A Shocking Truth for Law and Economics: Consumer Welfare Explains the Internal Market for Electricity Better Than Total Welfare

2018 ◽  
pp. 101-133
Author(s):  
Fabrizio Esposito ◽  
Lucila de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Law And Economics ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Total Welfare ◽  
Better Than

Economic consequences for lawyers

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 368-398
Author(s):  
Fabrizio Esposito ◽  
Giovanni Tuzet
Keyword(s):  
Law And Economics ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Analytical Tool ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Legal Argumentation ◽  
Welfare Maximization ◽  
The Right ◽  
Total Welfare ◽  
The Eu

Abstract This article moves from the premise that a bilateral relationship between law and economics requires the contribution of the theory of legal argumentation. The article shows that, to be legally relevant, economic consequences have to be incorporated into interpretive arguments. In this regard, the jurisprudential preface strategy proposed by Craswell goes in the right direction, but begs the question of why the legally relevant consequences have to be assessed in terms of total welfare maximization instead of, in the EU context at least, consumer welfare maximization. After having identified five points of divergence between total and consumer welfare approaches, the article draws from legal inferentialism to propose an analytical tool – the explanatory scorekeeping model – for assessing the explanatory power of these two approaches. The model is then applied to the reasoning in United Brands Company v. Commission.

The Unsound Theory Behind the Consumer (and Total) Welfare Goal in Antitrust

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Glick
Keyword(s):  
Law And Economics ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Business Strategies ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Compensation Principle ◽  
Original Argument ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Total Welfare

This is the first installment of a two-part commentary on the New Brandeis School (the “New Brandeisians”) in Antitrust. In this first part, I examine why the New Brandeisians are correct to reject the consumer welfare standard. Instead of arguing, as the New Brandeisians do, that the consumer welfare standard leads to unacceptable outcomes, I argue that the consumer or total welfare standard was theoretically flawed and unrigorous from the start. My basic argument is that antitrust law addresses the impact of business strategies in markets where there are winners and losers. For example, in the classical exclusionary monopolist case, the monopolist’s conduct is enjoined to increase competition in the affected market or markets. As a result of the intervention, consumers benefit, but the monopolist is worse off. One hundred years of analysis by the welfare economists themselves shows that in such situations “welfare” or “consumer welfare” cannot be used as a reliable guide to assess the results of antitrust policy. Pareto Optimality does not apply in these situations because there are losers. Absent an ability to divine “cardinal utility” from observations of market behavior, other approaches such as consumer surplus, and compensating and equivalent variation cannot be coherently extended from the individual level to markets. The Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle that is in standard use in law and economics was created to address problems of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the existence of winners and losers. However, the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle is also inconsistent. Additional problems with the concept of welfare raised by philosophers, psychologists, and experimental economists are also considered. In light of this literature, the New Brandeisians are correct to reject Judge Bork’s original argument for adoption of the consumer welfare standard, but for deeper reasons than they have expressed thus far.

3 The Law and Economics of Anticompetitive Coordination

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Law

This chapter examines Article 101 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). All modern competition law regimes outlaw the coordination of independent undertakings where it leads to a restriction of competition. In the European Union, a prohibition system is enshrined in Article 101 TFEU, which holds that ‘agreements between undertakings’ which restrict competition are ‘incompatible’ with the Treaty. Article 101 TFEU is a three-pronged provision. First, Article 101(1) TFEU establishes a prohibition rule, which provides that agreements between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which restrict competition are incompatible with the internal market. Second, Article 101(2) TFEU declares that agreements deemed incompatible pursuant to Article 101(1) TFEU are null and void. Third, Article 101(3) TFEU embodies an exception rule which defuses the application of Article 101(1) to agreements that bring a positive net contribution to consumer welfare.

scholarly journals The Erroneous Foundations of Law and Economics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-114
Author(s):  
Mark Glick ◽  
Gabriel A. Lozada
Keyword(s):  
Law And Economics ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Pareto Efficiency ◽  
Wealth Maximization ◽  
The Status ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Ethical Failures ◽  
The 19Th Century

The fundamental originating principle of law and economics (L&E) is that legal decisions should be (and are) based on maximizing efficiency. But L&E proponents do not define “efficiency” in the way agreed to by most economists, as Pareto Efficiency. A Pareto optimal condition is obtained when no one can be made better off without making someone worse off. Pareto Improvements are win-win changes where no losers exist. In the judicial system, however, there are always winners and losers, because under Article III § 2 of the Constitution a legal case does not exist unless there is a justiciable “case or controversy” in need of resolution. Unable to use Pareto Efficiency, L&E scholars have been forced to adopt alternative definitions of efficiency. Most L&E scholars claim to define “efficiency” based on the work of Kaldor and Hicks, but (perhaps unwittingly) instead use a definition of “efficiency” derived from the 19th century idea of consumer surplus, which encompasses L&E notions such as “wealth maximization,” and “consumer welfare” in antitrust. Neither of these alternative definitions is viable, however. Outside of L&E, the Kaldor-Hicks approach has long been recognized to be riddled with logical inconsistencies and ethical failures, and the surplus approach is even more deficient. Remarkably, virtually none of the numerous L&E textbooks even hint at such problems. Critically, all definitions of efficiency improvements in economics are biased in favor of wealthy individuals or firms, either because they are dependent on the status quo ante distribution of assets, or because they bestow large advantages on parties with political influence or who can afford to bring lawsuits quickly. Many L&E practitioners treat efficiency improvements instead as being objectively good, an error revealing that L&E is primarily motivated by its neoliberal policy agenda.

1. Introduction to Competition Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-74
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Competition Analysis ◽  
Elasticity Of Demand ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Demand Curves ◽  
Producer Surplus ◽  
Total Welfare

This chapter provides an introduction to, and basis for, the material discussed in the subsequent chapters. It introduces some relevant concepts of microeconomics including demand curves, consumer and producer surplus, elasticity of demand, and economies of scale and scope. It discusses the model of perfect competition and the concepts of allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency; the problems in competition terms of monopoly and oligopoly; and the concept of welfare, particularly consumer welfare and total welfare. It considers various schools of competition analysis and theories and concepts relevant to competition law. It discusses the possible objectives of competition law, and particularly considers what objectives are pursued by EU competition law. The chapter also looks at US antitrust law; competition law and the digital economy; competition law and regulation; and at some basic issues in the application of EU competition law.

scholarly journals Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Storable Goods Markets

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (7) ◽  
pp. 2722-2751 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igal Hendel ◽  
Aviv Nevo
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Intertemporal Price Discrimination ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Future Consumption ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Total Welfare

We study intertemporal price discrimination when consumers can store for future consumption needs. We offer a simple model of demand dynamics, which we estimate using market-level data. Optimal pricing involves temporary price reductions that enable sellers to discriminate between price sensitive consumers, who stockpile for future consumption, and less price-sensitive consumers, who do not stockpile. We empirically quantify the impact of intertemporal price discrimination on profits and welfare. We find that sales (i) capture 25–30 percent of the gap between non-discriminatory profits and (unattainable) third-degree price discrimination profits, (ii) increase total welfare, and (iii) have a modest impact on consumer welfare. (JEL D11, D12, L11, L12, L81)

15. Competition law

2020 ◽  
pp. 415-449
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competitive Behaviour ◽  
The Uk

This chapter analyses the foundations of EU competition law. Competition law is an attempt to regulate the behaviour of private companies when active in the internal market so as to ensure that competition between different entities remains and is fair. The rules of competition law aim both to assist the completion of the internal market as well as addressing consumer welfare in more general terms. A further particularly interesting dimension is that unlike most internal market law, competition law applies regardless of the nationality of the companies or businesses active in the internal market. As such, UK companies active on the continent after Brexit will have to know these rules, regardless of whether they continue to apply in the UK. The chapter then details the two Treaty provisions that address anti-competitive behaviour: Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).

3 The Regulatory and Institutional Framework of EU Cartel Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Argenton Cédric ◽  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Stephan Andreas
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Eu

This chapter deals with the institutional and regulatory framework that applies to cartels in the European Union (EU), going over both the substantive and procedural rules. The key legal basis for the prosecution of cartels resides under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as interpreted by the case law of the EU courts. Article 101 TFEU is a three-pronged provision. First, the chapter shows how Article 101(1) TFEU establishes a prohibition rule providing that any agreement between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which restricts competition is to be deemed incompatible with the internal market. Next, the chapter takes a look at how Article 101(2) TFEU declares that agreements deemed incompatible pursuant to Article 101(1) TFEU are null and void. The ways in which Article 101(3) TFEU embodies an exception to the default prohibition rule, which defuses the application of Article 101(1) for agreements that bring a positive net contribution to consumer welfare, is also discussed.

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