Proofs, Arbitrary Exemplifications, and Inductive Generalizations in Euler’s Mathematical Practice

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Giovanni Ferraro
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Inductive Generalizations

Category Theory and Foundations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ernst
Keyword(s):  
Category Theory ◽  
Mathematical Thinking ◽  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Foundations Of Mathematics ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Technical Adequacy ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

In the foundations of mathematics there has been an ongoing debate about whether categorical foundations can replace set-theoretical foundations. The primary goal of this chapter is to provide a condensed summary of that debate. It addresses the two primary points of contention: technical adequacy and autonomy. Finally, it calls attention to a neglected feature of the debate, the claim that categorical foundations are more natural and readily useable, and how deeper investigation of that claim could prove fruitful for our understanding of mathematical thinking and mathematical practice.

A Priority and Application: Philosophy of Mathematics in the Modern Period

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Shabel
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Mathematical Reasoning ◽  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Pure Mathematics ◽  
Philosophical Account ◽  
Mathematical Ontology ◽  
To Come ◽  
Modern Mathematics

The state of modern mathematical practice called for a modern philosopher of mathematics to answer two interrelated questions. Given that mathematical ontology includes quantifiable empirical objects, how to explain the paradigmatic features of pure mathematical reasoning: universality, certainty, necessity. And, without giving up the special status of pure mathematical reasoning, how to explain the ability of pure mathematics to come into contact with and describe the empirically accessible natural world. The first question comes to a demand for apriority: a viable philosophical account of early modern mathematics must explain the apriority of mathematical reasoning. The second question comes to a demand for applicability: a viable philosophical account of early modern mathematics must explain the applicability of mathematical reasoning. This article begins by providing a brief account of a relevant aspect of early modern mathematical practice, in order to situate philosophers in their historical and mathematical context.

scholarly journals Social constructivism in mathematics? The promise and shortcomings of Julian Cole’s institutional account

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jenni Rytilä
Keyword(s):  
Social Constructivism ◽  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Social Constructs ◽  
Socially Constructed ◽  
The Social ◽  
Characteristic Features ◽  
Core Idea ◽  
Social Entities ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Mathematical Reality

AbstractThe core idea of social constructivism in mathematics is that mathematical entities are social constructs that exist in virtue of social practices, similar to more familiar social entities like institutions and money. Julian C. Cole has presented an institutional version of social constructivism about mathematics based on John Searle’s theory of the construction of the social reality. In this paper, I consider what merits social constructivism has and examine how well Cole’s institutional account meets the challenge of accounting for the characteristic features of mathematics, especially objectivity and applicability. I propose that in general social constructivism shows promise as an ontology of mathematics, because the view can agree with mathematical practice and it offers a way of understanding how mathematical entities can be real without conflicting with a scientific picture of reality. However, I argue that Cole’s specific theory does not provide an adequate social constructivist account of mathematics. His institutional account fails to sufficiently explain the objectivity and applicability of mathematics, because the explanations are weakened and limited by the three-level theoretical model underlying Cole’s account of the construction of mathematical reality and by the use of the Searlean institutional framework. The shortcomings of Cole’s theory give reason to suspect that the Searlean framework is not an optimal way to defend the view that mathematical reality is socially constructed.

The Relationship Between Proof and Certainty in Mathematical Practice

2022 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-84
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Doctoral Students ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Advanced Mathematics ◽  
Mathematics Educators ◽  
The Relationship

Many mathematics educators believe a goal of instruction is for students to obtain conviction and certainty in mathematical statements using the same types of evidence that mathematicians do. However, few empirical studies have examined how mathematicians use proofs to obtain conviction and certainty. We report on a study in which 16 advanced mathematics doctoral students were given a task-based interview in which they were presented with various sources of evidence in support of a specific mathematical claim and were asked how convinced they were that the claim was true after reviewing this evidence. In particular, we explore why our participants retained doubts about our claim after reading its proof and how they used empirical evidence to reduce those doubts.

scholarly journals Higher set theory and mathematical practice

1971 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey M. Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Mathematical Practice

scholarly journals On the centenary of Zygmunt Janiszewski (1888-1920): ideals of mathematical practice and the constitution of continuum theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (18) ◽  
pp. 431-453
Author(s):  
Luis Carlos Arboleda ◽  
Andrés Chaves
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Continuum Theory ◽  
Axiomatic System ◽  
Intellectual Character ◽  
The Social ◽  
Polish School ◽  
The Aesthetic ◽  
Aesthetic Values ◽  
Philosophy Of Mathematical Practice ◽  
Scientific Life

This paper shows the importance of applying a certain approach to the history and philosophy of mathematical practice to the study of Zygmunt Janiszewski's contribution to the topological foundations of Continuum theory. In the first part, a biography of Janiszewski is presented. It emphasizes his role as one of the founders of the Polish School of Mathematics, and the social, political and military facets in which his intellectual character was revealed, as well as the values that guided his academic and scientific life. Kitcher's view of mathematical practice is then adopted to examine the philosophical conceptions and epistemological style of Janiszewski in relation to the construction of the formal axiomatic system of knowledge about the continua. Finally, it is shown the convenience of differentiating in Kitcher's approach, the methods, procedures, techniques and strategies of practice, and the aesthetic values of mathematics. Keywords: Zygmunt Janiszewski; Continuum theory; Philosophy of mathematical practice; Polish school of mathematics.

scholarly journals Hilary Putnam on the philosophy of logic and mathematics

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 183
Author(s):  
José Miguel Sagüillo Fernández-Vega
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Logical Truth ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Philosophy Of Logic ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
And Mathematics

I discuss Putnam’s conception of logical truth as grounded in his picture of mathematical practice and ontology. i begin by comparing Putnam’s 1971 Philosophy of Logic with Quine’s homonymous book. Next, Putnam’s changing views on modality are surveyed, moving from the modal pre-formal to the de-modalized formal characterization of logical validity. Section three suggests a complementary view of Platonism and modalism underlying different stages of a dynamic mathematical practice. The final section argues for the pervasive platonistic conception of the working mathematician.

scholarly journals Relevant Arithmetic and Mathematical Pluralism

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 569-596
Author(s):  
Zach Weber
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Worked Examples ◽  
Incompleteness Theorem ◽  
Classical Counterpart ◽  
The One ◽  
Mathematical Pluralism

In The Consistency of Arithmetic and elsewhere, Meyer claims to “repeal” Goedel’s second incompleteness theorem. In this paper, I review his argument, and then consider two ways of understanding it: from the perspective of mathematical pluralism and monism, respectively. Is relevant arithmetic just another legitimate practice among many, or is it a rival of its classical counterpart—a corrective to Goedel, setting us back on the path to the (One) True Arithmetic? To help answer, I sketch a few worked examples from relevant mathematics, to see what a non-classical (re)formulation of mathematics might look like in practice. I conclude that, while it is unlikely that relevant arithmetic describes past and present mathematical practice, and so might be most acceptable as a pluralist enterprise, it may yet prescribe a more monistic future venture.

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