Human Impact on North Atlantic Biota

2021 ◽  
pp. 251-272
Author(s):  
Ingrid Mainland ◽  
Jennifer Harland
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Áslaug Geirsdóttir ◽  
David Harning ◽  
John Andrews ◽  
Gifford Miller ◽  
Yafang Zhong ◽  
...  

<p>Biogeochemical proxy records from Icelandic lake sediment reflect large-scale shifts in North Atlantic Holocene climate and highlight the impact that North Atlantic Ocean- and atmospheric circulation has on Iceland’s local climate. Following Early Holocene warmth, millennial-scale cooling has been modulated by centennial-scale climate change, culminating in the transition to the Little Ice Age (ca. 1300-1900 CE). Although the long-term cooling trend is presumably driven by variations in Earth’s orbit and the concomitant decline in Northern Hemisphere summer insolation, the centennial-scale variability has been linked to variations in solar irradiance, the strength of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, volcanism coupled with sea ice/ocean related feedbacks and internal modes of atmospheric variability. One manifestation of these regional climate changes on Iceland is the intensification of soil erosion, resulting in the degradation of its eco-systems and landscape. In recent millennia, persistent and severe soil erosion has also been linked to human impact on the environment following the settlement ~874 CE, rapid population growth and the poorly consolidated nature of tephra dominated soils. However, against the argument that the onset of severe soil erosion coincided with human settlement are composite landscape stability proxies extracted from the high-resolution, precisely-dated lake sediment cores. These data suggest event-dominated landscape instability and soil erosion began in the Middle to Late Holocene with an intensification of landscape instability around ~500 CE, several centuries before the acknowledged settlement of Iceland, after which soil erosion continue to increase. In order to statistically identify abrupt and persistent changes within our landscape stability proxy records, we performed an analysis that targets mean regime shifts in individual time series. The first clear regime shift occured around ~500 CE, with a second large shift ~1200 CE. In order to provide a causal explanation for these regime shifts, we looked to a new 2 ka fully coupled climate transient simulation using CESM1, with forcing data from PMIP4, including insolation, volcanic aerosols, land-cover, and GHG. The CESM results show a ~0.5°C reduction in summer temperature in the first millennium CE, consistent with increased landscape instability and soil erosion in Iceland.  A second phase of persistent summer cooling in the model occurs after 1150 CE, with stronger cooling after 1450 CE, reaching a minimum shortly after 1850 CE, ~1°C lower than at the start of the experiment. Orbitally driven declines in summer insolation appear to be the dominant forcing early in the first millennium CE, with volcanism and solar irradiance reductions increasingly important after 500 CE and in the second millennium CE, but positive feedbacks from sea ice and the overturning circulation are necessary to explain the magnitude of peak LIA cooling when soil erosion is at its greatest in Iceland. Collectively, our initial results suggest that natural variations in regional climate and volcanism are likely responsible for soil erosion prior to human impact, with intensification of these processes following settlement particularly during the cooling associated with the Little Ice Age.</p>


Author(s):  
Kristopher B. Karnauskas ◽  
Lei Zhang ◽  
Dillon J. Amaya

1892 ◽  
Vol 34 (872supp) ◽  
pp. 13940-13941
Author(s):  
Richard Beynon

2019 ◽  
pp. 73-81
Author(s):  
Oleh Poshedin

The purpose of the article is to describe the changes NATO undergoing in response to the challenges of our time. Today NATO, as a key element of European and Euro-Atlantic security, is adapting to changes in the modern security environment by increasing its readiness and ability to respond to any threat. Adaptation measures include the components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the security challenges it might face. Responsiveness NATO Response Force enhanced by developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats. As part of it, was established a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, a new Allied joint force that deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory. NATO emphasizes, that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. Cooperation with NATO already contributes to the implementation of national security and defense in state policy. At the same time, taking into account that all decision-making in NATO based on consensus, Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance quite vague perspective. In such circumstances, in Ukraine you often can hear the idea of announcement of a neutral status. It is worth reminding that non-aligned status did not save Ukraine from Russian aggression. Neutral status will not accomplish it either. All talks about neutrality and the impossibility of Ukraine joining NATO are nothing but manipulations, as well as recognition of the Ukrainian territory as Russian Federation area of influence (this country seeks to sabotage the Euro-Atlantic movement of Ukraine). Think about it, Moldova’s Neutrality is enshrined in the country’s Constitution since 1994. However, this did not help Moldova to restore its territorial integrity and to force Russia to withdraw its troops and armaments from Transnistria.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-15
Author(s):  
Volodymyr Shypovskyi ◽  
Volodymyr Cherneha ◽  
Serhiy Marchenkov

Recent events in Ukraine have shown that, along with the advancement of information technology, methods of conducting modern warfare are being enhanced. Cyberspace is deliberately used by the Russian Federation to commit cyber warfare against Ukraine. Therefore, in order to address their influence effectively, it is important not only successfully deal with its consequences but also to foresee the potential adversaryʼs actions by analyzing their previous operations and incorporating the lessons learned by other countries. Across the globe, including Ukraine, the issue of information security and cyberattacks has become exceedingly urgent. Everybody is aware of the ongoing attacks on information networks of various government agencies and energy firms, cyberattacks on e-mail networks of political parties and organizations around the world. Likewise, despite the steadily growing numbers, cyberattack cases against the individuals and private businesses are not reported as widely as they occur. As a result, The North Atlantic Alliance countries began tackling the issue of cyberthreats much earlier than Ukraine. Consequently, NATO and its allies rely on powerful and robust cyber defenses to ensure the Alliance's core tasks of collective defense. The article discusses methods and strategies for providing cyber defense in NATO member states and recommends ways to increase the level of protection in the state's cyber space, as part of Ukraineʼs national security and defense domain.


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