The New Regulatory Environment and the Need for Consistent Risk Measures for Financial Institutions

2000 ◽  
pp. 245-248
Author(s):  
Michel Crouhy
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Risk Measures ◽  
Regulatory Environment

scholarly journals Interconnectedness and systemic risk measures of Chinese financial institutions

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming Qi ◽  
Jiawei Zhang ◽  
Jing Xiao ◽  
Pei Wang ◽  
Danyang Shi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Risk Measures ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Vulnerability Index ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Systemic Risks ◽  
Impact Index ◽  
Systemic Impact ◽  
Potential Risks

PurposeIn this paper the interconnectedness among financial institutions and the level of systemic risks of four types of Chinese financial institutions are investigated.Design/methodology/approachBy the means of RAS algorithm, the interconnection among financial institutions are illustrated. Different methods, including Linear Granger, Systemic impact index (SII), vulnerability index (VI), CoVaR, and MES are used to measure the systemic risk exposures across different institutions.FindingsThe results illustrate that big banks are more interconnected and hold the biggest scales of inter-bank transactions in the financial network. The institutions which have larger size tend to have more connection with others. Insurance and security companies contribute more to the systemic risk where as other institutions, such as trusts, financial companies, etc. may bring about severe loss and endanger the financial system as a whole.Practical implicationsSince other institutions with low levels of regulation may bring about higher extreme loss and suffer the whole system, it deserves more attention by regulators considering the contagion of potential risks in the financial system.Originality/valueThis study builds a valuable contribution by examine the systemic risks from the perspectives of both interconnection and tail risk measures. Furthermore; Four types financial institutions are investigated in this paper.

scholarly journals The Brazilian Financial System, Cyber Security Policy and Personal Data Protection

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-186
Author(s):  
Carlos Goettenauer
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Regulatory Environment ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
The Creation

Purpose ”“ This work intends to map and analyze, through the polycentric regulation proposal introduced by Julia Black, the contribution of the actors involved in the creation of the data protection regulatory legal regime in financial system, after the introduction of the cyber security policy by the Central Bank of Brazil, the approval of the General Data Protection State and new financial business models. Methodology ”“ It first analyses the regulatory and statutory norms associated with data protection in the financial system, combined with the cyber security policies published by financial institutions. After this, it identifies the actors who contribute to the regulatory environment and their respective regulatory role. The final step is the creation of a table to categorize each actor’s functions in the regulatory regime. Findings ”“ The research concludes that the contracts between financial institutions and technology play a major role on creating and hybrid regulatory environment for data protection. Originality ”“ The work is an original analysis of the data protection regulatory legal regime in financial system, using polycentric regulation not only as a theoretical reference, but also as a methodological framework.

Risk Measures: Robustness, Elicitability, and Backtesting

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xue Dong He ◽  
Steven Kou ◽  
Xianhua Peng
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Risk Measures ◽  
Risk Measure ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Annual Review ◽  
Publication Date ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Basel Accord ◽  
Economic Considerations

Risk measures are used not only for financial institutions’ internal risk management but also for external regulation (e.g., in the Basel Accord for calculating the regulatory capital requirements for financial institutions). Though fundamental in risk management, how to select a good risk measure is a controversial issue. We review the literature on risk measures, particularly on issues such as subadditivity, robustness, elicitability, and backtesting. We also aim to clarify some misconceptions and confusions in the literature. In particular, we argue that, despite lacking some mathematical convenience, the median shortfall—that is, the median of the tail loss distribution—is a better option than the expected shortfall for setting the Basel Accords capital requirements due to statistical and economic considerations such as capturing tail risk, robustness, elicitability, backtesting, and surplus invariance. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Statistics, Volume 9 is March 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

A LIQUIDATION RISK ADJUSTMENT FOR VALUE AT RISK AND EXPECTED SHORTFALL

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850010 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAKSHITHE WAGALATH ◽  
JORGE P. ZUBELLI
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Risk Adjustment ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Risk Measures ◽  
Risk Measure ◽  
Expected Shortfall ◽  
Adjusted Risk ◽  
Risk Managers

This paper proposes an intuitive and flexible framework to quantify liquidation risk for financial institutions. We develop a model where the “fundamental” dynamics of assets is modified by price impacts from fund liquidations. We characterize mathematically the liquidation schedule of financial institutions and study in detail the fire sales resulting endogenously from margin constraints when a financial institution trades through an exchange. Our study enables to obtain tractable formulas for the value at risk and expected shortfall of a financial institution in the presence of fund liquidation. In particular, we find an additive decomposition for liquidation-adjusted risk measures. We show that such a measure can be expressed as a “fundamental” risk measure plus a liquidation risk adjustment that is proportional to the size of fund positions as a fraction of asset market depths. Our results can be used by risk managers in financial institutions to tackle liquidity events arising from fund liquidations better and adjust their portfolio allocations to liquidation risk more accurately.

Optimale Regulierung bleibt eine Herausforderung!

2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiltrud Thelen-Pischke
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Basel Ii ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Regulatory Environment ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis

The challenge of perfect regulation! Comments to the debate on reforms of the financial sector. In the light of the recent financial crisis the question was raised, if there is any chance of regulation at all to help prevent future crises. As lessons learned from the financial crisis regulators have already adopted numerous measures that aim to enhance financial regulation. Most prominent is the reform of the well-known Basel II soon to be Basel III framework. The following paper takes a closer look on the most important measures against the background of the economic aspects of financial intermediation. The overall focus of this paper is the question if the reform of Basel II can improve the regulatory environment. This includes an analysis of how the changes in financial regulation will affect financial institutions. As a result the paper will show that most of the discussed and adopted measures actually lead to greater regulatory effectiveness. Nevertheless, the key factor for more effective financial regulation is a deep knowledge with regard to financial institutions and their business models. Only a thourough understanding of each individual bank and the system as a whole puts the regulator in the position to assess risks which might lead to the next financial crisis and to react appropriately.

Canadian Financial Institutions: Changing the Regulatory Environment

1986 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 662
Author(s):  
J. A. Galbraith ◽  
Jacob Ziegel ◽  
Leonard Waverman ◽  
David W. Conklin
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Regulatory Environment

Transparency of Financial Regulation

2014 ◽  
pp. 257-285
Author(s):  
James R. Barth ◽  
Apanard (Penny) Prabha ◽  
Clas Wihlborg
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Regulatory Environment ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
The Public ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

This chapter explores the concept of transparency in financial regulation from the perspective of the public. It looks at the role of risk assessment in transparency and the regulatory environment as well as the importance of pluralism in competition in the financial sector. The chapter first considers the meaning of “transparency of financial regulation” and its relation to simplicity. It then traces the progression of the Basel capital adequacy framework from Basel I to Basel III, along with the sources of lack of transparency in the framework. It also presents data showing the lack of transparency in the Basel Capital Accord and countries’ regulatory responses to the global financial crisis. Differences in the implementation of regulation regarding systemically important financial institutions are outlined. Finally, it discusses recent proposals for the separation or separability of financial activities with the goal of enhancing the transparency of banks’ activities for both market participants and resolution authorities.

scholarly journals Backtesting Marginal Expected Shortfall and Related Systemic Risk Measures

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denisa Banulescu-Radu ◽  
Christophe Hurlin ◽  
Jérémy Leymarie ◽  
Olivier Scaillet
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Risk Measures ◽  
Risk Measure ◽  
Expected Shortfall ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Finite Sample ◽  
Marginal Expected Shortfall

This paper proposes an original approach for backtesting systemic risk measures. This backtesting approach makes it possible to assess the systemic risk measure forecasts used to identify the financial institutions that contribute the most to the overall risk in the financial system. Our procedure is based on simple tests similar to those generally used to backtest the standard market risk measures such as value-at-risk or expected shortfall. We introduce a concept of violation associated with the marginal expected shortfall (MES), and we define unconditional coverage and independence tests for these violations. We can generalize these tests to any MES-based systemic risk measures such as the systemic expected shortfall (SES), the systemic risk measure (SRISK), or the delta conditional value-at-risk ([Formula: see text]CoVaR). We study their asymptotic properties in the presence of estimation risk and investigate their finite sample performance via Monte Carlo simulations. An empirical application to a panel of U.S. financial institutions is conducted to assess the validity of MES, SRISK, and [Formula: see text]CoVaR forecasts issued from a bivariate GARCH model with a dynamic conditional correlation structure. Our results show that this model provides valid forecasts for MES and SRISK when considering a medium-term horizon. Finally, we propose an early warning system indicator for future systemic crises deduced from these backtests. Our indicator quantifies how much is the measurement error issued by a systemic risk forecast at a given point in time which can serve for the early detection of global market reversals. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance.

Stand-alone vs systemic risk-taking of financial institutions

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 374-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sascha Strobl
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Risk Measures ◽  
Risk Measure ◽  
Idiosyncratic Risk ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Content Type ◽  
State Of The Economy ◽  
The Usa

Purpose This study investigates the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions in the USA. Specifically, differences between taking risks that affect primarily the shareholders of the institution and risks contributing to the overall systemic risk of the financial sector are examined. Additionally, differences between risk-taking before, during and after the financial crisis of 2007/2008 are examined. Design/methodology/approach To analyze the determinants of stand-alone and systemic risk, a generalized linear model including size, governance, charter value, business cycle, competition and control variables is estimated. Furthermore, Granger causality tests are conducted. Findings The results show that systemic risk has a positive effect on valuation and that corporate governance has no significant effect on risk-taking. The influence of competition is conditional on the state of the economy and the risk measure used. Systemic risk Granger-causes idiosyncratic risk but not vice versa. Research limitations/implications The major limitations of this study are related to the analyzed subset of large financial institutions and important risk-culture variables being omitted. Practical implications The broad policy implication of this paper is that systemic risk cannot be lowered by market discipline due to the moral hazard problem. Therefore, regulatory measures are necessary to ensure that individual financial institutions are not endangering the financial system. Originality/value This study contributes to the empirical literature on bank risk-taking in several ways. First, the characteristics of systemic risk and idiosyncratic risk are jointly analyzed. Second, the direction of causality of these two risk measures is examined. Moreover, this paper contributes to the discussion of the effect of competition on risk-taking.

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