How Parties Govern: Political Parties and the Internal Organization of Government

Author(s):  
Torbjörn Bergman ◽  
Alejandro Ecker ◽  
Wolfgang C. Müller
Author(s):  
Philip Norton

This chapter discusses the political organization of the UK Parliament, at the heart of which are the political parties. It first considers the internal organization of Parliament, focusing on how political parties are structured. There are two principal parties facing one another in Parliament: the party in government and opposition parties. The opposition comprises frontbench Members (shadow ministers) and backbenchers. Smaller parties may also designate some Members as ‘frontbenchers’ (official spokespeople for the party). The frontbench of each party includes whips. The chapter provides an overview of these whips as well as parliamentary parties before considering legislative–executive relations. In particular, it examines how parties shape the relationship between Parliament and the executive, and how these have changed over time.


Author(s):  
Yolanda Fernández Vivas

El trabajo que aquí presentamos es un análisis sobre el régimen jurídico de los partidos políticos en Alemania, que se caracteriza por ser un régimen jurídico con una regulación muy exhaustiva y eficaz. En este artículo hacemos referencia al estatus jurídico constitucional que tienen los partidos en Alemania y se presta especial atención a la organización interna y funcionamiento de los partidos, así como a su sistema de financiación, dos cuestiones que, en los últimos meses en España, están siendo objeto de debate.This essay analyzes the legal status of political parties in Germany, which is characterized as a legal regime with a very comprehensive and effective regulation. The essay is focused on the constitutional legal status that political parties have in Germany, their internal organization and functioning and their funding system; issues that, nowadays, are being discussed in Spain.


2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 559-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
OLLE FOLKE ◽  
TORSTEN PERSSON ◽  
JOHANNA RICKNE

In this analysis of how electoral rules and outcomes shape the internal organization of political parties, we make an analogy to primary elections to argue that parties use preference-vote tallies to identify popular politicians and promote them to positions of power. We document this behavior among parties in Sweden's semi-open-list system and in Brazil's open-list system. To identify a causal impact of preference votes, we exploit a regression discontinuity design around the threshold of winning the most preference votes on a party list. In our main case, Sweden, these narrow “primary winners” are at least 50% more likely to become local party leaders than their runners-up. Across individual politicians, the primary effect is present only for politicians who hold the first few positions on the list and when the preference-vote winner and runner-up have similar competence levels. Across party groups, the primary effect is the strongest in unthreatened governing parties.


2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (90) ◽  
pp. 39-59
Author(s):  
Irena Pejić

Given that political parties participate in the formation, structuring and activity of the parliament, their presence has had a dual impact on the National Assembly of Serbia in the past three decades. On the one hand, their influence has been reflected on the internal structure and efficiency of parliamentary work. On the other hand, the party system combined with the electoral model has left its mark on the mode of political representation. The paper focuses on the impact the political parties have had on the National Assembly in the Republic of Serbia, particularly their influence on the internal organization of the Assembly and the effectiveness in the parliamentary process. The main goal is to explore the normative framework and parliamentary practice in order to analyze the actual prospects of the National Assembly to meet the basic postulates for exercising effective national representation. The main question is whether the Assembly, relying on its constitutional autonomy, is able to achieve the goals of the "working parliament" and the political representation of all citizens. The problem develops around the extent to which the people's representation is capable of exercising its constitutional functions if it does not support and protect the differentiated political will of the people. The aim is to point out to the possibilities provided by the normative framework and the need for successful parliamentary practice in exercising parliamentary autonomy. Parliamentary autonomy is necessary not only for good internal organization of parliament and effectiveness in the parliamentary process but also in terms of strengthening the National Assembly's external impact and position towards the holders of the executive power. The subject matter of analysis are the activities of political parties in parliament, observed through the work of parliamentary groups and parliamentary committees, as well as a lack of the parliamentary opposition guarantees.


Author(s):  
Bonnie N. Field

This chapter explains the functions and working of Spain’s parliament, las Cortes Generales. More specifically, it first analyses parliament’s place within the constitutional system, and representation related to political parties, women and other minority groups, and citizen trust. It then outlines parliament’s internal organization, including asymmetric bicameralism, parliamentary party groups, and committees. Finally, it discusses the characteristics of law-making, and executive–legislative relations in this parliamentary regime, before briefly concluding. While parliamentary institutions in Spain have changed little since redemocratization, throughout, the chapter highlights the (potential) transformations of legislative politics as a result of changes in the parliamentary party system.


1946 ◽  
Vol 5 (17) ◽  
pp. 55-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Conor Cruise O’Brien

The history of modern political parties is rich in examples of the law that a sharp change in the party line involves a tightening in party discipline, often including a structural re-organization. The Parnellite movement did not escape the operation of this law. The Kilmainham treaty, which marked the transmutation of Parnellism from a quasi-revolutionary movement into a completely constitutional one, could not have been implemented without a drastic subordination of the various branches of the movement to central control, i.e. the control of the parliamentary party itself. As the party had been reduced by secessions until it contained, for all practical purposes, no opponents of Parnell, this meant that the whole great movement of the ‘New Departure’, or what was left of it, was now to be steered, by the little group of Parnell’s lieutenants, out of land-agitation into the more or less peaceful ways of electioneering. It was not immediately necessary to tighten the internal organization of the party itself, partly because of the secessions and partly because its make-up was such that it was inclined to welcome rather than oppose shifts to the right. What was needed was to discipline the ‘peripheral organizations’, as they would now be called, one or two of which had in the past not merely acted independently of the parliamentarians but had exercised some control over them. Before going further with the description of how the party machine was perfected in the years following the Kilmainham treaty, it might be well, for the sake of clarity, to list these organizations and indicate briefly their relation to the parliamentary party in the immediate pre-Kilmainham era.


Author(s):  
Mark D. Brewer ◽  
Jeffrey M. Stonecash
Keyword(s):  

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