Presidential politics of constitutional amendment in Francophone Africa: The case of Senegal

The paper is devoted to the role of the head of state in initiating and implementing constitutional reforms in Senegal. This country can legitimately be regarded as one of the few examples of a relatively successful democratization process in Africa, as evidenced, among other things, by the lack of military coups leading to the loss of power by civilian governments, as well as by two democratic transfers of power (in 2000–2001 and 2012), after which the main opposition parties gained the presidency and the majority of parliamentary seats. Both these fundamental political transformations generated important constitutional changes (for example, the adoption of the current Constitution of 2001, or the constitutional modifications of 2016 and 2019) that have influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, the position of the presidency in Senegalese systems of government. The author analyses their significance for the functioning of contemporary political institutions in the broader context set by the politics of constitutional amendment which was conducted by previous presidents of this country. The main goal of the paper is to examine to what extent the constitutional modifications introduced before and after the adoption of the 2001 Constitution were designed to contribute to the beginning or consolidation of pro-democratic trends, and to what extent they were created to strengthen the position of an incumbent president himself, leading to a political imbalance and regress in the democratization process. The author argues that the constitutional modifications adopted over the years have often gone in two opposite directions, influencing the efficiency and durability of Senegalese institutional structures.

The Effects of Constitutional Changes on the Judiciary System in Albania: The Process of Vetting

The adoption of laws in Albania is often achieved through consensus among legislators, declaring it as the best solution for a certain political or legal situation, which resulted ineffective in many cases. The focus of law improvements was concentrated on control/Vetting, that is, the exclusion from the judicial system of individuals who do not meet one of the three constitutional criteria (wealth, moral integrity, and professionalism). Vetting, control per se, is not a reform of justice, but only one of its constitutive phases. The Albanian Constitution changes aim to restructure the justice institutions to achieve the standards requested for the Albanian EU integration. The paper goes through the different constitutional reforms, focusing on the judicial system changes especially on the recent results of the vetting process in Albania. The questions like: How is the Vetting process affecting judicial standards, how are the new Albanian justice institutions reacting, what is the public opinion on this progress and the benefits of society, are essential to understand how this process was conducted in Albania, its problems and difficulties. The results are explained through underlining different studies, media interventions, and recent political and public statements of involved institutions. Received: 19 August 2021 / Accepted: 1 November 2021 / Published: 3 January 2022

Беларусь на перепутье конституционного развития

The article analyzes the possible options for the constitutional development of the Republic of Belarus. Among them: amending the current Constitution, the adoption of a new Constitution and the restoration of the 1994 Constitution. The author substantiates his approach to the forthcoming constitutional reforms.

Comparing Experiences of Constitutional Reforms to Enshrine the Right to Water in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru: Opportunities and Limitations

In this paper we compare recent efforts towards the constitutionalization of the right to water in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru to understand the opportunities and limitations related to the attempts to enhance access to piped water to the highest normative level. Peru passed a constitutional amendment in 2017 while Brazil and Colombia have seen much right-to-water activism but have not succeeded in passing such reforms. We explore the role of the existing domestic legal frameworks on drinkable water provision and water management towards the approval of constitutional amendments. We find that all three countries have specialized laws, water governing institutions, and constitutional jurisprudence connecting access to water with rights, but the legal opportunity structures to enforce socio-economic rights vary; they are stronger in Colombia and Brazil, and weaker in Peru. We argue that legal opportunity structures build legal environments that influence constitutional reform success. Legal opportunity structures act as incentives both for social movements to push for reforms and for actors with legislative power to accept or reject them. Our findings also show that in some contexts political cost is a key element of constitutional reforms that enshrine the right to water; therefore, this is an element that should be considered when analyzing these processes.

Render unto Caesar Just a Little Bit Longer: The Relationship between Constitutional Reforms and Executive Survival

Since the third wave of democracy, term limits have become a popular fixture of most constitutions intended to constrain the executive. Yet, recent constitutional reforms around the world show that presidents seeking re-election sometimes overturn the entire constitutional order to extend their power. What is the impact of these constitutional manipulations on the longevity of the executive in office? Using survival analysis of all political leaders and national constitutions from 1875 to 2015, this article demonstrates, for the first time, that when ‘authoritarian-aspiring’ presidents remove constitutional term limits, they increase their stay in office by more than 40%. Our findings contrast with a widely held position in the comparative authoritarian literature suggesting that dictators survive longer under institutional constraints. On the contrary, we argue that by removing constitutional barriers, rulers consolidate more power at the expense of their most ambitious allies and can stay in power longer.

Finland

This chapter analyzes plenary debates in the Eduskunta, the unicameral legislature of Finland. Recent constitutional reforms have strengthened the role of the Eduskunta, which the findings also reflect. Access to the floor is relatively unconstrained in Finland, but there is also a strong element of party control involved. The chapter shows that opposition MPs, small parties, and party leaders make active use of plenary speeches. The constitutional reform increased the likelihood of frontbenchers and experienced MPs to deliver speeches. Gender and partially seniority have little effect on who gets to speak in the plenary, but there is also quite a significant variation between political parties. Overall, our results indicate that the plenary has become a more important arena in Finnish politics, both for the cabinet and the opposition.

ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES

Since gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian countries have embarked on state building with regard for the experience of developed countries. During the political modernization process, the countries of Central Asia heeded great attention to the constitution. The political elites in power have enshrined the separation of powers between the government branches in the basic law. At the same time, the institution of the president retained a special status in the state power system. This fact reflected the specifics of the development of new states, where the legislative body was absent or played an insignificant role for a prolonged time period. The president plays a major role in the political systems of the regional states (with the exception of Kyrgyzstan), which was manifested in his special status. As a result, a patron-client model has developed in the regional states, where the president acquires and maintains the loyalty of political elites through material incentives. Meanwhile, the regional countries were undergoing continuous constitutional reforms. The amendments to the fundamental law have been and are being used by the presidents of the Central Asian countries to maintain and reinforce their legitimacy. The need to solve this problem has increased in the context of a decline in economic growth and accumulated internal socio-economic problems. In 2020-2021, the coronavirus pandemic produced a negative impact. These challenges posed the task of implementing a new democratic transformation strategy for the executive authorities of the regional states, in particular, the expansion of powers in the legislative branch of government. At the present stage, a new balance of forces has emerged in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which involves a higher responsibility of the parliament and government for the implementation of socio-economic reforms. This afforded greater stability to the political regimes in these countries. In Tajikistan, a power centralization tendency has developed, and the position of the incumbent is being solidified. Hopes for carrying out structural economic reforms are pinned on the president. Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a desire to develop parliamentarianism in order to prevent the development of authoritarian tendencies. However, the introduction of a parliamentary form of government did not lead to the solution of the country’s internal problems, primarily due to the continued enormous influence of informal institutions on the authorities. Major socio-economic problems faced by the Kyrgyz authorities in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic triggered another round of political tension in the country and ultimately led to a change of power and a transition to a presidential form of government. The changes introduced to the constitutions of the regional states create the appearance of the implementation of democratic principles and the use of procedures to improve the efficiency of the government. At the same time, institutional changes undermine socio-political stability, creating problems for further national development.