Enactive neuroscience, the direct perception hypothesis, and the socially extended mind

2015 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Froese

AbstractPessoa's The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (2013) is an integrative approach to neuroscience that complements other developments in cognitive science, especially enactivism. Both accept complexity as essential to mind; both tightly integrate perception, cognition, and emotion, which enactivism unifies in its foundational concept of sense-making; and both emphasize that the spatial extension of mental processes is not reducible to specific brain regions and neuroanatomical connectivity. An enactive neuroscience is emerging.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Thompson ◽  
Mog Stapleton

This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.


Author(s):  
Andrew Saxon ◽  
Shane Walker ◽  
David Prytherch

This chapter focuses on the adoption and adaptation of methodologies drawn from research in psychology for the evaluation of user response as a manifestation of the mental processes of perception, cognition and emotion. We present robust alternative conceptualizations of evaluative methodologies, which allow the surfacing of views, feelings and opinions of individual users producing a richer, more informative texture for user centered evaluation of software. This differs from more usual user questionnaire systems such as the Questionnaire of User Interface Satisfaction (QUIS). We present two different example methodologies so that the reader can firstly, review the methods as a theoretical exercise and secondly, applying similar adaptation principles, derive methods appropriate to their own research or practical context.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 471-486
Author(s):  
Romina Esposito ◽  
Marta Bortoletto ◽  
Carlo Miniussi

The human brain is a complex network in which hundreds of brain regions are interconnected via thousands of axonal pathways. The capability of such a complex system emerges from specific interactions among smaller entities, a set of events that can be described by the activation of interconnections between brain areas. Studies that focus on brain connectivity have the aim of understanding and modeling brain function, taking into account the spatiotemporal dynamics of neural communication between brain regions. Much of the current knowledge regarding brain connectivity has been obtained from stand-alone neuroimaging methods. Nevertheless, the use of a multimodal approach seems to be a powerful way to investigate effective brain connectivity, overcoming the limitations of unimodal approaches. In this review, we will present the advantages of an integrative approach in which transcranial magnetic stimulation–electroencephalography coregistration is combined with magnetic resonance imaging methods to explore effective neural interactions. Moreover, we will describe possible implementations of the integrative approach in open- and closed-loop frameworks where real-time brain activity becomes a contributor to the study of cognitive brain networks.


2020 ◽  
pp. 105971232097667
Author(s):  
Susana Ramírez-Vizcaya

Sensorimotor theory of perception has been criticized for its ambiguity about the need for internal representations and the lack of a proper account of agency and subjective experience. The book under review offers a compelling non-representational, world-involving interpretation, and operationalization of this theory, showing that alternatives to representationalism are viable. It also provides a thought-provoking theory of sensorimotor agency and the pre-reflective experience of action that builds on the enactive notions of autonomy and sense-making. The account provided in this book fits into a radically embodied, enactive, and extended cognitive science. However, the notion of the environment requires further conceptual clarification by the enactive camp.


1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Gopnik

AbstractAs adults we believe that our knowledge of our own psychological states is substantially different from our knowledge of the psychological states of others: First-person knowledge comes directly from experience, but third-person knowledge involves inference. Developmental evidence suggests otherwise. Many 3-year-old children are consistently wrong in reporting some of their own immediately past psychological states and show similar difficulties reporting the psychological states of others. At about age 4 there is an important developmental shift to a representational model of the mind. This affects children's understanding of their own minds as well as the minds of others. Our sense that our perception of our own minds is direct may be analogous to many cases where expertise provides an illusion of direct perception. These empirical findings have important implications for debates about the foundations of cognitive science.


2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-109
Author(s):  
Łukasz Afeltowicz ◽  
Witold Wachowski

Abstract The aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of distributed cognition (DCog) in the context of classic questions posed by mainstream cognitive science. We support our remarks by appealing to empirical evidence from the fields of cognitive science and ethnography. Particular attention is paid to the structure and functioning of a cognitive system, as well as its external representations. We analyze the problem of how far we can push the study of human cognition without taking into account what is underneath an individual’s skin. In light of our discussion, a distinction between DCog and the extended mind becomes important.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Afsheen Yousaf ◽  
Eftichia Duketis ◽  
Tomas Jarczok ◽  
Michael Sachse ◽  
Monica Biscaldi ◽  
...  

AbstractMotivationComplex neuropsychiatric conditions including autism spectrum disorders are among the most heritable neurodevelopmental disorders with distinct profiles of neuropsychological traits. A variety of genetic factors modulate these traits (phenotypes) underlying clinical diagnoses. To explore the associations between genetic factors and phenotypes, genome-wide association studies are broadly applied. Stringent quality checks and thorough downstream analyses for in-depth interpretation of the associations are an indispensable prerequisite. However, in the area of neuropsychology there is no framework existing, which besides performing association studies also affiliates genetic variants at the brain and gene network level within a single framework.ResultsWe present a novel bioinformatics approach in the field of neuropsychology that integrates current state-of-the-art tools, algorithms and brain transcriptome data to elaborate the association of phenotype and genotype data. The integration of transcriptome data gives an advantage over the existing pipelines by directly translating genetic associations to brain regions and developmental patterns. Based on our data integrative approach, we identify genetic variants associated with Intelligence Quotient (IQ) in an autism cohort and found their respective genes to be expressed in specific brain areas.ConclusionOur data integrative approach revealed that IQ is related to early down-regulated and late up-regulated gene modules implicated in frontal cortex and striatum, respectively. Besides identifying new gene associations with IQ we also provide a proof of concept, as several of the identified genes in our analysis are candidate genes related to intelligence in autism, intellectual disability, and Alzheimer’s disease. The framework provides a complete extensive analysis starting from a phenotypic trait data to its association at specific brain areas at vulnerable time points within a timespan of four days.Availability and ImplementationOur framework is implemented in R and Python. It is available as an in-house script, which can be provided on [email protected]


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 1619
Author(s):  
Shinya Watanuki

Brand equity is an important intangible for enterprises. As one advantage, products with brand equity can increase revenue, compared with those without such equity. However, unlike tangibles, it is difficult for enterprises to manage brand equity because it exists within consumers’ minds. Although, over the past two decades, numerous consumer neuroscience studies have revealed the brain regions related to brand equity, the identification of unique brain regions related to such equity is still controversial. Therefore, this study identifies the unique brain regions related to brand equity and assesses the mental processes derived from these regions. For this purpose, three analysis methods (i.e., the quantitative meta-analysis, chi-square tests, and machine learning) were conducted. The data were collected in accordance with the general procedures of a qualitative meta-analysis. In total, 65 studies (1412 foci) investigating branded objects with brand equity and unbranded objects without brand equity were examined, whereas the neural systems involved for these two brain regions were contrasted. According to the results, the parahippocampal gyrus and the lingual gyrus were unique brand equity-related brain regions, whereas automatic mental processes based on emotional associative memories derived from these regions were characteristic mental processes that discriminate branded from unbranded objects.


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