Husserl’s Phenomenology of Scientific Practice

Author(s):  
Mirja Hartimo
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Hilary Radner ◽  
Alistair Fox

This chapter assesses Raymond Bellour’s contribution to the area of research known as “film analysis,” arguing that it is best understood as an “art” rather than a scientific practice. Grounded in the French tradition of “explication du texte” as a means of approaching literature, Bellour was among the first film scholars to bring a French literary sensibility to the analysis of Classical Hollywood film, which enabled him to recognize the rhetorical refinements of the cinematic medium and its potential for poetic expression. The chapter explores the significant concepts that define Bellour’s approach: segmentation; “the unattainable text” (also referred to as “the undiscoverable text” or “le texte introuvable”); le blocage symbolique (also referred to as “the symbolic blockage”);“the textual volume”; Hitchcock and psychoanalysis; and enunciation.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adib Rifqi Setiawan

It is requisite that each activity is necessary to have a clear purpose as it was designed to be a well applicable plan. Scientific literacy indicates that science has value outside scientific practice is hardly modern idea and reality, although we lose sight of this history. Unfortunately, PISA study at 1999-2015 and several preexist works has shows that common science teachings don’t optimally guide students to achieve scientific literacy. As matter of fact, the answer to how to guide student achieving scientific literacy has not been obtained yet. By proposing this work, I am consider that thematic learning as an alternative method to guide students on achieving scientific literacy. Thematic learning is an educational method of teaching in which emphasis is given on choosing a specific theme for teaching concepts. It is based on integrating various information and use it to demonstrate the topic. Pedagogy of thematic learning is based on its exploration of broad areas in one theme. I don’t deny that the concept of integrating subjects to teach in Indonesian schools, generally is not new and has not been very successful in the past. In addition, some people consider thematic learning as an opportunity while others view it as having problems. The answer, however, to how thematic learning education implementation has not been studied yet comprehensively. Therefore, thematic learning lesson plans is very important to be designed then implemented. This work constructs lesson plan to guide primary education student on achieving scientific literacy, using R&D approach four-D model: define, design, develop, and disseminate. It gained lesson plan completed by student worksheets also assessment tests as well, that validated by experts and practitioners nor reliability counted based exclusively on test.


This paper analyzes Foucault’s early thinking (from 1954 to 1957) as it bears on psychology, anthropology and psychiatry. The author maintains that Foucault’s texts from that period can be mined for the origins of the Foucault methodology, early indications of its scope, and its first applications. Although Foucault opposed a phenomenology of epistemology and allied himself with the latter, a close reading of his early work reveals a paradoxical synthesis of phenomenological and epistemological views. The influences of Georges Canguilhem, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Ludwig Binswanger were decisive here.Foucault adopted the “practice-to-theory” vector from Canguilhem and grounded the history of psychology and psychiatry on the study of essential oppositions: normal - pathological, personality - environment, evolution - history. Merleau-Ponty’s theory allowed him to demonstrate that the ontological perspective of psychology and psychiatry does not match the subject of their research, which is the person and their experience. Foucault’s application of Binswanger and the idea of existence is to problematize the boundaries between psychology and psychiatry and their identity as sciences while formulating the problem of pathology and normality as crucial to their identification. He also considers mental illness as one of the forms of experience. Foucault thus goes beyond the boundaries of psychology and psychiatry to develop his archaeological method. In the Order of things and the Archaeology of Knowledge he makes two philosophical maneuvers: in the first, he rejects the subject; in the second he abandons the continuity of history. Foucault’s early psychological and psychiatric discourse is then the first harbinger of his trespassing the boundaries of disciplines and schools, combining perspectives, and scrutinizing the foundations of scientific practice. A critical dialogue with his own earlier thought is the source of Foucault’s birth as a philosopher.


Descartes once argued that, with sufficient effort and skill, a single scientist could uncover fundamental truths about our world. Contemporary science proves the limits of this claim. From synthesizing the human genome to predicting the effects of climate change, some current scientific research requires the collaboration of hundreds (if not thousands) of scientists with various specializations. Additionally, the majority of published scientific research is now coauthored, including more than 80% of articles in the natural sciences. Small collaborative teams have become the norm in science. This is the first volume to address critical philosophical questions about how collective scientific research could be organized differently and how it should be organized. For example, should scientists be required to share knowledge with competing research teams? How can universities and grant-giving institutions promote successful collaborations? When hundreds of researchers contribute to a discovery, how should credit be assigned—and can minorities expect a fair share? When collaborative work contains significant errors or fraudulent data, who deserves blame? In this collection of essays, leading philosophers of science address these critical questions, among others. Their work extends current philosophical research on the social structure of science and contributes to the growing, interdisciplinary field of social epistemology. The volume’s strength lies in the diversity of its authors’ methodologies. Employing detailed case studies of scientific practice, mathematical models of scientific communities, and rigorous conceptual analysis, contributors to this volume study scientific groups of all kinds, including small labs, peer-review boards, and large international collaborations like those in climate science and particle physics.


Author(s):  
Marc Lange

Some philosophers regard no reducible physical properties as perfectly natural. However, in scientific practice, some but not other reducible physical properties (such as the property of having a given center of mass) denote genuine, explanatorily potent respects in which various systems are alike. What distinguishes these natural reducible physical properties from arbitrary algebraic combinations of more fundamental properties? Some philosophers treat naturalness as a metaphysical primitive. However, this chapter I suggests that it is not—at least, not as far as the naturalness of reducible physical properties is concerned. Roughly speaking, it is argued here that a reducible physical property’s naturalness is grounded in its role in the explanation of laws.


This collection brings together new and important work by both emerging scholars and those who helped shape the field on the nature of causal powers, and the connections between causal powers and other phenomena within metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. Contributors discuss how one who takes causal powers to be in some sense irreducible should think about laws of nature, scientific practice, causation, modality, space and time, persistence, and the metaphysics of mind.


2021 ◽  
pp. 053901842110186
Author(s):  
Fred D’Agostino ◽  
Jeffery Malpas

Picking up on Olof Hallonsten’s contention that contemporary science evaluation is ‘mostly counterproductive’, we argue that the contemporary focus on evaluation is antagonistic to innovation or novelty in science, even though innovation is one of the values that evaluation is often supposed to support. In arguing for the antagonistic relation between evaluation and innovation, we consider arguments from the nature of audit and the situational logic of scientific practice.


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