NATO adaptation to current challenges and mechanisms of Ukraine’s cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

2019 ◽  
pp. 73-81
Author(s):  
Oleh Poshedin

The purpose of the article is to describe the changes NATO undergoing in response to the challenges of our time. Today NATO, as a key element of European and Euro-Atlantic security, is adapting to changes in the modern security environment by increasing its readiness and ability to respond to any threat. Adaptation measures include the components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the security challenges it might face. Responsiveness NATO Response Force enhanced by developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats. As part of it, was established a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, a new Allied joint force that deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory. NATO emphasizes, that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. Cooperation with NATO already contributes to the implementation of national security and defense in state policy. At the same time, taking into account that all decision-making in NATO based on consensus, Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance quite vague perspective. In such circumstances, in Ukraine you often can hear the idea of announcement of a neutral status. It is worth reminding that non-aligned status did not save Ukraine from Russian aggression. Neutral status will not accomplish it either. All talks about neutrality and the impossibility of Ukraine joining NATO are nothing but manipulations, as well as recognition of the Ukrainian territory as Russian Federation area of influence (this country seeks to sabotage the Euro-Atlantic movement of Ukraine). Think about it, Moldova’s Neutrality is enshrined in the country’s Constitution since 1994. However, this did not help Moldova to restore its territorial integrity and to force Russia to withdraw its troops and armaments from Transnistria.

Author(s):  
STAŠA NOVAK

The impact of cyber technologies on the modern societies is significant. States have to adapt to the changed security environment to be able to ensure the security and stability for their territories and populations. Deterrence, which usually goes hand in hand with defence, is about preventing conflicts by dissuading potential aggressors to attack. With regard to cyber, the rules of deterrence change when compared to traditional deterrence, because of the special characteristics of the cyberspace. What is needed is new way of thinking about deterrence and a more comprehensive approach to it. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) approach to deterrence is resting upon the appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear and missile defence capabilities. However, following the 2014 Enhanced NATO Cyber Defence Policy, NATO is de facto already pursuing certain elements of cyber deterrence based on strong defence, declaratory policy and responsive measures. Responsive measures are not NATO offensive cyber capabilities, but the possibility of a collective defence response to a cyber attack, which implies a response with all available means. The article is providing an insight into NATO’s existing cyber defence policy and possible future developments of cyber deterrence at the level of the Alliance. Vpliv kibernetske tehnologije na sodobno družbo je pomemben. Države se morajo prilagoditi spremenjenemu varnostnemu okolju, da bi bile zmožne zagotoviti varnost in stabilnost svojih ozemelj ter prebivalstva. Odvračanje, ki gre po navadi z roko v roki z obrambo, pomeni preprečevanje spopadov z odvračanjem napada morebitnih agresorjev. V kibernetiki so pravila drugačna kot pri tradicionalnem odvračanju zaradi posebnih značilnosti kibernetskega okolja. Zato sta nujna nova miselnost in bolj celosten pristop k odvračanju. Pristop Nata k odvračanju temelji na ustrezni mešanici konvencionalnih, jedrskih in raketnih zmogljivosti. Kljub temu pa po sprejemu izboljšane politike o kibernetski obrambi (Enhanced NATO Cyber Defence Policy) iz leta 2014 Nato v resnici izvaja nekatere elemente kibernetskega odvračanja, ki temeljijo na močni obrambi, deklaratorni politiki in odzivnih ukrepih. Odzivni ukrepi ne pomenijo Natovih ofenzivnih kibernetskih zmogljivosti, temveč možnost za odzivanje kolektivne obrambe na kibernetski napad, pri čemer se uporabijo vsa sredstva, ki so na voljo. V članku so predstavljeni trenutna Natova kibernetska politika in mogoči prihodnji dogodki, povezani s kibernetskim odvračanjem na ravni zavezništva.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grzegorz KOSTRZEWA-ZORBAS

The greatest change ever in the defence policy and military strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation occurred in 2014 in response to a series of major cyber attacks against NATO member states and partner states - Estonia in 2007, the United States and Georgia in 2008, and others in later years - and to a general transformation of the security environment in which cyberwar and other threats to cybersecurity gain rapidly in importance. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO recognised that cyber defence is part of its central task of collective defence and that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty - ”The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all . . .” - can be invoked in the case of cyber attacks. This statement is the first and only expansion of the meaning of Article 5 and the first and only addition of a new type of warfare to the policy and strategy of NATO. After the change, the Alliance must face new challenges not less urgent and difficult than the old ones of kinetic warfare or weapons of mass destruction. This article addresses the broadest strategic context of the change. An analysis is made in the light of the global strategic thought and of the development of warfare through history. By entering the new strategic space of cyber warfare, NATO proves itself to be among the world’s most modern and advanced powers while, at the same time, it returns to the ancient - and lasting - tenet of strategy: information is not inferior to force. This way the Alliance moves away from Carl von Clausewitz and closer to Sun Zi. The recognition of cyberspace as a strategic space also corresponds to another influential idea in the heritage of strategy: the concept of the ”great common” the control of which is the key to the power over the world and over war and peace worldwide. Alfred Thayer Mahan considered the global ocean to be the ”great common” crossed by vital trade routes and by navies competing for superiority. Now cyberspace is as open, vital and fragile as the maritime space was in Mahan’s vision. Cyberwar also creates a promise and a temptation of a decisive strike - the first and last strike in a war - circumventing all military defences and paralysing the enemy country. It is a new version - less lethal or not, dependent on the tactics of cyber attacks in a cyber offensive - of the idea of strategic bombing and of the entire concept of air power, especially by its visionary Giulio Douhet, and then of nuclear strategy. Finally, the article provides two practical recommendations regarding the policy and structure of the North Atlantic Alliance in unfolding new era. Now NATO needs a speedy follow-on to the breakthrough decision of the Wales Summit. Cyber defence should be fully integrated into the next Strategic Concept which is expected in or around 2020 but could be worked out sooner because of the accelerating transition of the security environment. NATO should also consider establishing a global Cyber Command to maintain the initiative and to assure the credibility of the enlarged meaning of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This credibility will be immediately, continuously and comprehensively tested by many players of the global game.


Author(s):  
Sylwia Leszczuk

The rapid development of technology and hence also the cybernetic sphere, including the associated difficulties in defining it, as well as the occurrences within it and the lack of upholding legal regulations and too little awareness in public and private life as to the dangers it may generate, make it serve as a basis for the development of advanced and difficult to neutralize threats that are able to affect the real world. The most important in the context of  the text are cyber attacks and cyberwar. Due to the impact that the virtual world can have on reality, organizations such as NATO must finally adapt to changes taking place in the real world. The aim of the text is to take a look at an possibility of invoking the famous article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty by a member state of  NATO. Keywords: cyberspace, cyberwar, cyber attack, cyberconflict, NATO, article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.


2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie C. Hofmann

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union's (EU) European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) both occupy the policy space of crisis management. This overlap has two effects. First, overlap has generated “chessboard politics” shaping member state strategies. Second, institutional overlap has generated a number of feedback effects. The prior existence of NATO shaped the conceptualization and organization of ESDP at its creation, and the existence of two alternative security institutions continues to influence the ways that the institutions evolve—how each institution defines security interests and how member states adjust the mandate of each institution to address changes in the security environment. Because both institutions are intergovernmentally organized and consensus-based, the actions and decisions of both institutions reflect the agreements of members. Chessboard politics and feedback effects are consequently interrelated—states strategize to affect outcomes in one venue or another, and decisions in one institution can affect decisions and behaviors in the other institution.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (31) ◽  
pp. 93-104
Author(s):  
Wiesław Kamiński

The article presents the directions and causes of changes in the command system and organization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. It presents issues related to the changes that took place in the Polish Armed Forces after 1989 resulting from changes in the international security environment and resulting from Polish accession to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.


Subject Changes to NATO's command structure. Significance In July, NATO is expected formally to adopt a new command structure at its summit in Brussels. Two new commands, focusing on the North Atlantic and on logistics, plus a cyber operations centre, will be created. NATO is adapting to the new security environment in Europe and returning to a larger command structure and in-area rather than out-of-area crisis management efforts. Impacts Much of NATO’s attention will be on Russian defence and military moves near Europe. The two commands will strengthen NATO’s ability efficiently to move assets about, and to engage in cyber activities. Other commands could be created in coming years, such as for the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions. NATO’s Southern Hub in Italy could be further developed to focus on North Africa and the Middle East. Other commands could close or be downsized, such as the UK-based Maritime Command and US-based Allied Command Transformation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 334-335
Author(s):  
Steven Hill

The multilateralism that we practice at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) derives from the North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty in honor of this city, where it was signed on April 4, 1949. Next year we will be celebrating seventy years of this remarkable document, which provides the legal foundation for NATO's continued adaptation to the changing transatlantic security environment. One recent example of this adaptation came last year when Montenegro joined the Alliance. Montenegro's accession received almost unanimous advice and consent in the Senate. That is an important sign of the continuing vitality of interest in multilateralism here in Washington.


1892 ◽  
Vol 34 (872supp) ◽  
pp. 13940-13941
Author(s):  
Richard Beynon

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