Cognitive Science and Debunking Arguments of Religious Belief

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Kelly James Clark
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Debunking Arguments

Born idolaters: The limits of the philosophical implications of the cognitive science of religion

2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Jong ◽  
Christopher Kavanagh ◽  
Aku Visala
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Cognitive Constraints ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Work Done

SummaryIn recent years, theoretical and empirical work done under the rubric of the cognitive science of religion (CSR) have led many to conclude that religion (or, at least, some aspects thereof) is “natural”. By this, it is meant that human beings are predisposed to believe in supernatural agents, and that their beliefs about these agents are constrained in various ways. The details about how and why these predispositions and cognitive constraints developed and evolved are still largely unknown, though there is enough of a theoretical consensus in CSR for philosophers to have begun reflecting on the implications of CSR for religious belief. In particular, much philosophical work has been done on the implications of CSR for theism, on both sides of the debate. On one hand, CSR might contribute to defeating particular arguments for theism, or indeed theism altogether; on the other hand, CSR might provide support for specific theological views. In this paper, we argue that the CSR is largely irrelevant for

scholarly journals Emotional bonds: Bridging the gap between evolutionary and humanistic accounts of religious belief

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-28
Author(s):  
Léon Turner
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Social Bonding ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Evolutionary Account ◽  
Emotional Bonds ◽  
Pluralistic Approach ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Broad Consensus

Recent years have seen a growing willingness in the evolutionary cognitive science of religion (ECSR) to embrace an inclusive, theoretically pluralistic approach and the emergence of a broad consensus around some key themes that collectively constitute a central theoretical core of the field. Nevertheless, ECSR still raises serious problems for some in the humanities. In exploring the reasons for the perception of conflict between humanistic and cognitive evolutionary approaches to religion, I suggest that both ECSR’s default account of the origins of religion and religion’s role in social bonding rely upon notions of culturally unmediated universal cognitive mechanisms that preclude alternative humanistic explanations. I subsequently suggest that the gap between humanistic approaches and the evolutionary study of religion more broadly conceived may be narrowed by further expanding ECSR to include recent research into the brain opioid theory of social attachment (BOTSA), which emphasises the emotional rather than cognitive basis of religion’s social bonding functions. Finally, I outline a possible evolutionary account of the earliest forms of religious ideas and practices, which decouples the origins of religion from the evolution of specialised cognitive machinery and which humanists are likely to find more amenable than mainstream ECSR.

scholarly journals Religious Belief is Not Natural. Why Cognitive Science of Religion Does Not Show That Religious Belief is Trustworthy

Studia Humana ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 34-44
Author(s):  
Hans Van Eyghen
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
World Religions ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Afterlife Beliefs

Abstract It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs.

scholarly journals What Does Theology Have to Do With Religion?

Open Theology ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Olli-Pekka Vainio
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Processing System ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments ◽  
Information Processing System ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking

AbstractIn the cognitive science of religion (CSR), it is often claimed that religion is a product of information processing system that is nonconscious, automatic and irrational. This view rests on a theoretical basis provided by dual-process accounts (DPA) of reasoning. In this paper, I will provide some examples how DPAs are employed in contemporary theorizing in CSR and point out some problems, which reveal an oversight that may impede the progress of the scientific study of religion. The topic touches on the wider debate on evolutionary debunking arguments but my point concerns CSR theorizing and how it might not be able to understand religion properly.

Reflections on the Debate: What Does Philosophy Have to Do with the Cognitive Study of Religion?

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 429-442
Author(s):  
Aku Visala
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Basic Assumptions ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Cognitive Study ◽  
Philosophical Task

Abstract Why should the study of religion in general and cognitive study of religion in particular be interested in philosophy in the first place, and vice versa? The paper offers some responses to the debate between John Shook and his respondents. It will suggest that such debates are useful, as it is a philosophical task to reflect upon the basic assumptions, inference patterns and theories of the study of religion. Furthermore, cognitive study of religion and other approaches in the study of religion should be of great interest to philosophers of religion. The paper puts the debate in a larger context of the dialogue of philosophy and cognitive science of religion and introduces two central themes: debates about psychological explanations and debunking arguments.

scholarly journals Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief from Cognitive Science

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly James Clark ◽  
Dani Rabinowitz
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Short Discussion ◽  
Theistic Belief

A large chorus of voices has grown around the claim that theistic belief is epistemically suspect since, as some cognitive scientists have hypothesized, such beliefs are a byproduct of cognitive mechanisms which evolved for rather different adaptive purposes. This paper begins with an overview of the pertinent cognitive science followed by a short discussion of some relevant epistemic concepts. Working from within a largely Williamsonian framework, we then present two different ways in which this research can be formulated into an argument against theistic belief. We argue that neither version works. 

Cognitive Science and Moral Philosophy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
William FitzPatrick
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Experimental Work ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Joshua Greene

Can empirical work in cognitive science and moral psychology impact issues of general theoretical relevance to moral philosophy? Some think it can. They take it to underwrite debunking arguments against mainstream philosophical views. This chapter first critiques recent philosophical work by two prominent experimentalists, Joshua Greene and Shaun Nichols. The chapter argues that the cases they make for this sort of strong impact of experimental work on moral philosophy suffer from a problematic form of scientism and ultimately fail. Indeed, they fail for reasons that likely apply to other projects with similar ambitions as well. Second, the chapter clarifies the dialectical situation with respect to empirically driven attempts to debunk traditional philosophical views, which leads to a general challenge to such debunking projects going forward. It ends by suggesting a more modest and plausible role for experimental work in connection with moral philosophy that gives up the overreaching debunking ambitions.

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