Towards Model-Based Policy Elaboration on City Scale Using Game Theory: Application to Ambulance Dispatching

2018 ◽  
pp. 404-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergey V. Kovalchuk ◽  
Mariia A. Moskalenko ◽  
Alexey N. Yakovlev
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Theory Application

Grid Cyber-Physical System Risk Management Model Based on Cooperative Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cunbin Li ◽  
Ding Liu ◽  
Yi Wang ◽  
Chunyan Liang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Risk Management ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Physical System ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Power Grid ◽  
Management Model ◽  
Cyber Physical System ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Generation Power

AbstractAdvanced grid technology represented by smart grid and energy internet is the core feature of the next-generation power grid. The next-generation power grid will be a large-scale cyber-physical system (CPS), which will have a higher level of risk management due to its flexibility in sensing and control. This paper explains the methods and results of a study on grid CPS’s behavior after risk. Firstly, a behavior model based on hybrid automata is built to simulate grid CPS’s risk decisions. Then, a GCPS risk transfer model based on cooperative game theory is built. The model allows decisions to ignore complex network structures. On this basis, a modified applicant-proposing algorithm to achieve risk optimum is proposed. The risk management model proposed in this paper can provide references for power generation and transmission decision after risk as well as risk aversion, an empirical study in north China verifies its validity.

scholarly journals Evolution of Game Theory Application in Irrigation Systems

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 271-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianthi V. Podimata ◽  
Panayotis C. Yannopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Irrigation Systems ◽  
Theory Application

scholarly journals Comparative Models of Capitalism in the Areas of Financial System and Corporate Governance – the Diversity of Capitalism Approach Perspective

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76
Author(s):  
Paweł Pisany
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Systems ◽  
Financial Reforms ◽  
Institutional Complementarity ◽  
Capital Markets Union ◽  
Theory Application ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Regulatory Challenges

Abstract This article presents and assesses the methodology and results of a comparative analysis conducted by Bruno Amable in financial systems and corporate governance in the context of current policy and regulatory challenges. The article, which is based on a literature review and game theory examples, first describes and evaluates the methodology and final classification given by Amable. The role of Amable’s core concept; namely, institutional complementarity, is underlined. A game theory application in comparative institutional studies is then presented, including the author’s own “institutional game.” Finally, we assess Amable’s achievements in financial systems and corporate governance, concluding that they are valuable, innovative and useful despite some (perhaps justified) criticisms of the framework Amable used. In particular, the value of introducing institutional complementarity into comparative studies should not be underestimated. The analysis presented here suggests that Amable’s methodology may also be applicable when designing current financial reforms in the EU, especially European Capital Markets Union (CMU), because it can broaden policy maker’s horizons and promote consistent solutions.

scholarly journals Effective decisions for individualized assessment and minimization of the risk of unfriendly takeover of enterprises: the features of the game theory application

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 370-379
Author(s):  
Oksana Korolovych ◽  
Olha Chabaniuk ◽  
Natalia Ostapiuk ◽  
Yurii Kotviakovskyi ◽  
Nelia Gut
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
External Environment ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Control Moment ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Antagonistic Game ◽  
Target Company ◽  
Legislative Framework ◽  
Theory Application ◽  
Detailed Assessment

The conditions for doing business at this stage are often similar in a game in which you need to calculate your actions a few steps ahead. At the same time, it is important to highlight several possible current options and make the necessary decision at the control moment. Moreover, each of the options formed should be justified, understandable and take into account the risk factors and available resources.Today, the main problem of assessing and minimizing the risk of “unfriendly takeover” is due to the fact that in most cases the raider is a player who acts quite legitimately and relies on the loopholes of the current legislative framework. Therefore, it is easier to identify possible actions of the raider and to avoid them within the limits of the reverse game than to deal with the consequences.The purpose of the research is to study the specificity of the individualized assessment and minimization of the risk of “unfriendly takeover” by using elements of game theory.It has been taken into account that the effect of individualization in assessing the risk of unfriendly takeover of enterprises can possibly be achieved on the basis of the application of game theory, the elements of which provide simulation of the unfriendly takeover process within the mathematical description of the inherent combinations of attack/defence as if they actually occurred in time both within one state of the external environment and for their given set.The results allowed forming mathematical decision-making models based on the elements of the antagonistic game “raider-target enterprise” and “raider games with the external environment”, which proved the possibility to: 1) identify possible functions of wins/losses; 2) combinations of attacks that can be neglected (that is, from the point of view of the rationality of decisions, will be rejected by the raider); 3) the ranking of the raider’s “attack combinations” for the reliability of their use during “unfriendly takeover”. Under such conditions, the target company can provide not only a detailed assessment, but also an effective minimization of the risk of “unfriendly takeover” and allocate the best combination of protection.

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