Constitutional Genealogy of Judicial Review in the Administrative State

Author(s):  
Ernst Hirsch Ballin
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann

US administrative law forms a body of law that is considered to be particularly ‘political’. From an early stage on, US administrative law has endeavoured to provide instruments and procedures that foster and implement democratic ideals and concepts; consequently, US ‘freedom of information’ and the standards of public participation in the rulemaking process have often served as a model for foreign administrative law systems. Nevertheless, the agency actions have constantly been questioned and disputed. This book offers a systematic analysis of the constitutional foundations as well as the procedures, of liability and judicial review in administrative matters, and it examines the legitimacy of the American ‘administrative state’.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane

This Foreword introduces a Fordham Law Review symposium held in March 2014 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. One of the most-cited administrative-law decisions of all time, Chevron has sparked thirty years of scholarly discussion concerning what Chevron deference means, when (or even if) it should apply, and what impact it has had on the administrative state. Part I of the Foreword discusses the symposium contributions that address Chevron’s scope and application, especially in light of City of Arlington v. FCC. Part II introduces the contributions that explore empirically and theoretically Chevron’s impact outside of the judicial-review context -- i.e., its effect on legislative- and administrative-drafting theory and practice, its influence within the regulatory state more generally, and its adoption (or lack thereof) in state administrative law. Part III turns to the intersection of Chevron and federalism. Part IV concludes by grappling with the contributors’ diverse views on whether Chevron is indeed a big deal and, if so, whether it is a good or bad deal for the modern administrative state.


Author(s):  
Somanathan TV

This chapter explores how India’s constitutional law has addressed the administrative and regulatory State as it has evolved outside the traditional branches of government, and how judicial review is exercised over it. It begins by providing a background on constitutional issues relating to the administrative State as it functions within the executive branch, before turning to a discussion of the major regulatory bodies that either are explicitly called ‘regulatory’ or exercise regulatory functions. It then considers the constitutional position of the administrative and regulatory State based on judicial decisions and on the Indian Constitution. It also examines the conceptual underpinnings of, and justification for, the regulatory State, along with some specific concerns arising from the regulatory State such as legal uncertainty and excessive delegation. The chapter concludes by analysing some of the issues associated with the emerging constitutional jurisprudence on the regulatory State.


Afrika Focus ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kwadwo B. Mensah

This paper develops along the following line. First, we shall attempt to explain what discretion is, why it has become very important in the modem administrative state, and the dangers that it poses in a democratic legal system. It then looks at the problems which have to be faced in justifying judicial review of discretion. It takes an in depth analysis of legal liberalism and functionalism. Aimed with these 'lenses', it attempts to explain the theoretical basis of two important Ghanaian cases, Re Akoto , and People's Popular Party v Attorney General (PPP v AG)'. It examines the provisions which regulate the use of discretionary powers in the Ghanaian 1993 Constitution and it looks at the choices we have to make from the various theories and the development of the administrative state in Ghana.KEY WORDS: functionalism, Ghana, judicial review, law, liberalism 


2018 ◽  
Vol 277 (1) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
D. A. Candeub

<p>Tirania e o direito administrativo</p><p> </p><p><em>The Federalist Papers </em>define “tyranny” as “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many.” This definition would seem to include the modern administrative agency, which exercises all three powers. To avoid tyrannical agencies and their illegitimate exercise of power, judges and academics look to administrative law. Its procedures and requirements, such as public comment, judicial review, agency reason-giving and deliberation, and executive oversight, saddle agencies with checks and balances and, therefore, legitimacy. Yet unease with the administrative state continues; indeed, it seems to be in a constant crisis of legitimacy, suggesting that administrative law’s quest for legitimacy has not succeeded. This Article argues that this crisis of legitimacy stems from the inherent conflict between the assumptions underlying those of administrative law and the Constitution. These sets of assumptions differ profoundly over political actors’ motivations and human nature, rationality in political and administrative decision-making, and the role of executive lawmaking in a democracy. This Article compares <em>The Federalist Papers </em>and administrative law and scholarship to uncover those differences. But this Article does not engage in an “originalist” critique of administrative law. Instead, it shows that administrative law’s crisis of legitimacy inevitably proceeds from its jarring discontinuity with deep assumptions underlying our constitutional structure.</p><p> </p><p>A obra <em>O federalista </em>define “tirania” como “a acumulação de todos os poderes, legislativo, executivo e judiciário, nas mesmas mãos, seja na de um, alguns ou vários”. Essa definição pareceria incluir a agência administrativa moderna, que exerce todos os três poderes. Para evitar agências tiranas e seu exercício ilegítimo do poder, juízes e acadêmicos procuram o direito administrativo. Seus procedimentos e requerimentos, como comentários públicos, revisão judicial, agência de razão e deliberação e supervisão executiva, selam agências com verificações e balanços e, portanto, legitimação. Ainda assim, o desconforto com o Estado administrativo continua; inclusive, parece ser uma constante crise de legitimidade, sugerindo que a busca do direito administrativo por legitimidade não prosperou. Este artigo argumenta que essa crise de legitimidade se origina do conflito inerente entre hipóteses subjacentes às do direito administrativo e a Constituição. Esse conjunto de hipóteses difere profundamente das motivações de atores políticos e da natureza humana, da racionalidade na tomada de decisões políticas e administrativas, e em toda a legislação executiva na democracia. Este artigo compara a obra <em>O federalista</em>, as leis administrativas e a escolaridade para revelar aquelas diferenças. Mas este artigo não se engaja em uma crítica “original” do direito administrativo. Pelo contrário, mostra que a crise de legitimidade do direito administrativo inevitavelmente provém de chocante descontinuidade com premissas subjacentes à estrutura constitucional.</p>


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mannu Chowdhury

This case comment examines the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v Wall. The court ruled that a church’s decision to excommunicate a member could not be judicially reviewed. Rather, judicial review is reserved for decisions by state actors. Wall narrows the scope of judicial review such that many quasi-public actors—such as sports administrators and political parties—are no longer subject to judicial review. The author argues that Wall’s prima facie simplification of the law of judicial review masks deeper conceptual and practical tensions. Specifically, by immunizing quasi-public actors—who are integral to the administrative state—from judicial review, Wall raises questions of accountability. Moreover, the spread of Charter values among such actors is potentially thwarted by this decision. Finally, what is more problematic is that in arriving at its approach to judicial review in Wall, the Supreme Court misinterpreted a helpful body of cases on the public–private distinction and further complicated the question of when judicial review is available to litigants.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward H. Stiglitz

166 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 633 (2018)Courts and legal observers have long been concerned by the scope of authority delegated to administrative agencies. The dominant explanation of delegated authority is that it is necessary to take advantage of administrative agencies' expertise and expansive rulemaking capacity. Though this explanation makes sense in many settings, it falters in many areas and has given rise to a number of longstanding puzzles, such as why Congress does not invest in its own institutional capacity.Unrecognized in this debate over the puzzles of delegation is that Congress may delegate to take advantage of another distinctive attribute of administrative decisionmaking: the credible rationality and transparency afforded by administrative procedures. Drawing on positive political theory, this Article shows that Congress may delegate, not for expertise, but for public trust, which the legislature itself (appropriately) lacks due to concerns over the influence of special interest lucre, among other reasons. The procedural constraints that bind administrative agencies, as made credible by judicial review, encourage fairness and rationality and discourage the most egregious abuses of lawmaking authority. In delegating, Congress takes advantage of these credible constraints, which the institution cannot easily develop internally; and in relieving Members of Congress from public suspicion, it also advances their parochial electoral objectives.This vision of the administrative state accounts for a number of features of our legal and political system. It explains, for instance, why Congress has generally not invested in greater internal capacity-because trust, not capacity is the binding constraint; why, as a positive matter, fairness and transparency are essential to administrative procedures; and why, if those administrative procedures undergo erosion, as some suggest has occurred, anxiety about administrative lawmaking might arise. The Article concludes with a discussion of normative and doctrinal implications of this trust-based conception of administration, including a call for reorienting administrative procedures to more fully promote credible rationalityUnrecognized in this debate over the puzzles of delegation is that Congress may delegate to take advantage of another distinctive attribute of administrative decision-making: the credible rationality and transparency afforded by administrative procedures. Drawing on positive political theory, this Article shows that Congress may delegate, not for expertise, but for public trust, which the legislature itself (appropriately) lacks due to concerns over the influence of special interest lucre, among other reasons. The procedural constraints that bind on administrative agencies, as made credible by judicial review, encourage fairness and rationality and discourage the most egregious abuses of lawmaking authority. In delegating, Congress takes advantage of these credible constraints, which the institution cannot easily develop internally; and in relieving Members of Congress from public suspicion, it also advances their parochial electoral objectives.This vision of the administrative state accounts for a number of features of our legal and political system. It explains, for instance, why Congress has generally not invested in greater internal capacity — because trust, not capacity is the binding constraint; why, as a positive matter, fairness and transparency are essential to administrative procedures; and why, if those administrative procedures undergo erosion, as some suggest has occurred, anxiety about administrative lawmaking might arise. The Article concludes with a discussion of normative and doctrinal implications of this trust-based conception of administration, including a call for re-orienting administrative procedures to more fully promote credible rationality.


Author(s):  
Li-Ann Thio

The legal culture, political context, and organization of any one national state is key to apprehending the role of courts and judicial review in upholding the rule of law and the administrative state. Constitutional principles like the separation of powers, basic rights, and governance priorities like efficiency will shape the scope, intensity, and grounds of judicial review, which actors are susceptible to it, and questions of standing. Different ideological communities place varying emphasis on these factors. Models of judicial review, based on the French special administrative courts or English common law courts of general jurisdiction, were first developed in Western liberal democracies. These have been influential exports beyond Europe, although susceptible to autochthonous adaptations informed by local culture and exigencies. This chapter examines the chief features of courts and judicial review in Western liberal democracies, where the function of judicial review has gone beyond ensuring legality and conformity of administrative processes to standards of substantive and procedural fairness, to include protecting fundamental rights and promoting participatory democracy in the rule-making process. It examines how judicial review operates, similarly or distinctly, under other government regimes beyond liberal democratic orders, within non-liberal developmental states with communitarian cultures and socialist legal systems.


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