An Institutional Analysis of the Proposed European Central Bank with Comparisons to the U.S. Federal Reserve System

Institutional and Competence Evolution of the U.S. Central Bank in the Twentieth CenturySummary The article describes the initial shape of the U.S. central bank, i.e. the Federal Reserve System created under the federal act of 1913 as a “Federal Reserve”, as well as the reasons for its competence and institutional evolution mainly in the thirties of the twentieth century. The paper seeks to identify the consequences of the absence of statutory regulations – in many ways necessary for the proper functioning of the central bank in the United States as a confederation, which has become a major cause of the appropriation of powers by the representatives of the private sector at the central bank. In addition, by analyzing the agreement concluded by the representatives of the bank and the U.S. Treasury Department the article shows the consequences of the absence of constitutional guarantees for the central bank’s operational independence. The article also seeks to name and describe the laws passed in the twentieth century, which have contributed significantly to today’s field of competence of the Federal Reserve System and its present modus vivendi.

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Method of Collecting Exchange Rates for the Calculation of the Value of the SDR for the purposes of Rule 0-2(a)

Policy Papers ◽

10.5089/9781498345170.007 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 16 (60) ◽

Author(s):

Keyword(s):

New York ◽

Central Bank ◽

Exchange Rates ◽

Federal Reserve ◽

European Central Bank ◽

Federal Reserve Bank ◽

European Central ◽

Reserve Bank ◽

Bank Of England ◽

The U.S

This paper proposes modifications to the method of collecting exchange rates for the calculation of the value of the SDR for the purposes of Rule O-2(a). The value of the SDR in terms of the U.S. dollar is determined daily as the sum of the equivalents in U. S. dollar values of the amounts of the currencies that comprise the SDR valuation basket (as provided in Rule O-1), calculated on the basis of exchange rates established in accordance with procedures decided from time to time by the Fund.1 The current procedures are set out in Decision No. 6709-(80/189) S, as amended by Decision No. 12157-(00/24) S, March 9, 2000 (see Annex), which specifies the method for collecting exchange rates for this purpose. Under these procedures, the relevant currency amounts are converted into U.S. dollars using daily exchange rates that are provided to the Fund by the Bank of England (BoE). If rates cannot be obtained from the BoE, they are provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and, if not available there, by the European Central Bank (ECB). The BoE, FRBNY, and ECB intend to rely on a new, more robust methodology to provide exchange rates to the Fund after November 1, 2016, and the proposed modifications reflect these changes.

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Is SDR Creation Inflationary?

Policy Papers ◽

10.5089/9781498339490.007 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 2011 (7) ◽

Author(s):

Keyword(s):

Central Bank ◽

Federal Reserve ◽

European Central Bank ◽

World Economy ◽

Central Banks ◽

International Reserves ◽

Short Paper ◽

European Central ◽

The World ◽

The U.S

Giving greater prominence to SDRs in international reserves would entail allocating them more frequently in significant amounts. The question has properly been raised whether such issuance would be inflationary for the world economy. This short paper addresses that question. It explores five different “scenarios” that describe how recipient countries and the leading central banks—most notably the U.S. Federal Reserve (FRB) and the EU’s European Central Bank (ECB)—would respond to those allocations. It concludes that SDR issuance would be inflationary for the world economy under two of the scenarios, but not under the remaining three scenarios, which include the most likely ones.

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Causes of The Outbreak of the Eurozone Crises: The Role of the Usa and the European Central Bank Monetary Policy

e-Finanse ◽

10.1515/fiqf-2016-0114 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 11 (2) ◽

pp. 47-63

Author(s):

Natalia Białek

Keyword(s):

Monetary Policy ◽

Central Bank ◽

Interest Rates ◽

European Central Bank ◽

Institutional Design ◽

Global Financial Crisis ◽

European Central ◽

Low Interest Rates ◽

The Usa ◽

The U.S

Abstract This paper argues that the loose monetary policy of two of the world’s most important financial institutions-the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank-were ultimately responsible for the outburst of global financial crisis of 2008-09. Unusually low interest rates in 2001- 05 compelled investors to engage in high risk endeavors. It also encouraged some governments to finance excessive domestic consumption with foreign loans. Emerging financial bubbles burst first in mortgage markets in the U.S. and subsequently spread to other countries. The paper also reviews other causes of the crisis as discussed in literature. Some of them relate directly to weaknesses inherent in the institutional design of the European Monetary Union (EMU) while others are unique to members of the EMU. It is rather striking that recommended remedies tend not to take into account the policies of the European Central Bank.

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