National Goods Versus Public Goods: Defense, Disarmament, and Free Riders

1990 ◽  
pp. 88-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Riders

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

Gossip and Reputation in Social Dilemmas

2019 ◽  
pp. 192-213
Author(s):  
Manfred Milinski
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Interaction Partner ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
The Individual

In a social dilemma the interest of the individual is in conflict with that of the group. However, individuals will help their group, if they gain in reputation that pays off later. Future partners can observe cooperative or defective behavior or, more likely, hear about it through gossip. In Indirect Reciprocity games, Public Goods games, and Trust games gossip may be the only information a participant can use to decide whether she can trust her interaction partner and give away her holdings hoping for reciprocation. Even the mere potential for gossip can increase trust and trustworthiness thus promoting cooperation. Gossip is a cheap mechanism for disciplining free riders, potentially even extortioners. The temptation for manipulative gossip defines the gossiper’s dilemma. Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity help to avoid being manipulated. The danger of false gossip is reduced when multiple gossips exist.

Responsibility to Punish: Discouraging Free-Riders in Public Goods Games

2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zack Devlin-Foltz ◽  
Katherine Lim
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games

scholarly journals BRIBE AND PUNISHMENT: EFFECTS OF SIGNALING, GOSSIPING, AND BRIBERY IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (06) ◽  
pp. 755-771 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. L. C. BAZZAN ◽  
SÍLVIO R. DAHMEN
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Social Mechanisms ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Social Attachments

In public goods games, individuals contribute to create a benefit for a group. However this attracts free-riders, who enjoy the benefits without necessarily contributing. Nonetheless, in real-life scenarios cooperation does not collapse. Several explanations have been proposed in order to explain this phenomenon, such as punishment and signaling. In the present work, we investigate the effects of new elements associated with punishment upon signaling such as gossiping and bribery. Agents may denounce free-riders (who on their turn get punished) or may be bribed to remain silent and even spread rumors of false good behavior. Having a model with richer social mechanisms enable us to test how cooperation develops in situations in which players have social attachments. Our results show that when punishment and bribery are present, the levels of contribution are kept at a relatively higher value compared to the situation when no punishment is exercised. As to what regards gossiping, if the number of free-riders is high, finding mechanisms to prevent gossiping could be an important step in order to increase the contribution. If the ratio between free-riders and other agents is about one, then gossiping does affect contribution in a positive way.

scholarly journals Group Formation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: a Survey and Meta-Analytic Evidence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Guido ◽  
Andrea Robbett ◽  
Rustam Romaniuc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Group Formation ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Sorting Method ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Highly Sensitive ◽  
Social Dilemma Games

We survey the growing literature on group formation in the context of three types of social dilemma games: public goods games, common pool resources, and the prisoner’s dilemma. The 62 surveyed papers study the effect of different sorting mechanisms – endogenous, endogenous with the option to play the game, and exogenous – on cooperation rates. Our survey shows that cooperators are highly sensitive to the presence of free-riders, independently of the sorting mechanism. We complement the survey with a meta-analysis showing no difference in terms of cooperation between studies implementing an endogenous and exogenous sorting. What is more, we find that it is no more likely for a cooperator to be matched with like-minded partners in endogenously formed groups than in exogenously formed groups. These observations are related. As we show in the survey, the success of a sorting method in matching like-minded individuals and the levels of cooperation are closely interlinked.

Personality, Punishment and Public Goods: Strategic Shifts towards Cooperation as a Matter of Dispositional Honesty–Humility

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin E. Hilbig ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Timo Heydasch
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Longitudinal Design ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Openness To Experience ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders

Contributions in the public goods game—a classical social dilemma situation—have been shown to depend strongly on the presence versus absence of punishment or sanctions for free riders. Also, there appear to be noteworthy individual differences in the degree to which decision makers cooperate. Herein, we aimed to bring these two lines of research together. Firstly, we predicted that both presence of punishment and high dispositional Honesty–Humility (as conceptualized in the Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to experience model of personality) should yield higher contributions. Secondly, and more importantly, we expected an interaction, such that only those low in Honesty–Humility would condition their behaviour on the presence versus absence of punishment, thus employing cooperation strategically. In line with the hypothesis, the results of two experiments (one of which comprised a longitudinal design) corroborated that the degree to which decision makers shift towards higher contributions when punishment is introduced depends on their dispositional level of Honesty–Humility. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Public Goods: Contribution and Benefit

1991 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 187-202
Author(s):  
Anthony de Jasay
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Sulla Base ◽  
Free Riders

Abstract In questo scritto viene messa in discussione la definizione tradizionale di bene pubblico, in base alia quale la natura pubblica di un bene è conseguenza della non-escludibilità ed indivisibilità, e ne viene proposto un concetto alternativo per cui la natura pubblica è piuttosto causa di tali caratteristiche.Contrariamente all’approccio tradizionale che considera il problema dei beni pubblici come un dilemma del prigioniero in cui contribuire è irrazionale da un punto di vista individuale, l’autore argomenta che la fornitura volontaria di beni pubblici rappresenta la soluzione di un gioco in cui l’utilità attesa derivante da strategie da «sucker» o da «free rider» varia al variare della probabilità soggettiva che un qualsiasi altro beneficiario adotti una data strategia.La coercizione a contribuire rappresenta dunque la condizione necessaria non per la fornitura di beni pubblici, ma per la realizzazione di una «giustizia» anti-free rider nella organizzazione della stessa. In sostanza, la coercizione assegna ad una scelta sociale la selezione di «suckers» e «free riders», selezione che, in sua assenza, avrebbe luogo sulla base di scelte individuali volontarie di tali ruoli.

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