scholarly journals Action understanding and active inference

2011 ◽  
Vol 104 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 137-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Friston ◽  
Jérémie Mattout ◽  
James Kilner
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Riccardo Proietti ◽  
Giovanni Pezzulo ◽  
Alessia Tessari

We advance a novel computational model of the acquisition of a hierarchical action repertoire and its use for observation, understanding and motor control. The model is grounded in a principled framework to understand brain and cognition: active inference. We exemplify the functioning of the model by presenting four simulations of a tennis learner who observes a teacher performing tennis shots and forms hierarchical representations of the observed actions - including both actions that are already in her repertoire and novel actions - and finally imitates them. Our simulations that show that the agent’s oculomotor activity implements an active information sampling strategy that permits inferring the kinematics aspects of the observed movement, which lie at the lowest level of the action hierarchy. In turn, this low-level kinematic inference supports higher-level inferences about deeper aspects of the observed actions, such as their proximal goals and intentions. Finally, the inferred action representations can steer imitative motor responses, but interfere with the execution of different actions. Taken together, our simulations show that the same hierarchical active inference model provides a unified account of action observation, understanding, learning and imitation. Finally, our model provides a computational rationale to explain the neurobiological underpinnings of visuomotor cognition, including the multiple routes for action understanding in the dorsal and ventral streams and mirror mechanisms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Badcock ◽  
Axel Constant ◽  
Maxwell James Désormeau Ramstead

Abstract Cognitive Gadgets offers a new, convincing perspective on the origins of our distinctive cognitive faculties, coupled with a clear, innovative research program. Although we broadly endorse Heyes’ ideas, we raise some concerns about her characterisation of evolutionary psychology and the relationship between biology and culture, before discussing the potential fruits of examining cognitive gadgets through the lens of active inference.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nabil Bouizegarene ◽  
maxwell ramstead ◽  
Axel Constant ◽  
Karl Friston ◽  
Laurence Kirmayer

The ubiquity and importance of narratives in human adaptation has been recognized by many scholars. Research has identified several functions of narratives that are conducive to individuals’ well-being and adaptation as well as to coordinated social practices and enculturation. In this paper, we characterize the social and cognitive functions of narratives in terms of the framework of active inference. Active inference depicts the fundamental tendency of living organisms to adapt by creating, updating, and maintaining inferences about their environment. We review the literature on the functions of narratives in identity, event segmentation, episodic memory, future projection, storytelling practices, and enculturation. We then re-cast these functions of narratives in terms of active inference, outlining a parsimonious model that can guide future developments in narrative theory, research, and clinical applications.


Author(s):  
Diane Jeske

Emotions play a critical role in both moral deliberation and moral action. Understanding the emotions and how they ought to interact with theoretical principles is an important part of fulfilling our duty of due care in moral deliberation. By examining the Nazi police squads and the Nazi virtue of “hardness,” we can come to see how ordinary people can suppress their emotions in order to carry out morally odious tasks. We can then see that the methods we use to live with our treatment of nonhuman animals bear striking similarities to the methods used by those in the police squads. Ted Bundy, a psychopath, suggests that a lack of emotions can hinder our ability to grasp moral concepts, thus showing that even while emotions must be regulated by theory, they also play an important role in any full understanding of the significance of moral demands.


Author(s):  
Lauren Swiney

Over the last thirty years the comparator hypothesis has emerged as a prominent account of inner speech pathology. This chapter discusses a number of cognitive accounts broadly derived from this approach, highlighting the existence of two importantly distinct notions of inner speech in the literature; one as a prediction in the absence of sensory input, the other as an act with sensory consequences that are themselves predicted. Under earlier frameworks in which inner speech is described in the context of classic models of motor control, I argue that these two notions may be compatible, providing two routes to inner speech pathology. Under more recent accounts grounded in the architecture of Bayesian predictive processing, I argue that “active inference” approaches to action generation pose serious challenges to the plausibility of the latter notion of inner speech, while providing the former notion with rich explanatory possibilities for inner speech pathology.


Author(s):  
Anil K. Seth

Consciousness is perhaps the most familiar aspect of our existence, yet we still do not know its biological basis. This chapter outlines a biomimetic approach to consciousness science, identifying three principles linking properties of conscious experience to potential biological mechanisms. First, conscious experiences generate large quantities of information in virtue of being simultaneously integrated and differentiated. Second, the brain continuously generates predictions about the world and self, which account for the specific content of conscious scenes. Third, the conscious self depends on active inference of self-related signals at multiple levels. Research following these principles helps move from establishing correlations between brain responses and consciousness towards explanations which account for phenomenological properties—addressing what can be called the “real problem” of consciousness. The picture that emerges is one in which consciousness, mind, and life, are tightly bound together—with implications for any possible future “conscious machines.”


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozan Çatal ◽  
Tim Verbelen ◽  
Toon Van de Maele ◽  
Bart Dhoedt ◽  
Adam Safron

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Yonaira M. Rivera ◽  
Meghan B. Moran ◽  
Johannes Thrul ◽  
Corinne Joshu ◽  
Katherine C. Smith

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Stephen Fox

Active inference is a physics of life process theory of perception, action and learning that is applicable to natural and artificial agents. In this paper, active inference theory is related to different types of practice in social organization. Here, the term social organization is used to clarify that this paper does not encompass organization in biological systems. Rather, the paper addresses active inference in social organization that utilizes industrial engineering, quality management, and artificial intelligence alongside human intelligence. Social organization referred to in this paper can be in private companies, public institutions, other for-profit or not-for-profit organizations, and any combination of them. The relevance of active inference theory is explained in terms of variational free energy, prediction errors, generative models, and Markov blankets. Active inference theory is most relevant to the social organization of work that is highly repetitive. By contrast, there are more challenges involved in applying active inference theory for social organization of less repetitive endeavors such as one-of-a-kind projects. These challenges need to be addressed in order for active inference to provide a unifying framework for different types of social organization employing human and artificial intelligence.


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