Banking without a Central Bank: Scotland before 1844 as a ‘Free Banking’ system

1991 ◽  
pp. 37-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence H. White
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Free Banking

scholarly journals Money, Banking, and Financial Markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 2049-2086 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Andolfatto ◽  
Aleksander Berentsen ◽  
Fernando M Martin
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Free Banking ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Deposit Contracts ◽  
Liquidity Insurance ◽  
Meaningful Role

Abstract The fact that money, banking, and financial markets interact in important ways seems self-evident. The theoretical nature of this interaction, however, has not been fully explored. To this end, we integrate the Diamond (1997, Journal of Political Economy105, 928–956) model of banking and financial markets with the Lagos and Wright (2005, Journal of Political Economy113, 463–484) dynamic model of monetary exchange—a union that bears a framework in which fractional reserve banks emerge in equilibrium, where bank assets are funded with liabilities made demandable in government money, where the terms of bank deposit contracts are affected by the liquidity insurance available in financial markets, where banks are subject to runs, and where a central bank has a meaningful role to play, both in terms of inflation policy and as a lender of last resort. Among other things, the model provides a rationale for nominal deposit contracts combined with a central bank lender-of-last-resort facility to promote efficient liquidity insurance and a panic-free banking system.

Arah Kebijakan Pengawasan terhadap Perbankan Syariah dalam Sistem Perbankan Nasional di Indonesia

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52
Author(s):  
Andrew Shandy Utama
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
Islamic Bank ◽  
Independent Direction ◽  
National Banking System

This research aims to explain the direction of policy regarding supervision of Islamic banking in the banking system in Indonesia. The method used in this research is normative legal research using the statutory approach. The results of this research explain that the policy regarding supervision of Islamic banking in the national banking system in Indonesia is headed toward an independent direction. In Law Number 7 of 1992 and Law Number 10 of 1998, it is stated that supervision of Islamic banking is done by Bank Indonesia as the central bank. Based on Law Number 21 of 2008, supervision of Islamic banking is strengthened by not only being supervised by Bank Indonesia, but also by the National Sharia Council of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia by placing Sharia Supervisory Councils in each Islamic bank. After the ratification of Law Number 21 of 2011, supervision of Islamic banking moved from Bank Indonesia to an independent institution called the Financial Services Authority.

scholarly journals TREASURY BILLS AND/OR CENTRAL BANK BILLS FOR ABSORBING SURPLUS LIQUIDITY: THE MAIN CONSIDERATIONS

2013 ◽  
Vol 04 (02) ◽  
pp. 1350011
Author(s):  
OBERT NYAWATA
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Market Development ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Treasury Bills ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Excess Liquidity ◽  
Challenging Question ◽  
Transmission Of Monetary Policy

This paper discusses the challenging question of whether central banks should use Treasury bills or central bank bills for draining excess liquidity in the banking system. While recognizing that there are practical reasons for using central bank bills, the paper argues that Treasury bills are the first best option especially because of the positive externalities for the financial sector and the rest of the economy. However, the main considerations in the choice should be: (i) operational independence for the central bank; (ii) market development; and (iii) the strengthening of the transmission of monetary policy impulses.

scholarly journals Unanswered quibbles: George Selgin still gets it wrong with fractional reserve free banking

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Bagus ◽  
David Howden
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Real Income ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Free Banking ◽  
Fractional Reserve Banking ◽  
Credit Expansion ◽  
Investment Projects ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Monetary Equilibrium ◽  
El Sistema

In this article we reply to George Selgin’s counterarguments to our article «Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles». Selgin regards holding cash as saving while we focus on the real savings necessary to maintain investment projects. Real savings are unconsumed real income. Variations in real savings are not necessarily equal to variations in cash holdings. We show that a coordinated credit expansion in a fractional reserve free banking (FRFB) system is possible and that precautionary reserves consequently do not pose a necessary limit. We discuss various instances in which a FRFB system may expand credit without a prior increase in real savings. These facets all demonstrate why a fractional reserve banking system —even a free banking one— is inherently unstable, and incentivized to impose a stabilizing central bank. We find that at the root of our disagreements with Selgin lies a different approach to monetary theory. Selgin subscribes to the aggregative equation of exchange, which impedes him from seeing the microeconomic problems that the stabilization of «MV» by a FRFB system causes. Key words: Free banking, fractional reserve, monetary equilibrium, credit expansion, economic cycle. JEL Classification: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34. Resumen: En este artículo respondemos a George Selgin, que a su vez respondió a nuestro artículo «Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles». Selgin considera que los saldos de tesorería son ahorros, mientras nosotros nos fijamos en los ahorros reales necesarios para mantener proyectos de inversion. Ahorros reales son ingresos reales no consumidos. Variaciones en los ahorros reales no necesariamente coinciden con las variaciones en los saldos de tesoreria. Mostramos que una expansión crediticia coordinada es posible en un sistema bancario de reserva fraccionaria (FRFB) y que las reservas prudenciales no constituyen necesariamente un limite a la expansión co - ordinada. Discutimos varios escenarios en los que el sistema FRFB puede expandir los créditos sin un aumento previo en los ahorros reales. Todas estas facetas muestran que un sistema bancario de reservas fraccionarias —incluso uno de banca libre— es inherentemente inestable y produce incentivos para imponer un banco central estabilizador. Mostramos que el origen de nuestras diferencias con Selgin está en un enfoque diferente a la teoría monetaria. Selgin es partidario de la ecuación de intercambio que es muy agregada y que le impide ver los problemas microeconomicas que la estabilización de «MV» por parte del sistema FRFB produce. Palabras clave: Banca libre, reserva fraccionaria, equilibrio monetario, expansión crediticia, ciclo económico. Clasificación JEL: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34.

scholarly journals CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS

2019 ◽  
pp. 94-100
Author(s):  
T.S. Hudima ◽  
V.A. Ustymenko
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Digital Currency ◽  
Business Entities ◽  
The Right ◽  
Article 5

The article is devoted to identifying the peculiarities of the central bank digital currency (CBDC), explaining their impact on the monetary policy of the state, and identifying the prospects for the transformation of domestic banking legislation in connection with the implementation of the CBDC. It is noted that the scope of competence of the Central Bank and the legal basis for the issuance of the CBDC will depend on the economic and legal features of the digital currency, the degree of its impact on the monetary policy, the financial stability of the country’s economy and so on. In the process of forming the appropriate legal field and defining the conceptual apparatus in the sphere of emission and circulation of the CBDC, the peculiarities of the use of the latter in economic transactions and the specific functions not inherent in ordinary means of payment should be taken. СBDC initiatives will help: 1) progressively narrow the banking system at the level of the Central Banks (such as the Chicago Plan) by allowing individuals and businesses to deposit directly into the accounts of the Central Banks; 2) increasing confidence of economic entities and individuals in the financial system; 3) strengthening the financial stability of the economy (both domestically and globally). Granting business entities or individuals the right to store digital money directly with the Central Bank can give rise to two main directions of influence on monetary policy: first, to strengthen its transmission mechanism; secondly, lead to banks being disrupted. This may lead to some legal issues regarding (1) the NBU’s area of competence; (2) the constitutional foundations of the legal economic order (Article 5 of the ECU). In particular, it cannot be ruled out that centralization of the production, servicing, and management of the СBDC turnover may violate the principles of competition in business activities, prevent abuse of monopoly position in the market, etc. Keywords: monetary policy, central bank digital currency, financial stability, competence, legal framework, economic operations, issue.

scholarly journals THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK IN THE FUNCTION OF IMPROVEMENT OF LIQUIDITY OF BANKING SECTOR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (24) ◽  
Author(s):  
Goran Mitrović ◽  
Živko Erceg
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Bosnia And Herzegovina ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Foreign Banks ◽  
Dayton Agreement ◽  
The Impact

The monetary policy of Bosnia andHerzegovina is rather limited because it is basedon the principles of a currency boardcharacterized by the impossibility of implementingthe basic monetary policy instruments incomparison with the monetary policy of theEuropean Union. However, the constant presenceof European integrations should point the need fora more drastic change in the monetary policy ofBosnia and Herzegovina. By entering theEuropean Monetary Union (EMU), the monetaryterritory of Bosnia and Herzegovina will becomeone of the branches of the European Central Bank(ECB). In addition, it is not difficult to concludewhy the Law about the Central Bank of Bosnia andHerzegovina has been adopted with the first lawsof the Dayton Agreement, if it is known that thelargest part of the banking system, and thereforethe financial market, is owned by foreign banks.This work will point out the significance of theCentral Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as oneof the most important factors for maintaining thepermanent liquidity of the banking sector inBosnia and Herzegovina. The possibilities andlimitations of the Central Bank of Bosnia andHerzegovina will be determined, with theassumption of macroeconomic sustainability overa longer period of time. The need of reforming thebanking system in Bosnia and Herzegovina will beanalyzed through the constant implementation ofthe Basel standards with the increasingparticipation of foreign banks in the Bosnia andHerzegovina. It will be determined the impact ofthe implementation of the Basel III in the bankingindustry in Bosnia and Herzegovina and itsconsequences on the banking and economicsystem.models, on the ways of financing theelimination of adverse consequences of naturaldisasters.

THE EVOLUTION OF A FREE BANKING SYSTEM

1987 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEORGE A. SELGIN ◽  
LAWRENCE H. WHITE
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Free Banking
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