those suffered by Ulysses S. Grant at the same time in Virginia. Johnston's tendency to evacuate his strong positions at the slightest sign of Union flanking moves, or because his corps leaders thought those positions untenable, not only contributed to Sherman's success but tremendously increased the morale of Union soldiers to the point where they were supremely confidence in their leader and in the eventual success of the campaign. In contrast, when Johnston fell back across the Chattahoochee River on July 9, Confederate President Jefferson Davis lost all patience with his Fabian strategy in Georgia and came to the conclusion that he had to be replaced. Johnston failed to protect all the possible crossings of the Chattahoochee that could be used by the Federals. As a result, Sherman was able to secure two bridgeheads on the south side of the river, well north of its junction with Peach Tree Creek, in the days following Johnston's fall back.

Conclusion

The battle of Peach Tree Creek was the largest tactical offensive mounted by the Army of Tennessee since the battle of Chickamauga ten months before. Soldier morale was depressed by the loss of their beloved commander, Joseph E. Johnson. While most men had no real opinion of John Bell Hood, they knew that the army would now take the offensive. Many Confederates were reluctant to close with the enemy on July 20. Hardee's Corps failed to press home its advantage of manpower over John Newton's division. At least one third of Winfield S. Featherston's Brigade refused to accompany their comrades in pressing home the assault against William T. Ward's division. More or the less the same was true along the rest of the battle line. In contrast, most Federals fought with determination that day. Hood also developed an attack plan that was too complicated as he struggled to master the complexities of army level command. Efforts to preserve and mark the battlefield for posterity were mounted after the war, especially in the 1930s, but they mostly failed and the battlefield largely has been consumed by the explosive growth of Atlanta in the twentieth century.

Scott versus Geary

Thomas M. Scott's Brigade of Loring's Division attacked John W. Geary's division, the only Twentieth Corps unit in place on good ground south of Peach Tree Creek. While Scott's right wing was stopped in bloody fighting, the left wing took advantage of a wooded ravine that lay to Geary's right (and should have been occupied by other Twentieth Corps troops if Hooker had placed his corps properly before the battle). Scott's left wing used this cover to flank Geary's line and throw his division into confusion. The right wing of Charles Candy's brigade fell back in and a bloody fight developed around the 13th New York Battery, in which the Federals held their ground and repulsed the Confederates. Meanwhile, Patrick H. Jones's brigade, to Candy's rear, adjusted its position to help Candy and oppose the enemy. David Ireland's brigade, to Jones' rear, broke up its column formation to go into action with some regiments moving forward to help the rest of the division and other regiments being forced back by the Confederates, who surged to the rear of Geary's position. In the end, after a confused, swirling battle in the woods, Geary's men repulsed Scott's attack.

Across Peach Tree Creek, July 19

Sherman wanted Thomas to move south toward Atlanta and cross Peach Tree Creek on July 19, as McPherson approached the city from the east. Schofield still had the assignment of trying to fill the gap between Thomas and McPherson. Federal efforts resulted in less progress than expected. Thomas pushed some of his men across the creek that day. After a small fight, Thomas J. Wood's division established a bridgehead where the Buck Head and Atlanta Road crossed the creek. It took a longer, bloodier battle for Caleb Dilworth's brigade of Jefferson C. Davis' division, Fourteenth Corps, to cross at the mouth of Green Bone Creek. Here Confederate General Daniel H. Reynolds' Brigade fought hard but was forced back. Davis then formed a bridgehead on the south side of the creek. Also, John W. Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps and Richard W. Johnson's division of the Fourteenth Corps crossed the creek between those two bridgeheads. In the Confederate army, Hood wanted to attack Thomas that day but his army was in disarray with many high level commanders shifting their responsibilities because of his elevation to army leadership. Hood also needed time to acclimate himself to his new position.

July 21–22

Union and Confederate survivors evaluated the battle of Peach Tree Creek, commented on the performance of their enemy, and judged the conduct of their own officers. The Federals were jubilant over their victory and the Confederates admitted defeat. The battle increased the already high state of morale among Union soldiers and dimmed Confederate hopes. Hood also was frustrated by the failure of his first battle as army leader, believing a report that Hardee had warned his men before the battle to be wary of Union earthworks. There is no proof of this but Hood blamed Hardee for the defeat in his official report and his post-war memoirs. Hood also blamed Joseph E. Johnston for instilling a timid mood among the men through his constant retreats and refusal to take the offensive. Sherman continued to close up on Atlanta during July 21-22, advancing his men to follow up Hood's evacuation of the Peach Tree Creek Line and the Outer Line. Hood prepared to strike at Sherman's left flank, which resulted in the Battle of Atlanta on the afternoon of July 22. His men came much closer to tactical victory than they had two days before at Peach Tree Creek.

Cleaning Up

With 2,500 Confederates and 1,900 Federals killed, wounded, and missing in the Battle of Peach Tree Creek, the first task for the victorious Unionists was to clean up the battlefield. Details collected the wounded of both sides, finding at least one woman soldier who had been disguised as a man lying injured on the field and wearing a Confederate uniform. Details also buried the dead of both sides either in single graves or in communal trenches. All manner of debris from discarded clothing to abandoned battle flags, small arms, and personal equipment littered the field. Several Federal surgeons described in detail the process of taking care of both Union and Confederate wounded for days following the battle at Peach Tree Creek and many personal stories of survival can be found in the letters, diaries, memoirs, and unit histories of the men and regiments engaged in the fight. The deaths of soldiers affected entire families back home in the North and South, and many wounded men who survived the battle carried the effects of their injuries for the rest of their lives, sometimes perishing of the after effects of a battlefield wound decades later.

O’Neal versus Williams and Reynolds versus McCook

Edward A. O'Neal's Brigade of Walthall's Division struck Alpheus S. Williams' division on Hooker's right. Williams was taken by surprise but his men reacted quickly to the attack. His division formed line in time to repulse several advances by O'Neal's troops with extremely heavy firing. Even though O'Neal handled his men well and they penetrated the wooded, uneven ground to Geary's right, they had to retire by the end of the day. Meanwhile, Daniel Harris Reynolds' Brigade of Walthall's Division advanced to the left of O'Neal against Anson McCook's brigade of Richard W. Johnson's Fourteenth Corps division. McCook's command was ready for action but one regiment, Douglas Hapeman's 104th Illinois, was forced by the configuration of the ground to be placed forward of the brigade's main line. This enabled part of Reynolds' line to almost flank the right of the 104th Illinois. Only by personally leading a counterattack could Hapeman save his flank just before reinforcements arrived to help him drive the Confederates away. On the far left of Hood's line, Samuel G. French's Division advanced two brigades toward the Fourteenth Corps line, to Reynolds' left, but they made little headway before the battle ended that day.