Efficiency Standards versus Negotiated Agreements in the European Electrical Appliance Sector

Author(s):  
P. Menanteau
1991 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard G. Multer ◽  
Thomas A. Darling ◽  
Jeryl L. Mumpower

Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 673
Author(s):  
Augustyn Wójcik ◽  
Piotr Bilski ◽  
Robert Łukaszewski ◽  
Krzysztof Dowalla ◽  
Ryszard Kowalik

The paper presents the novel HF-GEN method for determining the characteristics of Electrical Appliance (EA) operating in the end-user environment. The method includes a measurement system that uses a pulse signal generator to improve the quality of EA identification. Its structure and the principles of operation are presented. A method for determining the characteristics of the current signals’ transients using the cross-correlation is described. Its result is the appliance signature with a set of features characterizing its state of operation. The quality of the obtained signature is evaluated in the standard classification task with the aim of identifying the particular appliance’s state based on the analysis of features by three independent algorithms. Experimental results for 15 EAs categories show the usefulness of the proposed approach.


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magali Delmas ◽  
Alfred Marcus

This paper compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for pollution reduction using transaction costs economics. Two governance structures are analyzed with the transaction costs approach: command and control regulation (CCR) and negotiated agreements (NAs). We propose that the choice of governance structure depends on the strategies firms pursue given the attributes of their transactions and their market opportunities. The application of transaction cost economics analysis leads to different choices of regulatory instruments. Firms in more mature, stable industries are likely to choose command and control, while firms in new, dynamic sectors are more likely to opt for negotiated agreements. Frequency of transactions is a key factor in firm choice.


10.1068/c11s ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsten Hansen ◽  
Katja Sander Johannsen ◽  
Anders Larsen

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-356
Author(s):  
Rachel Xian

Abstract Political psychology and social constructivism exist in an “ideational alliance” against realism; however, both have overlooked behavioral conditioning, the basis of animal learning. Through six stages situated in international negotiation behaviors, the theory of Conditioning Constructs shows how behavioral conditioning can take parties from specific to diffuse reciprocity, rationalist to constructivist cooperation, and crisis to durable peace. In stages 1, 2 and 3, parties use negotiated agreements to exit prisoner’s dilemmas, continuously reinforce cooperation during agreement implementation, and satiate to rewards as initial implementation finalizes. In stages 4, 5 and 6, parties receive fresh rewards with new negotiations, undergo intermittent reinforcement with periodic agreements thereafter, and finally attribute cooperative behavior to actor constructs. Conditioning Constructs demonstrates that agency is possible in socially constructed structures through willful participation in conditioning through negotiation; and that, while Anatol Rapoport’s tit-for-tat strategy is suited to initial cooperation, intermittent reinforcement better preserves late-stage cooperation.


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