scholarly journals Plotinus on Care of Self and Soul

Plato Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 149-164
Author(s):  
Daniel Regnier

Plotinus’ philosophical project includes an important Socratic element. Plotinus is  namely interested in both self-knowledge and care of soul and self.  In this study I examine how through his interpretation of three passages from Plato (Timaeus 35 a, Phaedrus 246 band Theatetus 176 a-b), Plotinus develops an account of the role of care in his ethics.  Care in Plotinus’ ethical thought takes three forms. First of all, care is involved in maintaining the unity of the embodied self.  Secondly, situated in a providential universe, our souls – as sisters to the world soul - take part in the providential order by caring for ‘lower’ realities.  Finally, Plotinus develops an ethics of going beyond virtue, a process which involves care for the higher, potentially divine, self.

2019 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 04006
Author(s):  
Sergey Borisov

Philosophy as a project is defined by us in practical terms, as a form of spiritual activity, spiritual practice aimed at posing, analyzing, and resolving various worldview issues related to the development of a holistic view of a person and his place in the world. The article presents the main characteristics of the philosophical project of self-knowledge, consisting in self-awareness in the present, in personal self-determination and self-transformation. These characteristics are also applicable to the educational process. The article summarizes the practical experience of building up the process of teaching philosophy based on scientific ignorance. The main factors of this process are personal interest, successful self-realization, the role of a mentor and a friendly environment. The main method is dialogue, clarifying the basic relationship of a person with being. In this context, philosophizing fulfills a therapeutic function, becoming a practice of “self-care”.


2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 272-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Lambie

This article examines the role of emotion experience in both rational action and self-knowledge. A key distinction is made between emotion experiences of which we are unaware, and those of which we are aware. The former motivate action and color our view of the world, but they do not do so in a rational way, and their nonreflective nature obscures self-understanding. The article provides arguments and evidence to support the view that emotion experiences contribute to rational action only if one is appropriately aware of them (because only then does one have the capacity to inhibit one's emotional reactions). Furthermore, it is argued that awareness of emotion increases self-knowledge because it is a source of information about our biases.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Durt

Abstract While it seems obvious that the embodied self is both a subject of experience and an object in the world, it is not clear how, or even whether, both of these senses of self can refer to the same self. According to Husserl, the relation between these two senses of self is beset by the “paradox of human subjectivity.” Following Husserl’s lead, scholars have attempted to resolve the paradox of subjectivity. This paper categorizes the different formulations of the paradox according to the dimension each pertains to and considers the prospects of each proposed resolution. It will be shown that, contrary to the claims of the respective authors, their attempted resolutions do not really resolve the paradox, but instead rephrase it or push it to the next dimension. This suggests that there is something deeper at work than a mere misunderstanding. This paper does not aim to resolve the paradox but instead initiates a new approach to it. Instead of seeing the paradox as a misapprehension that needs to be removed, I dig deeper to reveal its roots in ordinary consciousness. Investigating the proposed resolutions will reveal the fundamental role of the natural attitude, and I will argue that already the general thesis of the natural attitude makes the decisive cut that leads to what Sartre calls a “fissure” in pre-reflective self-awareness. The phenomenological reduction deepens the cut into what Husserl calls the “split of the self,” which in turn engenders the paradox of subjectivity. The paradox’s roots in the structure of ordinary consciousness not only constitute a reason for its persistence, but also suggest a new way to further investigate the embodied self.


2005 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Dolson

AbstractThe focus is on the intersubjective, narrative and dialogic aspects of the clinical phenomenon of insight in psychosis. By introducing a socio-dialogic model for the clinical production of insight, it can be learned how insight, as a form of self-knowledge (of a morbid alteration in one's relation to the world/others), is a product of the clinical interview, namely the dialogic relation between patient and clinical interviewer. Drawing upon the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, expressly his notion of the ethical encounter, the production of insight in the clinical interview is elucidated as both a synchronic and diachronic phenomenon—a provisional form of self-knowledge based on historically-produced frames of meaning which are recalled and narrated, i.e., produced at a specific moment in time. The production of insight, based on auto-biographical memory, is ultimately a processual and transactional phenomenon which arises out of the narrative construction of experience and the dialogic negotiation of the individual's "authored" experience. This process may be understood as a synergistic dynamic between intersubjective micro-processes (dialogue) and symbolic macro-processes (such as "culture"), which may, when crystallized at the individual level, precipitate a subjectively insightful account of the prodromal illness experience.


Various aspects of language and culture are currently the focus of attention of linguists, ethnolinguists, sociolinguists, psycholinguists, and cultural studies. It is the reflection in the language of ethnic and personal self-knowledge, ways of perceiving and conceptualizing the world, the formation of symbols and stereotypes inherent in certain people. Culture of a people is reflected in the values of linguistic units i.e. that stably fixed in them is invariant in content, knowledge of the language, and in terms of their ability to convey information over time, ranging in size and connotations, knowledge of which may not be necessary for the knowledge of the language. Cultural studies of vocabulary and in whole the language is the main point of our paper.


2020 ◽  
pp. 114-118
Author(s):  
Olga Machkarina

The author reveals the views of I. M. Skvortsov, V. N. Karpov, P. I. Linitsky – Russian religious philoso-phers of the XIX century on the role of philosophy in the knowledge of the world around him in its integri-ty and comprehension of the "eternal law", on the connection of philosophy with private sciences and determination of the place of philosophy in the system of education, its influence on the formation of the thought culture of the student's personality, on the role of philosophy in the self-knowledge and upbring-ing of the moral personality.


2019 ◽  
pp. 155-200
Author(s):  
John Schwenkler

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 44-48 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by situating her appeal to the concept of practical knowledge in relation to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Following this, the chapter shows how several elements in Aquinas’ account are drawn on by Anscombe in her argument that an agent’s self-knowledge of her act is “the cause of what it understands”. It is argued that Anscombe meant to characterize an agent’s practical knowledge as both formal and efficient cause of its object. Finally, the chapter considers whether Anscombe succeeds in defending her thesis that intentional action is necessarily known without observation. Here it is argued, first, that knowledge of one’s act is not a strict requirement of doing something intentionally, and second, that the role of observation in an agent’s self-knowledge is different from that of evidence in observational knowledge of the world.


2020 ◽  
pp. 90-109
Author(s):  
Ivan I. Nazarenko ◽  

The study aims to interpret Boris Poplavsky’s novel Home from Heaven (1935) through the prism of the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice to identify the author’s concept of love, art, and the structure of reality. The novel Home from Heaven contains allusions that refer to the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice. The grounds for comparing the myth and the novel plot are seen in the fact that, in his poetic legacy, Poplavsky uses the metaphor of Orpheus in hell to express his own attitude. Poplavsky’s polemic with the ancient myth, with the understanding of the nature of love and the creative genius is revealed and explained by a change in axiology. The principle of allusions to the well-known myth is determined: it is not a manifestation of collisions of the myth in modern times, but a travesty of the mythological plot. In Home from Heaven, Oleg, the modern Orpheus (aspiring writer), does not descend into the realm of the dead for Eurydice, but he himself tries to return to the earthly reality from the “metaphysical hell”, escapes from God with the help of the female love of Eurydice (Tanya and Katya). Poplavsky’s image of the universe is the opposite of the ordered mythological model of the world: “heaven” is the world of culture and the subconscious, which correlates with the lower, infernal space of eternal torment. It is concluded that the modern man sees “hell” (not Hades) both in the metaphysical sphere of the spirit (culture) and in the earthly reality (in the sphere of eros). The correspondence of the modernist aesthetics to the semantics of the plot of the novel is justified: the modern Orpheus, like the ancient one, cannot save love and be saved by love in the “hell” of being. Poplavsky’s inversion of the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice clarifies his concept of love. A harmonious love relationship between people, uniting them into one whole, is impossible because people are prisoners of their consciousness and cannot fully open its content to others. Oleg discovers that, in order to achieve harmony, it is necessary to “build” a house on the “earth” and in the “heaven”, combining the physical with the spiritual. The modern Orpheus, having accepted the fate of the writer, fulfills his mission: having discovered the “hell” of culture and of his own consciousness, having plunged into the “hell” of the earthly reality, he does not succumb to the false art of Eurydice and discovers the true Eurydice—the Word. He returns to God within himself, to culture, but he knows about reality and unites the “heaven” and the “earth” in the “home” of his own creativity, thereby overcoming the total “hell”. According to Poplavsky’s concept, however, the modern Orpheus cannot claim the role of a medium, a prophet, and art is unable to reveal the future. Art does not transform reality, does not grant immortality to the creator, and is itself not immortal, but destroyed by time. Therefore, the epistemological (cognition of being and self-knowledge) and communicative (transfer of spiritual experience to representatives of future generations) functions of art remain.


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