scholarly journals An Analysis on Game Theoretic Negotiation Dynamism Based on Multi-Agent Paradigm in Virtual Enterprise

2002 ◽  
pp. 211-218
Author(s):  
Toshiya Kaihara ◽  
Susumu Fujii
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Enterprise ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Game Theoretic

Virtual Enterprise Coalition Strategy with Game Theoretic Multi-Agent Paradigm

CIRP Annals ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 513-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Kaihara ◽  
S. Fujii ◽  
K. Iwata
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Enterprise ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Game Theoretic

A Game-Theoretic Formulation of Multi-Agent Resource Allocation

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bredin ◽  
Rajiv T. Maheswaran ◽  
Cagri Imer ◽  
Tamer Basar ◽  
David Kotz ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Game Theoretic

scholarly journals Expressiveness and Nash Equilibrium in Iterated Boolean Games

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Julian Gutierrez ◽  
Paul Harrenstein ◽  
Giuseppe Perelli ◽  
Michael Wooldridge
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Infinite Sequence ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Temporal Logics ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Temporal Properties ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Boolean Games

We define and investigate a novel notion of expressiveness for temporal logics that is based on game theoretic equilibria of multi-agent systems. We use iterated Boolean games as our abstract model of multi-agent systems [Gutierrez et al. 2013, 2015a]. In such a game, each agent  has a goal  , represented using (a fragment of) Linear Temporal Logic ( ) . The goal  captures agent  ’s preferences, in the sense that the models of  represent system behaviours that would satisfy  . Each player controls a subset of Boolean variables , and at each round in the game, player is at liberty to choose values for variables in any way that she sees fit. Play continues for an infinite sequence of rounds, and so as players act they collectively trace out a model for , which for every player will either satisfy or fail to satisfy their goal. Players are assumed to act strategically, taking into account the goals of other players, in an attempt to bring about computations satisfying their goal. In this setting, we apply the standard game-theoretic concept of (pure) Nash equilibria. The (possibly empty) set of Nash equilibria of an iterated Boolean game can be understood as inducing a set of computations, each computation representing one way the system could evolve if players chose strategies that together constitute a Nash equilibrium. Such a set of equilibrium computations expresses a temporal property—which may or may not be expressible within a particular fragment. The new notion of expressiveness that we formally define and investigate is then as follows: What temporal properties are characterised by the Nash equilibria of games in which agent goals are expressed in specific fragments of  ? We formally define and investigate this notion of expressiveness for a range of fragments. For example, a very natural question is the following: Suppose we have an iterated Boolean game in which every goal is represented using a particular fragment of : is it then always the case that the equilibria of the game can be characterised within ? We show that this is not true in general.

Virtual Enterprise Coalition Strategy with Game Theoretic Multiagent Paradigm

2011 ◽  
pp. 263-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshiya Kaihara ◽  
Susumu Fujii
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Computer Simulation ◽  
Virtual Enterprise ◽  
Basic Research ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Computer Simulation Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Manufacturing Organizations ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Nowadays, virtual enterprise (VE) is a crucial paradigm of business management in an agile environment. VE exists in both service and manufacturing organizations, although the complexity of each enterprise in a VE may vary greatly from industry to industry. Obviously, there is a need for a mechanism through which these different functions can be integrated together transparently. In this contribution, we focus on the negotiation process in VE formulation as a basic research to clarify its effective management in terms of partner search. Each enterprise in VE is defined as an agent with multiutilities, and a framework of multiagent programming with game theoretic approach is newly proposed as a negotiation algorithm among the agents. Each unit is defined as an agent in our VE model, and their decision making is formulated as a game theoretic methodology. We develop a computer simulation model to form VEs through multiple negotiations among several potential members in the negotiation domain, and finally clarify the formulation dynamism with the negotiation process.

Quality management framework for a virtual enterprise network: a multi‐agent approach

2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 300-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
H.C.W. Lau ◽  
Christina W.Y. Wong ◽  
Eric W.T. Ngai ◽  
I.K. Hui
Keyword(s):  
Core Competencies ◽  
Virtual Enterprise ◽  
Enterprise Networks ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Enterprise Network ◽  
Management Framework ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Geographically Dispersed ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
To Come

Globalization and the borderless marketplace have created an opportunity for companies to come together to work on projects that could otherwise not be completed through the efforts of one or two companies acting independently. The formation of virtual enterprise networks combines the advantages of the various core competencies of members of the network to deliver customer satisfaction. Virtual enterprise networks consist of several firms that can be geographically dispersed, and that might be technically disparate in terms of system platforms. Coordination among members of the network and the the transfer of quality products and services among members of the network are the key factors in achieving success. The proposed framework presented in this paper utilizes a multi‐agent model to monitor quality within a virtual enterprise network to ensure that the processes among members run smoothly and efficiently.

scholarly journals Bounds and dynamics for empirical game theoretic analysis

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Tuyls ◽  
Julien Perolat ◽  
Marc Lanctot ◽  
Edward Hughes ◽  
Richard Everett ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Learning Algorithm ◽  
Agent Interactions ◽  
Approximate Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Blotto Game ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Payoff Structure ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Colonel Blotto

AbstractThis paper provides several theoretical results for empirical game theory. Specifically, we introduce bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. In doing so we provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the estimated meta-game is an approximate Nash equilibrium of the true underlying meta-game. We investigate and show how many data samples are required to obtain a close enough approximation of the underlying game. Additionally, we extend the evolutionary dynamics analysis of meta-games using heuristic payoff tables (HPTs) to asymmetric games. The state-of-the-art has only considered evolutionary dynamics of symmetric HPTs in which agents have access to the same strategy sets and the payoff structure is symmetric, implying that agents are interchangeable. Finally, we carry out an empirical illustration of the generalised method in several domains, illustrating the theory and evolutionary dynamics of several versions of the AlphaGo algorithm (symmetric), the dynamics of the Colonel Blotto game played by human players on Facebook (symmetric), the dynamics of several teams of players in the capture the flag game (symmetric), and an example of a meta-game in Leduc Poker (asymmetric), generated by the policy-space response oracle multi-agent learning algorithm.

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