Proportional ranking in primary elections: A case study

Many democratic political parties hold primary elections, which nicely reflects their democratic nature and promote, among other things, the democratic value of inclusiveness. However, the methods currently used for holding such primary elections may not be the most suitable, especially if some form of proportional ranking is desired. In this paper, we compare different algorithmic methods for holding primaries (i.e., different aggregation methods for voters’ ballots) by evaluating the degree of proportional ranking that is achieved by each of them using real-world data. In particular, we compare six different algorithms by analyzing real-world data from a recent primary election conducted by the Israeli Democratit party. Technically, we analyze unique voter data and evaluate the proportionality achieved by means of cluster analysis, aiming at pinpointing the representation that is granted to different voter groups under each of the algorithmic methods considered. Our finding suggest that, contrary to the most-prominent primaries algorithm used (i.e., Approval), other methods such as Sequential Proportional Approval or Phragmen can bring about better proportional ranking and thus may be better suited for primary elections in practice.

When life happens: the impact of life events on turnout

Habit is among the most influential explanations for why people vote. Scholars have addressed the impact of individual disruptions to habitual voting, but analyses including several life events are rare. We combine two panel surveys, conducted in the UK during 1991-2017, to examine the impact of unemployment, retirement, changes in partnership status, moving and disability on voting. We distinguish between habitual voters, occasional voters and habitual non-voters. For all voter groups, turnout declines with divorce. For other life events, the impacts diverge across the voter groups. Overall, the findings suggest that social connections are the strongest underlying mechanisms explaining the changes. Although the results support the voting habit thesis, they also suggest that previous research has overstated the persistence of voting habits. The results revise some of the canonical findings by demonstrating that the impact of life events differs across people with different voting habits and across different life events.

Sexual Harassment and Candidate Evaluation: Gender and Partisanship Interact to Affect Voter Responses to Candidates Accused of Harassment

Public airing of incidents of sexual harassment have moved abuse from the shadows to the light, spurring mass response in the form of #MeToo and “Time’s Up.” While sexual harassment holds negative valence, election outcomes suggest that not all voters punish leaders accused of harassment. We argue there is systematic variation in how voters respond to candidates accused of harassment because evaluations are made within the context of both partisanship and the gendered issue of sexual harassment. As a result, we expect to find distinct responses across four voter groups—Democratic women and men, and Republican women and men on the specific issue of harassment. We present supporting evidence from two survey experiments and a third associational study to show that Democratic women are most likely to electorally punish sexual harassers. Experimental evidence also shows that Republican men are least likely to electorally punish candidates accused of harassment.

Competing for Loyalists? How Party Positioning Affects Populist Radical Right Voting

As populist radical right parties muster increasing support in many democracies, an important question is how mainstream parties can recapture their voters. Focusing on Germany, we present original panel evidence that voters supporting the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)—the country’s largest populist radical right party—resemble partisan loyalists with entrenched anti-establishment views, seemingly beyond recapture by mainstream parties. Yet this loyalty does not only reflect anti-establishment voting, but also gridlocked party-issue positioning. Despite descriptive evidence of strong party loyalty, experimental evidence reveals that many AfD voters change allegiances when mainstream parties accommodate their preferences. However, for most parties this repositioning is extremely costly. While mainstream parties can attract populist radical right voters via restrictive immigration policies, they alienate their own voters in doing so. Examining position shifts across issue dimensions, parties, and voter groups, our research demonstrates that, absent significant changes in issue preferences or salience, the status quo is an equilibrium.

Strategi Kampanye Caleg Kiagus Ishak (PAN) dan Syafruddin (PPP) dalam Pileg 2019 Kota Palembang

Seeing from the phenomenon of legislative candidates who use various political campaign strategy methods used in competing in the legislative general election is very important, so in this study the author examines the problem of winning strategies that have been carried out by the incumbent legislative candidate from the PAN Party named Kiagus Ishak. Yasin and H. RM. Syafruddin, SE, .MM from the PPP Party as a new legislative candidate running where the two legislative candidates are both local male legislative candidates who come from Palembang aristocratic descent in winning the 2019 legislative elections in Palembang City what caused the success and the failure of the two legislative candidates. This study aims to determine the winning strategy used by the two candidates in their election area. Based on the theory used. The defensive strategy is used when the legislative candidates want to retain the majority or if the vote is achieved, they want to be preserved. This strategy was developed by legislative candidates as a way to maintain votes from the support surrounding the local community. The offensive political strategy is a political campaign strategy used to influence voters, what must be sold or displayed is the difference to the prevailing conditions at that time and the benefits that can be expected from it so that new voter groups can be formed in addition to existing voters. The results of the research conducted by the researchers, among others, were able to find that although both of them both bear the title of clan from the native area of ​​Palembang City, several factors were also found that led to the effectiveness of the strategies used by the two local male legislative candidates above, both Incumbent and incumbent candidates, namely Kiagus Ishak Yasin and a local legislative candidate, a local newcomer, H. RM. Syafruddin, SE, .MM so that it had a direct impact on the legislative candidates who won, namely Kgs Ishak Yasin from the PAN Party and there were also legislative candidates who failed to be elected or lost to H. RM. Syafruddin, SE, .MM from the PPP Party.

The reshaping of political representation in post-growth capitalism: A paradigmatic analysis of green and right-wing populist parties

This article aims to provide an analysis of the reconfiguration of political orientations in the face of weakening economic growth. We address a widely observed new polarization in the party systems of Western democracies, with radically universalist and ecological orientations, often represented by green parties, versus industrialist and authoritarian values, mainly represented by right-wing populism. In our effort to explain this constellation, we offer an alternative to accounts that merely focus on an underlying change of class structures or that, conversely, declare socio-economic factors obsolete in their relevance for voting behaviour. While the one side focuses on the ‘losers of modernization’ or deindustrialization, the other side emphasizes a cultural conflict between new cosmopolitan values and a defence of male, white, heterosexual, non-migrant privileges. In contrast to such accounts, we analyse how the general trend towards decelerated economic growth provoked new orientations on the (liberal) left and on the (populist) right. In a first step, we provide an overview of diagnoses of ‘secular stagnation’ and of the rise of radically universalist and right-wing parties in Western Europe, focusing in particular on the last decade and looking to the US by way of comparison. We then focus on the attitudes which the political actors in question entertain towards economic growth and offer an interpretation of their ‘cultural’ motives as struggles over economic distribution. The third and last step presents a Gramscian extension of socio-economic analysis beyond the study of voter groups and their attitudes. Here, we take into account the interests of the ruling classes along with the quest for legitimacy and projected changes in the regime of accumulation—if indeed the term accumulation is still adequate in a post-growth context.

Mediebruk og medietillit

To evaluate issues and party positions in the Sámi parliamentary elections, voters are dependent on information about political alternatives. Based on The 2017 Sámi Parliamentary Election Study, this chapter examines Sámi voters’ use of various information sources, how this use has changed over time, conditions that explain differences in use between voter groups, and whether voters have confidence in these information sources. An important finding is that the position of traditional news media has deteriorated between 2009 and 2017, while social arenas and social media’s position are increasing. This may indicate that the conditions for a joint Sámi public sphere are being weakened. The development can, however, be labeled as a hybridization where the Sámi public sphere has become increasingly diverse. We do not have data to determine whether this development will have a positive or a negative effect on Sámi democracy. Another significant finding is that Sámi speakers perceive most information sources as more important than those with less knowledge of Sámi language do. This applies to both Sámi-language and Norwegian-language media. However, the pattern is different regarding trust, where those who have Sámi language skills tend to have lower trust in traditional Norwegian-language media, compared with those who have weaker Sámi language skills.

Judeophobic Antisemitism among British Voters, 2016-2020

Through secondary analysis of survey data collected by YouGov for Campaign Against Antisemitism, this research note provides a longitudinal account of changes in Judeophobic antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Jews identified as Jews) in mainland Britain from 2016-2020. Because survey responses are aggregated by most recent general election vote, the dataset facilitates comparison between those who voted for each of Britain’s three main parties in the 2015, 2017, and 2019 UK general elections. (Those who voted for other parties, as well as those who did not vote and those for whom voting data are missing, are aggregated as a fourth category.) Amongst those who voted for the centrist Liberal Democrat party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism declined throughout the period. Amongst those who voted for the left-wing Labour Party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism began at a low level, rose to a peak in 2018, and then declined, returning to something close to their 2016 level by 2020. Changes amongst other voter groups were less clear-cut, although all voter groups saw a decline in Judeophobic antisemitism from 2019 to 2020. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze trends in antizionist antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Israel and its supporters), comparative figures for that form of antisemitism are provided for the years 2019–2020.

Judeophobic Antisemitism among British Voters, 2016-2020

Through secondary analysis of survey data collected by YouGov for Campaign Against Antisemitism, this research note provides a longitudinal account of changes in Judeophobic antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Jews identified as Jews) in mainland Britain from 2016-2020. Because survey responses are aggregated by most recent general election vote, the dataset facilitates comparison between those who voted for each of Britain’s three main parties in the 2015, 2017, and 2019 UK general elections. (Those who voted for other parties, as well as those who did not vote and those for whom voting data are missing, are aggregated as a fourth category.) Amongst those who voted for the centrist Liberal Democrat party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism declined throughout the period. Amongst those who voted for the left-wing Labour Party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism began at a low level, rose to a peak in 2018, and then declined, returning to something close to their 2016 level by 2020. Changes amongst other voter groups were less clear-cut, although all voter groups saw a decline in Judeophobic antisemitism from 2019 to 2020. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze trends in antizionist antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Israel and its supporters), comparative figures for that form of antisemitism are provided for the years 2019–2020.

Judeophobic Antisemitism among British Voters, 2016-2020

Through secondary analysis of survey data collected by YouGov for Campaign Against Antisemitism, this research note provides a longitudinal account of changes in Judeophobic antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Jews identified as Jews) in mainland Britain from 2016-2020. Because survey responses are aggregated by most recent general election vote, the dataset facilitates comparison between those who voted for each of Britain’s three main parties in the 2015, 2017, and 2019 UK general elections. (Those who voted for other parties, as well as those who did not vote and those for whom voting data are missing, are aggregated as a fourth category.) Amongst those who voted for the centrist Liberal Democrat party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism declined throughout the period. Amongst those who voted for the left-wing Labour Party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism began at a low level, rose to a peak in 2018, and then declined, returning to something close to their 2016 level by 2020. Changes amongst other voter groups were less clear-cut, although all voter groups saw a decline in Judeophobic antisemitism from 2019 to 2020. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze trends in antizionist antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Israel and its supporters), comparative figures for that form of antisemitism are provided for the years 2019–2020.