Comparative analysis of game theory application to various types of auctions in electric markets

Author(s):  
Nilson Sa Costa Filho ◽  
Felipe O.S. Saraiva ◽  
V. Leonardo Paucar
2015 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 271-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianthi V. Podimata ◽  
Panayotis C. Yannopoulos

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76
Author(s):  
Paweł Pisany

Abstract This article presents and assesses the methodology and results of a comparative analysis conducted by Bruno Amable in financial systems and corporate governance in the context of current policy and regulatory challenges. The article, which is based on a literature review and game theory examples, first describes and evaluates the methodology and final classification given by Amable. The role of Amable’s core concept; namely, institutional complementarity, is underlined. A game theory application in comparative institutional studies is then presented, including the author’s own “institutional game.” Finally, we assess Amable’s achievements in financial systems and corporate governance, concluding that they are valuable, innovative and useful despite some (perhaps justified) criticisms of the framework Amable used. In particular, the value of introducing institutional complementarity into comparative studies should not be underestimated. The analysis presented here suggests that Amable’s methodology may also be applicable when designing current financial reforms in the EU, especially European Capital Markets Union (CMU), because it can broaden policy maker’s horizons and promote consistent solutions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 370-379
Author(s):  
Oksana Korolovych ◽  
Olha Chabaniuk ◽  
Natalia Ostapiuk ◽  
Yurii Kotviakovskyi ◽  
Nelia Gut

The conditions for doing business at this stage are often similar in a game in which you need to calculate your actions a few steps ahead. At the same time, it is important to highlight several possible current options and make the necessary decision at the control moment. Moreover, each of the options formed should be justified, understandable and take into account the risk factors and available resources.Today, the main problem of assessing and minimizing the risk of “unfriendly takeover” is due to the fact that in most cases the raider is a player who acts quite legitimately and relies on the loopholes of the current legislative framework. Therefore, it is easier to identify possible actions of the raider and to avoid them within the limits of the reverse game than to deal with the consequences.The purpose of the research is to study the specificity of the individualized assessment and minimization of the risk of “unfriendly takeover” by using elements of game theory.It has been taken into account that the effect of individualization in assessing the risk of unfriendly takeover of enterprises can possibly be achieved on the basis of the application of game theory, the elements of which provide simulation of the unfriendly takeover process within the mathematical description of the inherent combinations of attack/defence as if they actually occurred in time both within one state of the external environment and for their given set.The results allowed forming mathematical decision-making models based on the elements of the antagonistic game “raider-target enterprise” and “raider games with the external environment”, which proved the possibility to: 1) identify possible functions of wins/losses; 2) combinations of attacks that can be neglected (that is, from the point of view of the rationality of decisions, will be rejected by the raider); 3) the ranking of the raider’s “attack combinations” for the reliability of their use during “unfriendly takeover”. Under such conditions, the target company can provide not only a detailed assessment, but also an effective minimization of the risk of “unfriendly takeover” and allocate the best combination of protection.


2019 ◽  
Vol 97 ◽  
pp. 03034
Author(s):  
Olga Shikuskaya ◽  
Galina Abuova ◽  
Ivan Vatunskiy ◽  
Mikhail Shikulskiy

In the analysis of the project documentation of a two-storeyed sports complex it was established that despite compliance of the project to all standards in the fire safety field, under certain conditions there is a danger of a delay of full people evacuation from the gym room in case of fire that can entail people’s death. For the purpose of ensuring fire safety several versions of space-planning decisions were considered. The scientific literature analysis showed efficiency of game theory use in the field of fire safety, however in the field of fire safety in construction it was not applied yet. Game theory Application (games with the nature in the conditions of uncertainty) for the revealed problem solution was proved. Three possible scenarios of emergence and development of the fire and four alternative space-planning decisions were considered. For all development scenarios of the fire time of critical values achievement of dangerous fire factors was defined. All necessary evacuation schemes are made and calculations are executed. On the calculated parameters basis the payoff matrix was constructed. An optimal variant of space-planning decisions was chosen. Research results showed expediency and efficiency of game theory application in the field of fire safety in construction.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 85-92
Author(s):  
Lais Domingues Leonel ◽  
Mateus Henrique Balan ◽  
Luiz Armando Steinle Camargo ◽  
Erik Eduardo Rego ◽  
Dorel Soares Ramos ◽  
...  

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 107301-107313
Author(s):  
Qingfeng Meng ◽  
Shaohong Tan ◽  
Zhen Li ◽  
Bingyao Chen ◽  
Weixiang Shi

2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 531-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedel Peldschus

The game theory allows mathematical solutions of conflict situations. Besides the fairly established application to economical problems, approaches to problems in construction operation have been worked out. An overview of applications is given. Solution strategies for such engineering problems are collected. Furthermore, concrete application examples are presented and an overview of further potential applications is given. Solutions of two‐person zero‐sum games are discussed as well as approaches to fuzzy games. Santrauka Lošimų teorija teikia matematinių sprendimų konfliktinėse situacijose. Straipsnyje pateikta daug ekonominių problemų sprendimo pavyzdžių, sukurtų statybos valdymo problemų sprendimo metodikų. Atlikta šių tyrimų apžvalga, surinktos minėtų inžinerinių problemų sprendimo strategijos. Pateikiami konkretūs teorijos taikymo pavyzdžiai dabarties sąlygomis ir ateityje. Aptariami „dviejų asmenų nulinės sumos“ lošimų sprendiniai, taip pat neapibrėžtų aibių teorijos taikymo lošimuose atveju.


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