Traditions of the Old Believers and the Fate of the Russian World in the XXI Century: Cultural and Philosophical Aspect

Introduction. Questions of continuity and cultural conservatism of the Russian society of the Modern era are one of the problems of the research in this article. The author suggests that the Old Russian religious and moral heritage was not completely destroyed by the Nikon church reforms in the Moscow state. The purpose of the article is to consider the diversity of forms of Russian religiosity in the context of the development of traditions of Russian society. Materials and Methods. In modern conditions, interest in religion and Old Believers continues to grow, as a rich cultural heritage of Russian society. Therefore, the appeal to the texts of the past in the philosophical method of dialogicality, hermeneutics, and a comprehensive analysis of the works of the Old Believers allows us to identify all the features of the heritage of the past of Russia. Results. The positions of the ethical and aesthetic consciousness of the schism teachers worried many Russian philosophers of the “Silver Age” era. The dramatic nature of the situation was that there was no complete reconciliation between the parties to the split in Russian spiritual thought. Discussion and Conclusion. Many of the ideas of Protopop Avvakum, one of the leaders of the Old Believers in Russia, continue to be relevant to the present day. The questions of the moral and socio-cultural identity of the Russians as the “last Orthodox kingdom” are of an eschatological nature. Many aspects of ritualism and rite-believing are preserved among the Russian people and among many Russian and foreign communities of believers. The confessional culture of the Old Russian epoch remains a mystery for many modern researchers and is of an actual nature, since many aspects of this problem remain poorly studied. The subject of the analysis of the influence of Old-Belief traditions on the fate of the spirituality of the Russian people is important.

Targeting COVID Vaccine Hesitancy in Rural Communities in Tennessee: Implications for Extending the COVID-19 Pandemic in the South

Approximately 40% of Tennesseans are vaccinated fully, due mainly to higher vaccination levels within urban counties. Significantly lower rates are observed in rural counties. Surveys suggest COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is entrenched mostly among individuals identifying as white, rural, Republican, and evangelical Christian. Rural counties represent 70 of the total 95 counties in Tennessee, and vaccine hesitancy signifies an immediate public health crisis likely to extend the COVID-19 pandemic. Tennessee is a microcosm of the pandemic’s condition in the Southern U.S. Unvaccinated communities are the greatest contributors of new COVID-19 infections, hospitalizations, and deaths. Rural Tennesseans have a long history of cultural conservatism, poor health literacy, and distrust of government and medical establishments and are more susceptible to misinformation and conspiracy theories. Development of novel strategies to increase vaccine acceptance is essential. Here, I examine the basis of COVID-19 following SARS-CoV-2 infection and summarize the pandemic’s extent in the South, current vaccination rates and efforts across Tennessee, and underlying factors contributing to vaccine hesitancy. Finally, I discuss specific strategies to combat COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. We must develop novel strategies that go beyond financial incentives, proven ineffective toward vaccinations. Successful strategies for vaccine acceptance of rural Tennesseans could increase acceptance among unvaccinated rural U.S. populations.

The Authoritarian Predisposition and American Public Support for Social Security

Authoritarianism, an individual-level predisposition that favors security, conformity, and certainty, has been powerfully linked with cultural conservatism and support for “strongman” politicians but weakly and inconsistently linked with public opinion toward economic issues. In examining this latter relationship, past work has tended to pose a dichotomous question, is authoritarianism associated with economic liberalism/conservatism or not? Here, I diverge from this approach and argue that authoritarianism is associated with support for one specific program—Social Security. I argue that the unique framing of this program, which emphasizes rule-following, certainty, and deservingness, should resonate with authoritarian-minded individuals. I test this with survey data, primarily from the American National Election Studies (ANES). Overall, I find a positive and substantively significant relationship between authoritarianism and support for Social Security but not for other types of domestic social welfare spending. These findings help us better understand the correlates of mass support for Social Security as well as the policy consequences of authoritarianism. These findings also suggest that Social Security will likely remain popular in an increasingly authoritarian Republican Party.

Migration and Partisan Change

As Democratic Party attachment and support for Democratic candidates has begun to grow in the South, existing theories designed to explain Republican growth—whether based on race relations, economic growth, or cultural conservatism—fare poorly. The author advances a new theory—Movers and Stayers theory—to explain this recent growth in Democratic support. This chapter includes a broad outline of the theory—one focused on population growth’s role in the expansion of Democratic support—and an explanation of the dynamics that boost progressivism in high-growth areas and inhibit its development in declining communities. The theory highlights the role of the distinctive progressivism of movers on the political attitudes of stayers in their new homes, and stayers in the communities they have left. The theory explains why community decline results in different political responses from whites and people of color, and it highlights the waning significance of Key’s “black belt” hypothesis.

Political Conversion to Islam Among the European Right

This paper introduces three cases of politicians from Western European countries who in the past have been affiliated with populist parties and recently converted to Islam. This article examines how an act of conversion to Islam enables these politicians to continue advancing their agendas. We argue that the public announcement of conversion allows these individuals to transmit their conservative political program directly to their audiences, circumventing the autocracy of leaders of their respective populist parties. In the converts’ rhetoric, Islam—universalized and freed from ethnocultural associations with Muslim minority communities—fulfils social and ethical functions abandoned by a “secularized” Christianity and, thereby, wages a struggle against cultural liberalism. We posit that conversion to Islam among politicians who have been previously associated with populist parties does not necessarily mean a 180-degree turn from outspoken anti-Muslim sentiments to fully embracing the culture of “the Muslim Other.” Instead, it manifests a movement within the right of the political spectrum: from open anti-multiculturalism to cultural conservatism, from defining European identity as exclusively secular and rational to seeing it as inherently spiritual yet compatible with the Enlightenment ideas on rationalism.