Boko Haram in Nigeria: R2P and Non‐State Armed Groups

Author(s):  
Çağlar Açıkyıldız
Keyword(s):  

Subject Outlook for Islamist militancy in West Africa. Significance Over the past four months Islamist armed groups have carried out high-profile attacks in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Mali. Such incidents are not new in the Sahel, but the methods and scale have changed. To some extent this mirrors changes seen in Nigeria, Kenya, the Middle East and Europe, where attackers explicitly target civilians in a bid to attract media attention. Impacts The risk of further attacks is unlikely to shift positive investor sentiment towards Ivory Coast, which is driven by strong GDP growth. Airport security will likely come under fresh scrutiny given recent bombings and hijackings in Somalia and Egypt respectively. Cameroon is vulnerable to further attacks given its involvement in the regional anti-Boko Haram force.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Agbiboa

Ce rapport RESOLVE, l’un de trois, cherche à comprendre l’origine, la dynamique et les moteurs des groupes armés communautaires ou GAC (community-based armed groups ou CBAGs) en Afrique. En tant qu’étude exploratoire, ce rapport implique la collecte, l’organisation et la synthèse des informations disponibles sur les acteurs de la sécurité non étatiques et leurs relations avec les communautés locales et les agences officielles de l’État, comme les systèmes d’application de la loi et de justice. Le rapport s’appuie sur des ouvrages académiques qui explorent les relations entre l’État et la société civile, en cherchant à remettre en question les rendus simplistes de ceux-ci en tant qu’entités distinctes avec des frontières clairement définies. Le rapport est également alimenté par des entretiens avec des membres de la Force d’intervention civile conjointe ou FICC (Civilian Joint Task Force ou CJTF), une milice pro- gouvernementale qui aide à repousser la violente insurrection de Boko Haram dans le nord-est du Nigeria.


2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Brubacher ◽  
Erin Kimball Damman ◽  
Christopher Day

ABSTRACTThis article examines the Task Forces created by the African Union (AU) to address the security threats posed by Boko Haram and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). It argues that these Task Forces are well suited to address transnational armed groups whose ambiguous political goals and extreme violence make traditional conflict resolution ineffective. Although the Task Forces fall within the AU's collective security mandate and broadly within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), their distinct characteristics make it more capable of addressing these new cross-border threats. Their reliance on nationally funded and directed militaries also allow the Task Forces to fulfil both the goals of the AU and the interests of the regimes that take leadership roles within these structures.


Significance Hosting the CHAN was an attempt by President Paul Biya's government to convince international audiences that it can host the AFCON despite ongoing conflict in the predominantly anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions, with armed groups now apparently using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Impacts Biya’s lack of a clear succession plan raises a risk of political instability in the event of his incapacitation. A first economic contraction in two decades will heap additional pressure on the government before the AFCON. Collaboration between armed anglophones and Boko Haram remains unlikely given their differing religious beliefs and ideology.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 667-677
Author(s):  
Kasaija Phillip Apuuli

Africa continues to suffer from outbreaks of conflict, with evidence pointing to an increasing number of violent armed incidents. The establishment of the African Union (AU) heralded (or so it was hoped) a new era in how African conflicts are managed and resolved. Since 2003, the AU has mandated a number of peace support operations including the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as a means to manage conflicts on the continent. In more recent times, the organization has also authorized three operations dealing with non-state armed groups namely the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Boko Haram and the Sahel Region Jihadists. Whilst some of these peace support missions recorded successes in meeting their mandates, generally all of them faced or are facing a number of challenges including funding, and logistical inadequacies among others. At the same time, the AU’s engagement in peacekeeping in Africa has occasioned opportunities for the organization including: increasing its capacity building in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution; adoption of initiatives like “Silencing the Guns” aimed at lessening the outbreak of conflicts; and establishing its own funding mechanisms on how to support its mandated and authorized peace support missions among others.


Author(s):  
Lauren Aarons

In recent years, the term 'tactic of terrorism' has increasingly been used to describe conflict-related sexual violence and human trafficking by non-state armed groups. This framing has complemented (and at times replaced) the longstanding recognition of 'rape as a weapon of war' including at the UN Security Council. This association with terrorism has tactical advantages but also poses wider risks for the realization of human rights. On the one hand, it has the potential to engage counter-terrorism powers and resources to prosecute perpetrators and prompt reparations. However, it also risks legitimizing harmful counter-terror measures and obscuring a more comprehensive understanding of the gendered harms associated with conflict and terrorism. With particular reference to the conflicts involving Boko Haram and Islamic State, this article weighs the advantages and costs of framing sexual violence and human trafficking as a 'tactic of terrorism' in order to inform and warn feminist human rights advocates.


Author(s):  
Ana Maria Ibanez

The article describes the magnitude, geographical extent,  and causes of forced population displacements in Colombia. Forced migration in Colombia is a war strategy adopted by armed groups to strengthen territorial strongholds, weaken civilian support to the enemy, seize valuable lands, and produce and transport illegal drugs with ease. Forced displacement in Colombia today affects 3.5 million people. Equivalent to 7.8 percent of Colombia's population, and second worldwide only to Sudan, this shows the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis the country is facing. The phenomenon involves all of Colombia's territory and nearly 90 percent of the country's municipalities expel or receive population. In contrast to other countries, forced migration in Colombia is largely internal. Illegal armed groups are the main responsible parties, migration does not result in massive refugee streams but occurs on an individual basis, and the displaced population is dispersed throughout the territory and not focused in refugee camps. These characteristics pose unique challenges for crafting state policy that can effectively mitigate the impact of displacement.


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