scholarly journals How Far we Can Go Without Looking Under the Skin: The Bounds of Cognitive Science

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-109
Author(s):  
Łukasz Afeltowicz ◽  
Witold Wachowski
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Distributed Cognition ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Cognitive System ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
External Representations

Abstract The aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of distributed cognition (DCog) in the context of classic questions posed by mainstream cognitive science. We support our remarks by appealing to empirical evidence from the fields of cognitive science and ethnography. Particular attention is paid to the structure and functioning of a cognitive system, as well as its external representations. We analyze the problem of how far we can push the study of human cognition without taking into account what is underneath an individual’s skin. In light of our discussion, a distinction between DCog and the extended mind becomes important.

Distributed cognition, representation, and affordance

2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiajie Zhang ◽  
Vimla L. Patel
Keyword(s):  
Distributed Cognition ◽  
Cognitive System ◽  
Controversial Issue ◽  
External Representations ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Distribution Transformation

This article describes a representation-based framework of distributed cognition. This framework considers distributed cognition as a cognitive system whose structures and processes are distributed between internal and external representations, across a group of individuals, and across space and time. The major issue for distributed research, under this framework, are the distribution, transformation, and propagation of information across the components of the distributed cognitive system and how they affect the performance of the system as a whole. To demonstrate the value of this representation-based approach, the framework was used to describe and explain an important, challenging, and controversial issue — the concept of affordance.

Language as a mental travel guide

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles P. Davis ◽  
Gerry T. M. Altmann ◽  
Eiling Yee
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Travel Guide

Abstract Gilead et al.'s approach to human cognition places abstraction and prediction at the heart of “mental travel” under a “representational diversity” perspective that embraces foundational concepts in cognitive science. But, it gives insufficient credit to the possibility that the process of abstraction produces a gradient, and underestimates the importance of a highly influential domain in predictive cognition: language, and related, the emergence of experientially based structure through time.

Précis ofUnified theories of cognition

1992 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Newell
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Convincing Evidence ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Unified Theories

AbstractThe book presents the case that cognitive science should turn its attention to developing theories of human cognition that cover the full range of human perceptual, cognitive, and action phenomena. Cognitive science has now produced a massive number of high-quality regularities with many microtheories that reveal important mechanisms. The need for integration is pressing and will continue to increase. Equally important, cognitive science now has the theoretical concepts and tools to support serious attempts at unified theories. The argument is made entirely by presenting an exemplar unified theory of cognition both to show what a real unified theory would be like and to provide convincing evidence that such theories are feasible. The exemplar is SOAR, a cognitive architecture, which is realized as a software system. After a detailed discussion of the architecture and its properties, with its relation to the constraints on cognition in the real world and to existing ideas in cognitive science, SOAR is used as theory for a wide range of cognitive phenomena: immediate responses (stimulus-response compatibility and the Sternberg phenomena); discrete motor skills (transcription typing); memory and learning (episodic memory and the acquisition of skill through practice); problem solving (cryptarithmetic puzzles and syllogistic reasoning); language (sentence verification and taking instructions); and development (transitions in the balance beam task). The treatments vary in depth and adequacy, but they clearly reveal a single, highly specific, operational theory that works over the entire range of human cognition, SOAR is presented as an exemplar unified theory, not as the sole candidate. Cognitive science is not ready yet for a single theory – there must be multiple attempts. But cognitive science must begin to work toward such unified theories.

Conceptualizing change in organizational cognition

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Distributed Cognition ◽  
Science Research ◽  
Research Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Organizational Cognition ◽  
Organizational Settings ◽  
Macro Domain ◽  
Task Specification ◽  
Domain Dynamics

PurposeSecchi and Cowley (2016, 2018) propose a Radical approach to Organizational Cognition (ROC) as a way of studying cognitive processes in organizations. What distinguishes ROC from the established research on Organizational Cognition is that it remains faithful to radical, anti-representationalist principles of contemporary cognitive science. However, it is imperative for proponents of ROC to legitimize their approach by considering how it differs from the established research approach of Distributed Cognition (DCog). DCog is a potential contender to ROC in that it not only counters classical approaches to cognition but also provides valuable insights into cognition in organizational settings.Design/methodology/approachThe paper adopts a conceptual/theoretical approach that expands Secchi and Cowley's introduction of ROC.FindingsThe paper shows that DCog research presupposes a task-specification requirement, which entails that cognitive tasks are well-defined. Consequently, DCog research neglects cases of organizational becoming where tasks cannot be clearly demarcated for the or are well-known to the organization. This is the case with the introduction of novel tasks or technical devices. Moreover, the paper elaborates on ROC's 3M model by linking it with insights from the literature on organizational change. Thus, it explores how organizing can be explored as an emergent phenomenon that involves micro, meso and macro domain dynamics, which are shaped by synoptic and performative changes.Originality/valueThe present paper explores new grounds for ROC by not only expanding on its core model but also showing its potential for informing organizational theory and radical cognitive science research.

scholarly journals Cognitive Factories: Modeling Situated Entropy in Physical Work Carried Out by Humans and Robots

Entropy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (9) ◽  
pp. 659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Fox ◽  
Adrian Kotelba ◽  
Ilkka Niskanen
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Distributed Cognition ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Information Gain ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Physical Work ◽  
Theoretical Frameworks ◽  
Assembly Work ◽  
Factory Production ◽  
Physical Components

Entropy in factories is situated. For example, there can be numerous different ways of picking, orientating, and placing physical components during assembly work. Physical components can be redesigned to increase the Information Gain they provide and so reduce situated entropy in assembly work. Also, situated entropy is affected by the extent of knowledge of those doing the work. For example, work can be done by knowledgeable experts or by beginners who lack knowledge about physical components, etc. The number of different ways that work can be done and the knowledge of the worker combine to affect cognitive load. Thus, situated entropy in factories relates to situated cognition within which knowledge is bound to physical contexts and knowing is inseparable from doing. In this paper, six contributions are provided for modelling situated entropy in factories. First, theoretical frameworks are brought together to provide a conceptual framework for modelling. Second, the conceptual framework is related to physical production using practical examples. Third, Information Theory mathematics is applied to the examples and a preliminary methodology in presented for modelling in practice. Fourth, physical artefacts in factory production are reframed as carriers of Information Gain and situated entropy, which may or may not combine as Net Information Gain. Fifth, situated entropy is related to different types of cognitive factories that involve different levels of uncertainty in production operations. Sixth, the need to measure Net Information Gain in the introduction of new technologies for embodied and extended cognition is discussed in relation to a taxonomy for distributed cognition situated in factory production. Overall, modelling of situated entropy is introduced as an opportunity for improving the planning and control of factories that deploy human cognition and cognitive technologies including assembly robotics.

scholarly journals Neo-mechanistic explanatory integration for cognitive science: the problem of reduction remains

Sofia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diego Azevedo Leite
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Models ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Significant Challenge ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Multi Level

One of the central aims of the neo-mechanistic framework for the neural and cognitive sciences is to construct a pluralistic integration of scientific explanations, allowing for a weak explanatory autonomy of higher-level sciences, such as cognitive science. This integration involves understanding human cognition as information processing occurring in multi-level human neuro-cognitive mechanisms, explained by multi-level neuro-cognitive models. Strong explanatory neuro-cognitive reduction, however, poses a significant challenge to this pluralist ambition and the weak autonomy of cognitive science derived therefrom. Based on research in current molecular and cellular neuroscience, the framework holds that the best strategy for integrating human neuro-cognitive theories is through direct reductive explanations based on molecular and cellular neural processes. It is my aim to investigate whether the neo-mechanistic framework can meet the challenge. I argue that leading neo-mechanists offer some significant replies; however, they are not able yet to completely remove strong explanatory reductionism from their own framework.

scholarly journals Choosing between different AI approaches? The scientific benefits of the confrontation, and the new collaborative era between humans and machines

1970 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-216
Author(s):  
Jordi Vallverdú
Keyword(s):  
Distributed Computing ◽  
In Silico ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Scientific Data ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Scientific Practices ◽  
Huge Amount ◽  
Key Points ◽  
Aim Of Science

AI is a multidisciplinary activity that involves specialists from several fields, and we can say that the aim of science, and AI science, is solving problems. AI and computer sciences are been creating a new kind of making science, that we can call in silico science. Both models top-eown and bottomup are useful for e-scientific research. There is no a real controversy between them. Besides, the extended mind model of human cognition, involves human-machine interactions. Huge amount of data requires new ways to make and organize scientific practices: supercomputers, grids, distributed computing, specific software and middleware and, basically, more efficient and visual ways to interact with information. This is one of the key points to understand contemporary relationships between humans and machines: usability of scientific data.

scholarly journals On the Subject of Objects: Four Views on Object Perception and Tool Use

1970 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 6-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tarja Susi ◽  
Tom Ziemke
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Tool Use ◽  
Theoretical Biology ◽  
Object Perception ◽  
Entry Point ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Subject And Object ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Von Uexküll ◽  
Functional Tone

This paper addresses the relation between an agent and its environment, and more specifically, how subjects perceive object/artefacts/tools and their (possible) use. Four different conceptions of the relation between subject and object are compared here: functional tone (von Uexküll), equipment (Heidegger), affordance (Gibson), and entry point (Kirsh). even as these concepts have developed within different disciplines (theoretical biology, philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science) and in very different historical contexts, they are used more or less interchangeably in much of the literature, and typically conflated under the label of ‘affordance’. However, at closer inspection, they turn out to have not only similarities, but also substantial differences, which are identified and discussed here. Given that the relation between subjects and their objects is crucial to understanding human cognition and interaction with tools and technology, as well as robots’ interaction with their environment, we argue that these differences deserve some more attention than they have received so far.

scholarly journals Distributed Cognition, Neuroprostheses and their Implications to Non-Physicalist Theories of Mind

1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-142
Author(s):  
Jean Gové
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Functioning ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Distributed Cognition ◽  
Common Assumption ◽  
Theories Of Mind ◽  
Organic Brain ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Brain

This paper investigates the notion of ‘distributed cognition’ – the idea that entities external to one’s organic brain participate in one’s overall cognitive functioning – and the challenges it poses. Related to this is also a consideration of the ever-increasing ways in which neuroprostheses replace and functionally replicate organic parts of the brain. However, the literature surrounding such issues has tended to take an almost exclusively physicalist approach. The common assumption is that, given that non- physicalist theories (dualism, hylomorphism) postulate some form of immaterial ‘soul’, then they are immune from the challenges that these advances in cognitive science pose. The first aim of this paper, therefore, is to argue that this is not the case. The second aim of this paper is to attempt to elucidate a route available for the non- physicalist that will allow them to accept the notion of distributed cognition. By appealing to an Aristotelian framework, I propose that the non-physicalist can accept the notion of distributed cognition by appeal to the notion of ‘unitary life’ which I introduce as well as Aristotle’s dichotomy between active and passive mind.

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