Local Fiscal Discipline

We study the tax-spend nexus for Russian regional budgets. Causal relationship running from taxing to spending is found, thus supporting the concept “tax and spend” suggested by M. Friedman. Next, elasticity of expenditure by revenue is estimated for a panel of 80 regional budgets basing on data for 2000—2017. Estimates are in the range of 0.72 to 0.78 (depending on the econometric technique), which exceeds elasticity for the federal budget more than twice. This evidences that fiscal policy at the sub-federal (as distinct from the federal) level has clear pro-cyclical nature. Besides, the largest sensitivity of expenditure to revenue shocks is found for the item “national economy”, implying marked adverse implications for economic growth. We suggest to mitigate this effect by modifying fiscal rules for sub-federal budgets. They are currently aimed primarily at enhancing fiscal discipline, with less emphasis on countercyclical policy, insulating economy from fiscal shocks.

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Commonalities and differences of tax systems in West Balkan countries Comparative analysis

European Journal of Social Sciences Education and Research ◽

10.26417/ejser.v3i1.p155-162 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 3 (1) ◽

pp. 155 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Teuta Balliu ◽

Aida Gaçe Llozana

Keyword(s):

Economic Development ◽

Comparative Analysis ◽

Foreign Direct Investments ◽

Fiscal Policies ◽

Fiscal Discipline ◽

Tax System ◽

Revenue Collection ◽

Balkan Countries ◽

The Subject ◽

Tax Systems

Countries of former Yugoslavia and Albania are considered as countries with many common problems as well as changes, which in this context are regarded as insignificant. On their way towards development, these countries are characterized by common problem, among which the most sensitive have been and still remain, unemployment, increasingly compressed public administration, unjustified optimism when planning the budget, mismanagement of public finances and poor fiscal discipline which mostly depends on being or not an election year. In these countries we notice the lack of harmony between economic and fiscal policies and the real needs of the economy. This is seen as other major common ofWest Balkan countries. This similiarity of problems narrows the possibility of competition associated to the foreign investment absorbing capacity. But, which is the moacroeconomic picture in the countries of West Balkan? What are their tax systems? How much are the foreign direct investments? Does the tax system serve as a promoter for these invvestments? This paper represents a comparative analysis of the fiscal systems in the countries of this region. The subject of this paper is the protection with arguments of the economic and fiscal policy which are built for the economic development of a country. This because we are given that there are two types of experiences related to tax system, one of which handles taxes as instruments for revenue collection and the other as a promoter factor for economic development.

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Towards Price Stability in Tanzania During Economic Reforms: Does Fiscal Discipline Matter?

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.2142410 ◽

2012 ◽

Author(s):

Michael O. A. Ndanshau ◽

Flaviana P. Nyasebwa

Keyword(s):

Economic Reforms ◽

Price Stability ◽

Fiscal Discipline

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Power to the People?: The Initiative Process and Fiscal Discipline in City Governments

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3427464 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Benedict Salazar Jimenez

Keyword(s):

Fiscal Discipline ◽

City Governments ◽

The People ◽

Initiative Process

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The Future Ain’t What It Used to Be

10.1093/oso/9780199351381.003.0011 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Ashoka Mody

Keyword(s):

Financial Markets ◽

Social Problems ◽

Financial Integration ◽

Fiscal Rules ◽

Fiscal Discipline ◽

European Project ◽

The Future ◽

The Right

This chapter describes two scenarios, the two possible ways in which the final act of the European project plays out. In the first scenario, European authorities remain confident that they have essentially been on the right track and they continue to make modest course corrections, which they believe will ensure a brighter European future. However, the elusive and frustrating pursuit of deeper economic and financial integration causes more economic and political damage. Setbacks and crises recur to test the euro and its accompanying political vision. In the second scenario, the pro-European vision, European authorities recognize the important truth that “more Europe” will not solve Europe's most pressing economic and social problems. They dismantle the economically counterproductive and politically corrosive system of fiscal rules and rely more on financial markets to enforce fiscal discipline. Paradoxically, the euro survives, not because it adds value but because it becomes largely irrelevant.

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Schröder Asserts the German National Interest, 1999–2003

10.1093/oso/9780199351381.003.0004 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Ashoka Mody

Keyword(s):

Monetary Union ◽

Democratic Party ◽

National Interest ◽

Social Democratic Party ◽

Fiscal Discipline ◽

Political Union ◽

Social Democratic ◽

European Institutions ◽

Deutsche Mark ◽

Full Swing

This chapter discusses how Gerhard Schröder, leader of Germany's Social Democratic Party, proposed to delay the euro's birth rather than start with members who had not achieved the required fiscal discipline. Campaigning to replace Helmut Kohl as chancellor in March 1998, Schröder observed that some countries would struggle to survive the rigors of the monetary union. However, once Schröder was elected chancellor in October, his hands were tied. In April 1998, the Bundestag had already authorized Germany's shift from the deutsche mark to the euro, Germany had made commitments to its European partners, and preparation for launch of the euro was in full swing. Ultimately, the euro was born uneventfully on January 1, 1999. Schröder continued the narrative of Europe's eventual political awakening; he even called for greater European “political union.” To the contrary, Schröder quickly developed a confrontational relationship with European institutions.

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National fiscal rules and fiscal discipline in the European Union

Applied Economics ◽

10.1080/00036846.2020.1859453 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 53 (20) ◽

pp. 2337-2359

Author(s):

Amélie Barbier-Gauchard ◽

Kea Baret ◽

Alexandru Minea

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Fiscal Rules ◽

The European Union ◽

Fiscal Discipline

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Why Should We Be Beggars with the Ballot in Our Hand? Veto Players and the Failure of Land Value Taxation in the United Kingdom, 1909–14

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123406000317 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 36 (4) ◽

pp. 575-591 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

IAIN McLEAN ◽

JENNIFER NOU

Keyword(s):

United Kingdom ◽

Welfare States ◽

Veto Players ◽

Temporary Increase ◽

British Politics ◽

Land Value ◽

Fiscal Discipline ◽

Veto Player ◽

The United Kingdom ◽

Entire History

Recent veto player work argues that majoritarian regimes such as the United Kingdom have better fiscal discipline and smaller welfare states than proportional regimes with more veto players. An analytic narrative of the failure of land value taxation in the United Kingdom between 1909 and 1914 shows, however, that it failed not because of previously advanced reasons, but because the number of veto players in British politics was sharply increased. This increase in veto player numbers prevented a tax increase. All seven of the conventional reasons for characterizing the United Kingdom as a low-n veto player regime failed to hold between 1906 and 1914. Observable implications discussed include the need to review the entire history of British politics in this period in the light of the temporary increase in veto players; and the ambiguous implications of number of veto players for fiscal discipline.

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