Biological weapons control. Prospects and implications for the future

JAMA ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 278 (5) ◽  
pp. 351-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. P. Kadlec
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-21

Received 30 January 2021. Accepted for publication 20 March 2021 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) does not have a legally binding verification regime. An attempt by the Ad Hoc Group of Experts, created by the UN Committee on Disarmament, to strengthen the BTWC by developing a legally binding document – the Protocol, was blocked by the United States in July 2001. The purpose of this work is to study the history, main provisions, significance and reasons for not signing the Protocol to the BTWC. The attention is paid to the events in biological weapons control, which have led a number of countries to the understanding of the necessity to develop the Protocol. The background of the US actions to block this document is the subject of special consideration. During the Second Review Conference on the Implementation of the Convention (8–25 September 1986, Geneva) the USSR, the German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic proposed to develop and adopt the Protocol as an addition to the BTWC. This document was supposed to establish general provisions, definitions of terms, lists of agents and toxins, lists of equipment that was present or used at production facilities, threshold quantities of biological agents designed to assess means and methods of protection. The proposed verification mechanism was based on three «pillars»: initial declarations with the basic information about the capabilities of each State Party; inspections to assess the reliability of the declarations; investigations to verify and confirm or not confirm the alleged non-compliance with the Convention. The verification regime was to be under the control of an international organization – the Organization for the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons. However, the US military and pharmaceutical companies opposed the idea of international inspections. The then US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Robert Bolton II, played a special role in blocking the Protocol. During the Fifth Review Conference in December 2001, he demanded the termination of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts mandate for negotiations under the pretext that any international agreement would constrain US actions. The current situation with biological weapons control should not be left to chance. Measures to strengthen the BTWC should be developed, taking into account the new fundamental changes in dual-use biotechnology. It should be borne in mind, that the Protocol, developed in the 1990s, is outdated nowadays.


JAMA ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 278 (5) ◽  
pp. 351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert P. Kadlec

1992 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 102-103
Author(s):  
Edmund P. Russell

Author(s):  
Barry Kellman

Weapons control was born of necessity to reduce the existential threats of weapons technologies following the last century’s world wars. In a dangerous and anarchic world, security can be enhanced by substituting multilateral agreements for unconstrained procurement, deployment, and transfer of weapons. This chapter focuses on four aspects of weapons control treaties: (1) nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, (2) eradication of chemical and biological weapons, (3) prohibition of unique inhumane weapons, and (4) restriction of the trade in conventional weapons. Cumulatively, these treaties serve to lower the risk of war, reduce war’s devastation should it begin, and curtail the enormous financial drain of procuring and stockpiling weapons. Methodologies have developed with established institutions and stipulated procedures that influence virtually every state’s military choices, significantly enhancing global security. These treaties have enabled humanity to stanch the inherent tendency of employing advancing technologies to make and use more powerful weapons. By significantly contributing to capping centuries of accelerating violence and by restraining how escalating fears of an adversary’s weapons can accelerate political friction into armed conflict, these treaties have contributed to building a more secure world order, thereby enabling diplomacy and other processes to help address more deep-rooted social conditions. It is perhaps the greatest achievement of these treaties to have fostered trust among the vast majority of states and their populations with regard to lethal weapons, enabling maturation of innumerable initiatives for promoting peace.


1992 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-194
Author(s):  
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg

Mark Wheelis makes a thoroughly scientific case for deterring the covert use of biological weapons through a program of global epidemiological surveillance, thoughtfully laid out in terms of function, organization, and goals. In tactical terms, however, it seems a bit like the tail of biological weapons control wagging the dog of the “other benefits”—as Dr. Wheelis recognizes in discussing the latter. The driving force for such a program would surely be its benefits for world public and economic health.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-741

During the summer of 2018, U.S. diplomacy related to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia took sharp twists and turns. President Trump's statements at a pair of diplomatic events abroad in July sowed confusion regarding the continued U.S. commitment to NATO and the nature of the relationship between the White House and the Kremlin. Yet despite some wariness regarding NATO and a desire to have “a very good relationship with Russia,” Trump joined a robust NATO summit declaration that emphasized Russian malfeasance and reaffirmed the importance of the North Atlantic Alliance. Several weeks later, the U.S. State Department announced the imposition of new sanctions on Russia pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991.


2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 479-487
Author(s):  
Jean Pascal Zanders ◽  
Amy E. Smithson

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