A Pluralistic Way Out of Epistemic Deflationism About Ontological Disputes

2017 ◽  
pp. 317-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Delia Belleri
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Disputes

scholarly journals Why Composition Matters

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (8) ◽  
pp. 934-949
Author(s):  
Andrew M. Bailey ◽  
Andrew Brenner
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophical Theology ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Composite Objects ◽  
Ontological Disputes

AbstractMany say that ontological disputes are defective because they are unimportant or without substance. In this paper, we defend ontological disputes from the charge, with a special focus on disputes over the existence of composite objects. Disputes over the existence of composite objects, we argue, have a number of substantive implications across a variety of topics in metaphysics, science, philosophical theology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Since the disputes over the existence of composite objects have these substantive implications, they are themselves substantive.

The Syntactic Priority Thesis and Ontological Disputes

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-164
Author(s):  
George Duke
Keyword(s):  
Syntactic Structure ◽  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Singular Terms ◽  
Priority Thesis ◽  
Ontological Disputes

The syntactic priority thesis (henceforth SP) asserts that the truth of appropriate sentential contexts containing what are, by syntactic criteria, singular terms, is sufficient to justify the attribution of objectual reference to such terms (Wright, 1983, 24). One consequence that the neo-Fregean draws from SP is that it is through an analysis of the syntactic structure of true statements that ‘ontological questions are to be understood and settled’ (Wright, 1983, 25). Despite the significant literature on SP, little consideration has been given to this bold metaontological claim.1 My concern here is accordingly not with specific applications of SP to debates in the philosophy of mathematics, but rather with the neo-Fregean's claim that SP can constitute a decisionprocedure in relation to substantive ontological disputes. I argue that the explanatory power of SP is limited to an account of what ‘there are’ sentences are true and does not extend as far as substantive ontology.

scholarly journals The Eventful Character of Bibikhin's Philosophical Thought

2021 ◽  
Vol V (1) ◽  
pp. 78-104
Author(s):  
Yuri Romanenko
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Teaching Philosophy ◽  
Transfer Of Knowledge ◽  
Ontological Category ◽  
Philosophical Thought ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Ontological Disputes ◽  
Intellectual Creativity

The article deals with the event-related aspects of V.V. Bibikhin's philosophical activities on the material of his lectures, texts and communication with contemporaries (S.S. Horuzhy, S.S. Averintsev and A.V. Akhutin). The eventfulness of the transfer of knowledge from teacher to student, as well as the unity of thought, word and life are the principles of teaching philosophy derived from the pedagogical experience of V.V. Bibikhin. He was a follower of A.F. Losev and M. Heidegger focusing his thoughts on clarifying ontological problems. Ontological thought is paradoxical in its own nature. This is revealed in the reading and interpretation of Bibikhin's writings, as well as in the evidence of his polemical communication with colleagues. One of the brightest ontological disputes of recent times is the discussion of V.V. Bibikhin and S.S. Horuzhy about the concept of energy which is an essential ontological category. These prominent Russian thinkers had a long-term friendship that included an element of intellectual rivalry. The author calls such communication “friendship in struggle” which has a paradoxical character. The philosophical definition of friendship presented in the book “The Pillar and Statement of Truth” by P.A. Florensky which has an antinomic character is used in the text. The paradoxical event and the polemic nature of V.V. Bibikhin's thought manifests itself in his works and correspondence with friends. The article provides illustrative examples of these moments of his intellectual creativity. V.V. Bibikhin is one of those thinkers who preserve the Russian philosophical tradition in the context of its disputes with other national traditions.

The Language of Ontology

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
New Work ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Ontological Disputes ◽  
Prominent Line

Metaphysical and ontological debates—debates about what exists and the nature of reality—have long been among the most discussed topics in philosophy. However, some argue that ontological debates are non-substantive, pointless, trivial, incoherent, or impossible. Debates about whether tables exist, or about the nature of reality, are taken to be defective in some way. This has led to a burgeoning literature studying the nature of metaphysical and ontological disputes themselves. A prominent line of argument has focused on questions concerning the language in which metaphysical disputes are conducted. Is there a ‘fundamental’ or ‘best’ language for ontology, or does the nature of language render metaphysical and ontological disputes non-substantive? This volume brings together new work from established and emerging authors on questions relating to the relationship between language and ontology. More specifically, essays in this volume consider such topics as whether there can be an ‘objectively best’ or privileged language of ontology; how we might compare languages to see which is the language of ontology; whether positing an ‘objectively best’ language is required of a substantive realist metaphysics; whether metaphysical debates are meaningless; the role of existence and truth in ontological theorizing; whether metaphysical claims should be interpreted as attempts to express truths about the nature of reality; and the relationship between natural language and theoretical metaphysics. Collectively, these essays advance a range of debates in metametaphysics and metaontology, and will be an invaluable resource for students and academics interested in the relationship between metaphysics and language.

Talking about Numbers

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katharina Felka
Keyword(s):  
Linguistic Research ◽  
Ontological Disputes ◽  
Do So

For thousands of years philosophers have discussed the question of whether numbers exist. Surprisingly, there are very easy arguments from commonly accepted truths that seem to decide the question. For instance, it is a commonly accepted truth that Obama has two hands. If Obama has two hands, then the number of Obama’s hands is two, and, thus, numbers exist. If such arguments were convincing, ontological disputes about the existence of numbers could be decided simply by pointing to Obama’s hands! The book offers a defense of the profoundness of traditional ontological questions by showing that the easy arguments in question are based on false linguistic assumptions. To do so it engages with recent linguistic research and develops analyses of the pertinent sentences that are of interest far beyond the metaontological question at hand.

La conferenza di Quine del 1946 sul nominalismo

2009 ◽  
pp. 17-32
Author(s):  
Peter Van Inwagen
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Ontological Disputes

- Quine's 1946 lecture Nominalism is a superb exposition of his early views on ontological commitment. In my opinion, they are presented more clearly in this lecture than in On What There Is. I go on to illustrate these views in connection with the problem of finding nominalistically acceptable paraphrases of two sentences: ‘Some zoological species are cross-fertile' and ‘There are three times as many dogs as there are cats'. Various philosophical problems are examined that arise from the paraphrases taken into consideration. I conclude that the value of the lecture does not lie in its contribution to the "nominalist paraphrase project" (a project impossible to carry out), but rather in what it adds to our understanding of how ontological disputes should be conducted.

Ontology by Stipulation

2021 ◽  
pp. 7-22
Author(s):  
Eli Hirsch
Keyword(s):  
Common Language ◽  
Previous Suggestion ◽  
Basic Point ◽  
The Common ◽  
Two Sides ◽  
Ontological Disputes

In previous work the author suggested that many ontological disputes can be viewed as merely verbal, in that each side can be charitably interpreted as speaking the truth in its own language. Critics have objected that it is more plausible to view the disputants as speaking the same language, perhaps even a special philosophy-room language, sometimes called Ontologese. This chapter suggests a different kind of deflationary move, in a way more extreme (possibly more Carnapian) than the author’s previous suggestion. The chapter supposes we encounter an ontological dispute between two sides, the A-side and the B-side, and we assume that they are speaking the same language so that (at least) one of them is mistaken (perhaps the common language is Ontologese). The author’s suggestion is that we can introduce by stipulation two languages, one for each side, such that in speaking the A-side stipulated language we capture whatever facts might be expressed in the A-side’s position, and in speaking the B-side stipulated language we capture whatever facts might be expressed in the B-side’s position. In this way we get whatever facts there might be in this ontological area without risking falsehood. A further part of the argument consists in explaining why the stipulation maneuver applies to questions of ontology but not to questions of mathematics (such as the Goldbach conjecture). One basic point is that mathematics has application to contingencies in a way that ontology doesn’t.

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