Tadeusz Czeżowski’s Theory of Knowledge and Beliefs

Author(s):  
Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Author(s):  
Richard Foley

A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. This book finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs—something important that she doesn't quite “get.” This may seem a modest point but, as the book shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information. Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.


2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 192-197
Author(s):  
Sherry S. Zhou ◽  
Alan P. Baptist

Background: There has been a striking increase in electronic cigarette (EC) use in the United States. The beliefs and practices toward ECs among physicians are unknown. Objective: The purpose of this study was to investigate EC practice patterns among allergists, pulmonologists, and primary care physicians. Methods: An anonymous survey was sent to physicians. The survey contained 32 questions and addressed issues related to demographics, cessation counseling behaviors, personal use, and knowledge and beliefs about ECs. Statistical analysis was performed by using analysis of variance, the Pearson χ2 test, Fisher exact test, and logistic regression. Results: A total of 291 physicians completed the survey (222 primary care physicians, 33 pulmonologists, and 36 allergists) for a response rate of 46%. The allergists asked about tobacco cigarette use as frequently as did the pulmonologists and more than the primary care physicians (p < 0.001), but they rarely asked about EC use. The pulmonologists scored highest on self-reported knowledge on ECs, although all the groups answered <40% of the questions correctly. The allergists did not feel as comfortable about providing EC cessation counseling as did the pulmonologists and primary care physicians (p < 0.001). All three groups were equally unlikely to recommend ECs as a cessation tool for tobacco cigarette users. Conclusion: Allergists lacked knowledge and confidence in providing education and cessation counseling for EC users. As the number of patients who use these products continues to increase, there is an urgent need for all physicians to be comfortable and knowledgeable with counseling about ECs.


Author(s):  
Martin Lee-Gosselin ◽  
Pierre-Sébastien Fournier ◽  
Isabelle Béchard

Some studies suggest that the benefits of antilock brake systems (ABS) may be offset through behavioral adaptation, such as driving faster or following closer. Whether preconditions for behavioral adaptation exist was examined by investigating driver knowledge and beliefs about ABS. Telephone interviews were conducted throughout Quebec early in 1999 with principal drivers of a stratified random sample of 404 drivers with currently registered light-duty vehicles, registered to the same person for at least 18 months. The response rate was 82 percent of 492 reached. Only medium-range and high-end 1990-1995 vehicles, for which ABS was either standard equipment or unavailable, were selected. The protocol involved mostly open questions that encouraged respondents to reveal their knowledge and beliefs with minimal prompting. The results indicated an important lack of understanding, on the part of a majority of drivers, regarding the functioning and use of ABS. This varied from an inability to identify conditions in which ABS is favorable or unfavorable to serious misconceptions; about 25 percent were wrong about whether their vehicle was ABS equipped. Cognitive preconditions for behavioral adaptations—sometimes increased prudence—were found for a minority of this sample, and there may be a relationship between a low level of knowledge and the perceived possibility of driving faster with these brakes. There appears to be a case for improved public and dealer-delivered information on the advantages and disadvantages of ABS in different driving conditions, which if balanced should not increase unsafe behavioral adaptation.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Olech

2020 ◽  
Vol 961 (7) ◽  
pp. 27-36
Author(s):  
A.K. Cherkashin

The purpose of the study is to show how the features of geocartographic way of thinking are manifested in the meta-theory of knowledge based on mathematical formalisms. General cartographic concepts and regularities are considered in the view of metatheoretic analysis using cognitive procedures of fiber bundle from differential geometry. On levels of metainformation generalization, the geocartographic metatheoretic approach to the study of reality is higher than the system-theoretical one. It regulates the type of equations, models, and methods of each intertheory expressed in its own system terms. There is a balance between the state of any system and its geographical environment; therefore the observed phenomena are only explained theoretically in a metatheoretic projection on the corresponding system-thematic layer of the knowledge map. Metatheoretic research enables passing from the systematization of already known patterns to the formation of new knowledge through the scientific stratification of reality. General methods of metatheoretic analysis are mathematically distinguished


1986 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD F. KITCHENER
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Claudio de Almeida

Contrary to millennial thought, inferential knowledge does seem to arise in certain cases of reasoning to which false premises are evidentially essential. The phenomenon refutes all of the well-known epistemologies that account for inferential knowledge. I offer an explanation of the phenomenon based on a fairly conservative revision to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, and explain why Peter Klein’s proposed solution fails. The explanation put forward here aims at giving us these two highly desirable results: (a) something we have never had and may not have noticed we needed, a defeasibility theory that is compatible with epistemological fallibilism, and, (b) within this revised, fallibilistic version of the defeasibility theory, an explanation of the benign/malignant distinction for false beliefs that completes the defeasibilist resolution of the Gettier Problem.


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