Public Goods: Contribution and Benefit

1991 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 187-202
Author(s):  
Anthony de Jasay
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Sulla Base ◽  
Free Riders

Abstract In questo scritto viene messa in discussione la definizione tradizionale di bene pubblico, in base alia quale la natura pubblica di un bene è conseguenza della non-escludibilità ed indivisibilità, e ne viene proposto un concetto alternativo per cui la natura pubblica è piuttosto causa di tali caratteristiche.Contrariamente all’approccio tradizionale che considera il problema dei beni pubblici come un dilemma del prigioniero in cui contribuire è irrazionale da un punto di vista individuale, l’autore argomenta che la fornitura volontaria di beni pubblici rappresenta la soluzione di un gioco in cui l’utilità attesa derivante da strategie da «sucker» o da «free rider» varia al variare della probabilità soggettiva che un qualsiasi altro beneficiario adotti una data strategia.La coercizione a contribuire rappresenta dunque la condizione necessaria non per la fornitura di beni pubblici, ma per la realizzazione di una «giustizia» anti-free rider nella organizzazione della stessa. In sostanza, la coercizione assegna ad una scelta sociale la selezione di «suckers» e «free riders», selezione che, in sua assenza, avrebbe luogo sulla base di scelte individuali volontarie di tali ruoli.

Lumpy Goods and Cheap Riders: An Application of the Theory of Public Goods to International Alliances

1987 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred Thompson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Defense Policy ◽  
Collective Security ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
International Alliances ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Basic Argument

ABSTRACTMancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser's ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’ has been described as ‘the best known application of the theory’ of collective (or public) goods. In that article, Olson and Zeckhauser advanced the claim that America's Western European Allies (and by implication, Japan as well) are all, more or less, ‘free riders.’ Yet, more than twenty years later, the meaning of this claim remains very much in doubt. This article outlines Olson and Zeckhauser's basic argument and conclusions and the evidence against their argument; explains how application of the ‘free rider’ thesis to the problem of collective security can be revised in the light of contemporary thinking about the provision of collective goods; presents some preliminary tests of this formulation; and suggests a few of the implications of this analysis for the formulation of United States defense policy.

scholarly journals PENGARUH PAJAK PENGHASILAN TERHADAP KESEJAHTERAAN: SUATU MODEL TEORITIS

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
Eddy Suratman
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Change Effect ◽  
Property Income ◽  
The Government ◽  
Tax Payers

Tax affects distortion on economy. To minimize the distortion, the government canonically switches the income resources to income tax from other types of tax deemed to have the least distortion. Furthermore, the increase of this income tax will affect the prosperity of the tax payers. This writing is aimed to develop a theoretical model of: firstly, change effect of income tax on income and leisure; secondly, change effect of income tax on consumptions of private goods and public goods; and thirdly, change effect of income tax on prosperities of tax payers and free rider. This writing indicates that (1) work and leisure hours are bound with time endowment, payment and property income after tax and utility parameter; (2) Income tax increase will promote leisure, thus income after tax will decrease; (3) As individuals, income tax payers can see this change positive or negative; and (4) Free riders will get their prosperity improved from income tax increase.

scholarly journals Extinction times in diffusive public good population dynamics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory J. Kimmel ◽  
Philip Gerlee ◽  
Philipp M. Altrock
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Extinction Time ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Time To Extinction ◽  
The Commons

AbstractThe co-evolutionary dynamics of competing populations can be strongly affected by frequency-dependent selection and population structure in space. As co-evolving populations grow into a spatial domain, their initial spatial arrangement, as well as their growth rate differences determine the dynamics. Here, we are interested in the dynamics of producers and free-rider co-evolution in the context of an ecological public good that is produced by a sub-population but evokes growth benefits to all individuals. We consider the spatial growth dynamics in one, two and three dimensions by modeling producer cell, free-rider cell and public good densities in space, driven by birth, death and diffusion. Typically, one population goes extinct. We find that uncorrelated initial spatial structures do not influence the time to extinction in comparison to the well-mixed system. We derive a slow manifold solution in order to estimate the time to extinction of either free-riders or producers. For invading populations, i.e. for populations that are initially highly segregated, we observe a traveling wave, whose speed can be calculated to improve the extinction time estimate by a simple superposition of the two times. Our results show that local effects of spatial dynamics evolve independently of the dynamics of the mean populations. Our considerations provide quantitative predictions for the transient dynamics of cooperative traits under pressure of extinction, and a potential experiment to derive elusive details of the fitness function of an ecological public goods game through extinction time observations.Author SummaryEcological public goods (PG) relationships emerge in growing cellular populations, for example between bacteria and cancer cells. We study the eco-evolutionary dynamics of a PG in populations that grow in space. In our model, public good-producer cells and free-rider cells can grow according to their own birth and death rates. Co-evolution occurs due to public good-driven surplus in the intrinsic growth rates and a cost to producers. A net growth rate benefit to free-riders leads to the well-known tragedy of the commons in which producers go extinct. What is often omitted from discussions is the time scale on which this extinction can occur, especially in spatial populations. We derive analytical estimates of the time to extinction in different spatial settings, and identify spatial scenarios in which extinction takes long enough such that the tragedy of the commons never occurs within the lifetime of the populations. Using numerical simulations we analyze the deviations from analytical predictions. Our results have direct implications for inferring ecological public good game properties from in vitro and in vivo experimental observations.

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

scholarly journals Nodes with the highest control power play an important role at the final level of cooperation in directed networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Ebrahimi ◽  
Marzieh Yousefi ◽  
Farhad Shahbazi ◽  
Mohammad Ali Sheikh Beig Goharrizi ◽  
Ali Masoudi-Nejad
Keyword(s):  
Free Rider ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Final Level ◽  
Input Signals ◽  
Tumoral Cells ◽  
Power Play

AbstractControllability of complex networks aims to seek the lowest number of nodes (the driver nodes) that can control all the nodes by receiving the input signals. The concept of control centrality is used to determine the power of each node to control the network. The more a node controls the nodes through connections in the network, the more it has the power to control. Although the cooperative and free-rider strategies and the final level of cooperation in a population are considered and studied in the public goods game. However, it is yet to determine a solution to indicate the effectiveness of each member in changing the strategies of the other members. In a network, the choice of nodes effective in changing the other nodes’ strategies, as free-riders, will lead to lower cooperation and vice versa. This paper uses simulated and real networks to investigate that the nodes with the highest control power are more effective than the hubs, local, and random nodes in changing the strategies of the other nodes and the final level of cooperation. Results indicate that the nodes with the highest control power as free-riders, compared to the other sets being under consideration, can lead to a lower level of cooperation and are, therefore, more effective in changing the strategies of the other nodes. The obtained results can be considered in the treatment of cancer. So that, destroying the tumoral cells with the highest control power should be a priority as these cells have a higher capability to change the strategies of the other cells from cooperators to free-riders (healthy to tumoral).

scholarly journals The Effect of Trusting and Trustworthy Environments on the Provision of Public Goods

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Lo Iacono ◽  
Burak Sonmez
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Learning Effect ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Similar Distribution ◽  
Incentive Structure ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Relevant Effect ◽  
Distribution Of Resources

Abstract Trusting and trustworthy environments are argued to promote collective action, as people learn to rely on their fellow citizens and believe that only few individuals will free ride. To test the causal validity of this mechanism, we propose an experimental design that allows us to create different trusting and trustworthy conditions simply by (i) manipulating the incentive structure of an iterated binary trust game and (ii) allowing information to flow among participants. Findings indicate that, given a similar distribution of resources among subjects, trusting and trustworthy environments strongly foster the provision of public goods. This outcome is largely driven by a learning effect: subjects transfer what they assimilate during a sequence of dyadic exchanges to their decision to act for the collectivity. In particular, results showed that what we learn from the community has a relevant effect on our ability to overcome the free-rider problem: we are more likely to act for the collectivity when we learn from the community to be trustful or reliable in our one-to-one interactions. The same applies in the opposite direction: we are more prone to free ride when we learn from the environment to be distrustful or unreliable in our dyadic exchanges.

Soliciting Accurate Evaluations of Public Goods

1981 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. H. Barnett
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Public Funds ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Bidding Mechanism ◽  
The Many

Among the many problems faced by policy makers in attempts to use public funds efficiently, none is more troublesome than that of inducing users of public goods to reveal their demand prices. The difficulty in attempts to solicit demand prices falls under the general rubric of the free-rider problem, and is manifest in the propensity of users to behave strategically when asked to reveal evaluations. Several preference revelation devices have been proposed to surmount this problem, but all of these schemes are seriously flawed. This article presents a device which overcomes some of the flaws contained in previous work. The preference revealing mechanism proposed here is a bidding mechanism which takes advantage of the commonly found trait of risk-aversion to discourage strategic revelations.

Political Centralization and Labour Coercion: Latin America and Russia in Comparative Perspective

Itinerario ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Pastore ◽  
Herman Freudenberger
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Basic Principle ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
The Other ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Transactions Costs ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
The Government

Government requires coercion, if only to arrest free riding. Physical coercion alone may not suffice for this purpose, however, and ideological means may be needed as well. This basic principle underlies all government. In market economies the coercive capabilities of government may be expected to be financed out of taxes ultimately levied on factor owners' money incomes, that is, on wages, profits, and rent. On the other hand, in economies where markets have not developed due to high transactions costs individuals' contributions to the provision of public goods will take the form of payments in kind and labour services. In this case, the free rider problem suggests labourers will attempt to shirk; the government, therefore, will have to compel labourers to work and, therefore, will appear to be coercing labour even though it may only be seeking to curtail shirking.

Morally Motivated Self-Regulation

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 1299-1329 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P Baron
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Social Pressure ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Certification Organizations

Self-regulation is the private provision of public goods and private redistribution. This paper examines the scope of self-regulation motivated by altruistic moral preferences that are reciprocal and stronger the closer are citizens in a socioeconomic distance. The focus is on the role of organizations in increasing self-regulation by mitigating free-rider problems. Social label and certification organizations can expand the scope of self-regulation but not beyond that with unconditional altruism. Enforcement organizations expand the scope of self-regulation farther, and for-profit enforcement is more aggressive than non-profit enforcement. Enforcement through social pressure imposed by NGOs also expands the scope of self-regulation. (JEL D64, H41, L51)

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