Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Third Person ◽  
Self Knowledge

Self-Knowledge

2021 ◽  
pp. 179-193
Author(s):  
Mattia Riccardi
Keyword(s):  
Traditional Conception ◽  
Reliable Source ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Mind

This chapter is concerned with Nietzsche’s scepticism about introspective knowledge. More precisely, it is claimed that Nietzsche rejects the traditional conception of introspective self-knowledge as something that is direct and privileged. To the contrary, he argues that self-knowledge is interpretive, for it is obtained by applying to oneself the same folk-psychological framework we apply in order to read the mind of other people. Furthermore, and relatedly, Nietzsche claims that introspective self-knowledge involves a falsification of what we actually think and do. Finally, it is argued that Nietzsche does not conclude from this that self-knowledge is impossible, but rather that third-person psychological and genealogical inquiry about oneself is a more reliable source of self-knowledge than introspection.

Selbstwissen: Die Grundidee

2015 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Moran
Keyword(s):  
Daily Life ◽  
First Person ◽  
Object A ◽  
The Third ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Third Person

AbstractIn philosophy it is widely recognized that a person’s first-person perspective on his own thought and action is importantly different from the third-person perspective we may have on the thought and actions of other people. In daily life it is natural to ask someone what he is doing or what he thinks about something, on the assumption that he knows what he is doing or what he is thinking. Some philosophers, however, argue that it is impossible to speak of knowledge in this context because the idea of knowledge requires a kind of distance between subject and object, a distance that is not present in the first-person context. I argue that this denial of self-knowledge is a paradoxical conclusion that we can resist, while retaining what is distinctive about the first-person.

scholarly journals In search of the True Self

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enrico Facco ◽  
Benedikt Emanuel Al Khafaji ◽  
Patrizio Tressoldi
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Scientific Study ◽  
True Self ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Eastern Philosophies ◽  
The Continuum

The Self is an interdisciplinary topic encompassing neuroscience, psychology, philosophy and anthropology. Despite the wealth of data available on the topic, its definition remains elusive, while its meaning overlaps with terms such as consciousness, Ego and I, and so has created more confusion and redundancy rather than clarity. Its study is also endowed with deep epistemological and metaphysical implications, on which the accepted axioms, theories and the method of investigation closely depend. Eastern philosophies have faced the problem of self-knowledge for some three millennia, achieving well-founded and valuable knowledge through introspection and meditation, and their results are worth being appraised in the Western, scientific study of the Self. We propose that the Self is related to the highest level of awareness in the continuum Ego-I-Self and, given its exclusively subjective nature (likewise consciousness), it can only be comprehensively explored through a neurophenomenological approach by merging the first and third person perspectives.

Knowledge, Belief, and the Asymmetry Thesis

2019 ◽  
pp. 41-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Åsa Wikforss
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
First Person ◽  
Psychological Literature ◽  
The Third ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Epistemic Asymmetry ◽  
The Third Person

This chapter examines the thesis that there is a deep-lying asymmetry between first- and third-person knowledge, by examining the idea that first-person knowledge is direct. The focus is on the propositional attitudes, in particular that of belief. Whereas philosophers generally take self-knowledge of belief to be direct and essentially different from knowledge of the beliefs of others, experimental psychologists have long challenged the idea that there is an important epistemic asymmetry between first- and third-person knowledge of belief. By drawing on some of the psychological literature, I argue that the psychologists are more nearly right. Although there are some interesting epistemic differences between first- and third-person knowledge of belief, the assumption of a deep-lying epistemic asymmetry is mistaken. In particular, I suggest, inference plays an important role both in the first- and in the third-person case.

Selbstwissen und Selbstfestlegung

2015 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Larmore
Keyword(s):  
Intimate Relation ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Self Knowledge

AbstractThe only knowledge we have of our own minds is knowledge acquired in the same third-person way in which we acquire knowledge of other people’s beliefs and desires. True, when we say on the basis of reflection that we believe or desire this or that, it seldom makes sense to challenge what we say. Yet such statements are not expressions of self-knowledge. They have instead the character of avowals, expressing our commitment to think and act in appropriate ways. Such avowals do attest to an intimate relation we have to ourselves alone. But this self-relation does not consist in our being immediately acquainted with the contents of our own minds. It consists in the fact that we alone - no one else in our place - can commit ourselves to thinking and acting in various ways.

Measuring the Big Five in Self-Report and Other Ratings

2000 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Barbaranelli ◽  
Gian Vittorio Caprara
Keyword(s):  
Big Five ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Structural Equation Models ◽  
Error Variance ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Fit Indexes ◽  
Response Modes

Summary: The aim of the study is to assess the construct validity of two different measures of the Big Five, matching two “response modes” (phrase-questionnaire and list of adjectives) and two sources of information or raters (self-report and other ratings). Two-hundred subjects, equally divided in males and females, were administered the self-report versions of the Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ) and the Big Five Observer (BFO), a list of bipolar pairs of adjectives ( Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Borgogni, 1993 , 1994 ). Every subject was rated by six acquaintances, then aggregated by means of the same instruments used for the self-report, but worded in a third-person format. The multitrait-multimethod matrix derived from these measures was then analyzed via Structural Equation Models according to the criteria proposed by Widaman (1985) , Marsh (1989) , and Bagozzi (1994) . In particular, four different models were compared. While the global fit indexes of the models were only moderate, convergent and discriminant validities were clearly supported, and method and error variance were moderate or low.

First-Person Experiments in Thinking

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renatus Ziegler ◽  
Ulrich Weger
Keyword(s):  
Physiological Parameters ◽  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Current Article ◽  
Thinking Process ◽  
Mental Contents

Abstract. In psychology, thinking is typically studied in terms of a range of behavioral or physiological parameters, focusing, for instance, on the mental contents or the neuronal correlates of the thinking process proper. In the current article, by contrast, we seek to complement this approach with an exploration into the experiential or inner dimensions of thinking. These are subtle and elusive and hence easily escape a mode of inquiry that focuses on externally measurable outcomes. We illustrate how a sufficiently trained introspective approach can become a radar for facets of thinking that have found hardly any recognition in the literature so far. We consider this an important complement to third-person research because these introspective observations not only allow for new insights into the nature of thinking proper but also cast other psychological phenomena in a new light, for instance, attention and the self. We outline and discuss our findings and also present a roadmap for the reader interested in studying these phenomena in detail.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document